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ABSTRACT
Cyber-security is one of our nation’s most critical security priorities, and its importance
continues to grow with the pervasiveness of computers and Web-based applications. In particular,
cross-site scripting (XSS) is one of the most common and dangerous types of injection attacks that
exploit input validation vulnerabilities. XSS has intensified due to: 1) lack of extensive security
domain knowledge of software engineers who are involved in building and/or maintaining Webapplications; and 2) lack of proper software development processes focused on security, resulting
in fixes to security vulnerabilities late in the software development lifecycle. Indeed, the cost
benefits of removing defects, in particular security-related faults, earlier in the lifecycle is well
documented. The research goal is to reduce successful XSS attacks through a unified approach
that identifies malicious and suspicious inputs/outputs based on customized application-specific
knowledge. The Intrusion Detection Approach (IDA), which is defined in this dissertation,
captures XSS-related domain knowledge from national catalogs of attack patterns and uses it to
generate application-specific XSS patterns for monitoring IO by integrating technologies and
techniques such as ontologies, provenance, formalizations and security-related domain knowledge.
The work hosts a security knowledge base that is easily maintainable whenever new attacks or
new ways of launching attacks come into use. Updating the security knowledge base results in
monitoring, identifying, and preventing XSS attacks without any changes to the Web application.
Risk analysis combined with provenance provides a unique way of prioritizing formalized patterns
based on sensitivity level of assets and trends of threats. Using the XSSMon tool, which realizes
the IDA, the author conducted a case study on two versions of a commercial Web application to
compare the effectiveness of XSSMon. The results showed that XSSMon had higher success rates
in identifying XSS-related attacks. Specifically, the overall success rates were 4.79% and 28.01%
for the original and latest version of the Web application, respectively, and 88.36% and 100% for
the initial and latest version of XSSMon, respectively. The results of this case study can be
extended to other Web applications that accept similar equivalence classes of IO.
vi
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1

PROBLEM STATEMENT AND GOAL
Cyber-security can be defined as security measures applied to computers to provide a

desired level of protection with respect to confidentiality, integrity, and availability ( CIA)
concerns. Confidentiality refers to the property that data should only be viewable by authorized
parties; integrity to the principle that only authorized users are allowed to change data; and
availability to the principle that data and computer resources will always be available to authorized
users [1]. Cyber attacks undermine the CIA concerns or information resident on it. The importance
of cyber-security is grows as the integration of computers into more and more aspects of modern
life continues. This in turn has increased cyber-attacks and the need to mitigate them, in particular
in dynamic Web applications that accept input from the user and performs actions based on the
input. The heart of the issue is the introduction of distrusted content into a dynamic page, where
neither the Web site nor the client has enough information to detect the event and take protective
actions. Such distrusted content can be introduced through malicious code provided by one client
for another client, or through malicious code sent by a client for itself.
Distrusted content or malicious scripts result in one of the most common application-level
attacks known as Cross Site Scripting (XSS). XSS was the second most prevalent consequence of
vulnerability exploitation for the first half of 2013 at 18% [2] and was ranked third for the entire
year of 2013 [3] [4] and has consistently stayed in the top three risks for Web applications since
2002 [2-6]. With XSS, every input and output has the potential to be an attack vector, which does
not occur with other vulnerability types. In addition, XSS has numerous subtleties and variants.
The goal of the work is to reduce successful XSS attacks through a unified approach that identifies
malicious and suspicious inputs/outputs based on customized application-specific knowledge.
This dissertation introduces the Intrusion Detection Approach (IDA), which realizes the goal by using
cyber-enhanced technologies, i.e., ontologies and provenance, to manage application-specific
knowledge for anomaly detection and XSS knowledge from national vulnerability data bases for
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misuse detection. The customized and formalized knowledge can be used monitor inputs and outputs
to Web applications to determine if they are capable of launching XSS attacks.

1.2

MOTIVATION
Cyber-attacks are placed among top five risks the world is likely to face over the next

decade [7] [8]. Cyber-attacks, in particular XSS, pose a severe threat to Web-application security
due to: a) lack of extensive security domain knowledge in software engineers who are involved in
building and maintaining Web-applications; and b) lack of proper software development processes
focused on security, resulting in fixes to security vulnerabilities late in the software development
life cycle (SDLC). Many approaches have been presented for detecting and preventing security
breaches; however, the approaches are reactive. Section 2 describe the approaches to detect
security breaches.
By capturing, maintaining, and sharing XSS-related knowledge, it is posited that XSS
attacks can be prevented by supporting application-specific customization of XSS knowledge to
create an intermediate layer between Web applications and its users. Furthermore, this would
address the aforementioned challenges by providing customization of existing knowledge about
XSS attacks for a Web application leading to enhanced security. In addition, the approach will
provide the ability to restructure and customize the knowledge to address changes to the Web
application over the course of its life cycle by keeping abreast with the new and emerging
weaknesses and attack patterns.
1.3

CHALLENGES
The challenges for developing a comprehensive security solution for XSS attack are as

follows [9]:
1. System requirements needed for XSS attack
i.

Malicious hackers have developed many tools that can launch XSS attacks by
bypassing the safeguards employed by the Web applications. The entry points of

2

vulnerable XSS Web applications can be found using automated tools. PHP Charset
Encoder is an example tool to launch attacks.
ii.

The most basic data manipulations that exploit the vulnerability and launch XSS attacks
are simple to perform. No special tools are needed to launch XSS attacks. Only a Web
browser is needed.

iii.

New evasive mechanisms can easily be found on the hacker’s discussion forums, where
new hacking attempts and success stories are discussed.

2. Social factors
i.

XSS vulnerabilities arise due to coding practices. Web applications are developed by
programmers with varied experience and with little or no knowledge of security needs
of an application. Coding vulnerabilities vary from site to site, and there is no single
patch available to fix all XSS vulnerabilities.

ii.

Web applications are usually maintained by a team that is generally not the same team
that developed the application, which increases the chances of introducing new XSS
vulnerabilities with each change request.

3. Diverse business needs
i.

Businesses prioritize increasing the customer base to increase the revenue. The advent
of technologies, such as AJAX, Web Services and Web 2.0, have contributed to more
aggressive schedules and a practice of prioritizing features that are not inclusive of
security. Usually, requirements evolve and change during implementation that forces
the developers to change functionality of the application without concern for changes
to security mechanisms.

ii.

Web applications are developed to meet diverse business needs. Therefore, the security
mechanism applicable for one Web application may not be applicable for the other.

The approach aims to address the aforementioned challenges.
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1.3
DEFINITIONS, ACRONYMS, AND ABBREVIATIONS
Definitions
Definitions
Blacklist or
Block-list
Fuzz testing or
Fuzzing
Fuzzer
Pattern
Payload
Whitelist
Acronyms
Acronyms
AOP
CAPEC
CSRF
CVE
CWE
DFA
DOM
DSI
FPSIV
FSA
FSM
IDS
IPS
IRM
IVV
MBT
MDD
MFE
NFA
OWASP
OWL
PQL
QAS
RFI
SAW
SDLC
SOA
SOP
SQL

Meaning
A list of discrete entities that have been previously determined to be
associated with malicious activity
Black-box software testing technique that involves using malformed or
semi-malformed data injection in an automated fashion.
Program that injects automatically the fuzz inputs into a program.
The regular and repeated way in which something happens or is done
The malicious code that performs a destructive operation
A list of discrete entities that are known to be benign and are approved
for use

Meaning
Aspect Oriented Programming
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
Cross Site Reference Forgery
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
Common Weaknesses Enumeration
Deterministic Finite Automata
Document Object Model
Document Structure Integrity
Five Primary Security Input Validation
Finite State Automata
Finite State Machines
Intrusion Detection System
Intrusion Prevention System
Inline Reference Monitor
Input Validation Vulnerability
Model Based Testing
Model Driven Development
Malicious File Execution
Non-deterministic Finite Automata
Open Web Application Security Project
Web Ontology Language
Program Query Language
Quality Attribute Scenarios
Remote Malicious File Inclusion
Semantic Abstract Workflow
Software Development Life Cycle
Service Oriented Architecture
Same Origin Policy
Structured Query Language
4

Acronyms
SVM
UIV
WfMC
WfMS
XCS
XML
XSD
XSS
ZAP

Meaning
Support Vector Machines
User Input Validation
Workflow Management Coalition
Workflow Management Systems
Cross Channel Scripting
Extensible Markup Language
XML Schema Definition
Cross Site Scripting
Zed Attack Proxy

Abbreviations
Abbreviations
e.g.
i.e.
ID
1.4

Meaning
For example
That is
Identification

ORGANIZATION
The organization of rest of the dissertation document is as follows: Chapter 2 presents the

background information to enhance understanding of the rest of the document; it also includes a
comprehensive survey of XSS detection and prevention approaches. Chapter 3 presents the
approach; it details the steps of the approach needed to accomplish the research goal. Chapter 4
presents the design and implementation details of the XSSMon tool developed based on the
described approach. Chapter 5 presents the setup, design, and results of the case study and their
analysis that support evaluation of the XSSMon tool to evaluate tool designed based on the
approach. Chapter 6 compares the more closely aligned systems described in Chapter 2 to the IDA
approach. Chapter 7 presents the conclusion, which includes a summary, significance, limitations
of the work and future directions of the effort. Appendix A includes a detailed description of the
techniques and approaches for detecting and preventing XSS attacks surveyed. Appendix B
presents the test suite for performing unit testing of the designed tool. Appendix C presents the
CRC cards for the tool design. Appendix D presents the details for each of the methods including
pre- and post-conditions and test design strategy for unit testing.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
This section provides background information to enhance understanding of the rest of the
document. This section is organized as follows: Section 2.1 provides an overview of cyber-security
and cyber-attacks from a historical perspective, including an overview of Web application
vulnerabilities and the main categories of XSS; Section 2.2 provides an overview of techniques,
methods, and tools that are available for detecting and/or preventing XSS vulnerabilities; Section
2.3 provides an overview of cyber-enhanced techniques and technologies, including an overview
of ontologies and their current usage in capturing security related domain knowledge and an
overview of attack-trees and their usage in different phases of SDLC with respect to software
security.
2.1

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CYBER-SECURITY

AND CYBERATTACKS

Early computer systems offered high security with relatively less functionality and
availability as compared to the current software systems [1]. As software vendors increased
functionality, moved to PCs and later to distributed computing and Web services, data availability
has increased by orders of magnitude, thereby marking the increase in issues of confidentiality and
integrity. The driving principle behind software development has been functionality and not
security. The basic design of the Internet was built around shared access and trust with security
measures being an afterthought. Many protocols in wide use mostly rely on trust and offer little, if
any, security to their users. This model made sense when the Internet was first developed and
information being transferred was not critical. Today, the Internet is used to transfer information
between people, their banks, their brokers, businesses and government entities mostly using Web
applications, which makes this information susceptible to cyber-attacks, identity thefts and
phishing attacks.
The earliest Web applications used the CGI protocol to interface with external applications.
The applications shared security issues that resulted from the common text parsing approaches
used. Applications were often vulnerable to input validation weaknesses, buffer overflows, and
6

denial of service attacks. As the Web gained popularity, Web browsers and HTTP protocol
evolved. Commercial Web-server software emerged that allowed Web developers to produce
custom plugins or extensions and filters that ran within the Web server process. This allowed
developers to interact with a Web request at multiple stages in the serving process, which exposed
Web servers to potentially vulnerable code and malicious user input, increasing the risk of Web
server crashes and imported security vulnerabilities. Attacks against Web servers were generally
concentrated on the core Web-server code and supporting libraries, or manipulated URL elements
and injection of unexpected user data. The attacks usually fell into standard vulnerability
categories such as: buffer overflows, sample code, input validation attacks, format string attacks,
canonicalization attacks, encoding attacks, privilege escalation, form tampering, user created
content, XSS, SQL injection, insecure direct object reference, remote malicious file inclusion
(RFI), cross-site request forgery (CSRF), access control weaknesses, authentication and session
management failures, data confidentiality failures, and poor error handling [10].
2.1.1

Overview of Web Vulnerabilities
Buffer-overflow attacks occur when an application tries to insert data into an available

buffer without checking the size of the buffer that can result in overflow of the buffer [10].
Attackers insert their malicious code into adjacent areas of the stack or heap by inserting larger
values that overflow the buffer. These malicious scripts can subsequently be executed by an
attacker with the privileges of the Web-server user.
Attackers can launch input validation attacks when the user input is inadequately validated
and sanitized. Format string attacks can occur when application code attempts to display unfiltered
user-passed variables. Canonicalization attacks occur when equivalent forms of canonical file
names are handled differently by a Web-server with unexpected results. Sample applications or
test scripts that were often badly coded and were not intended for production use include early
Apache test-cgi scripts (CVE1999-0070).
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Encoding attacks exploit incorrect handling of various forms of character encoding by the
Web server that allows attackers to bypass regular expression filters and launch attacks. Attackers
can exploit application or operating system (OS) behavior to execute code w ith higher than
expected privileges resulting in privilege escalation attack. Form-tampering attacks can be
launched by client-side manipulation of hidden form fields or modification of browser cookies
through local application proxies that alter Web application behavior. In a user-generated content
attack, back-doors or malicious server are uploaded into vulnerable Web applications to assist in
attacks.
Attackers are sometimes able to manipulate direct references to internal application objects
such as file names and user IDs. Insecure direct object reference attacks can include changing an
account ID in a dynamically generated Web page from an application that subsequently fails to
check if the attacker’s user ID is associated with changed account ID.
RFI attacks occur when an application improperly trusts user submitted files or references
to external objects such as remote URLs and then evaluate and execute the malicious contents.
These are common in PHP applications.
CSRF occurs when an attacker is able to trick an already authenticated user into performing
malicious action, which may succeed due to design weakness in the target application and the
user’s Web browser automatically supplies cached credentials.
Access control weaknesses occur when developers fail to programmatically enforce strict
access control allowing attackers to perform unauthorized actions or view restricted material.
Authentication and session management failures result from poorly implemented systems
that allow attackers to obtain credentials or tokens to impersonate valid users. Data confidentiality
failures occur when user credentials and other confidential data are not protected by correctly
implemented proven cryptographic standards. Failure to correctly handle unexpected errors can
crash an application revealing internal configuration information or bypass security systems
leading to attacks that result from poor error handling.
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SQL injection and XSS are the most popular injection attacks. A Web application is
vulnerable to SQL injection attacks when malicious content can flow into SQL queries without
being fully sanitized allowing the attacker to trigger malicious SQL operations by injecting SQL
keywords or operators [11]. Malicious SQL statements can be introduced into a vulnerable
application using different input mechanisms including user inputs, cookies, and server variables
[12]. Second-order SQL injection attack is a special case, where the attacker stores malicious
content into the database and triggers its execution at a later time. These attacks can lead to
authentication bypass, information disclosure and other problems.
2.1.2

XSS
Dynamic Web applications accept input from users and perform actions based on the input.

Lack of proper input validation results in XSS, which was first discovered in 1990s. It is one of
the most common type of injection attacks that exploit input validation vulnerability [13], in which
malicious scripts are injected into otherwise benign and trusted Websites [14].
Initially, only two primary types of XSS attacks were identified: Stored XSS (persistent)
and Reflected XSS (non-persistent). Stored XSS, also referred to as Persistent XSS, generally
occurs when user input is stored on the target server, such as in a database, message forum, visitor
log, or comment field. Subsequently, a victim retrieves the stored data from the Web application
without that data being made safe to render in the browser. With the advent of HTML5 and other
browser technologies, the attack payload can be permanently stored in the victim’s browser, such
as an HTML5 database and never sent to the server at all [15]. Reflected XSS, also referred to as
Non-Persistent XSS, occurs when user input is immediately returned by a Web application in an
error message, search result, or any other response. The message or response may include some
or all of the input provided by the user as part of the request without that data being made safe to
render in the browser and without permanently storing the user provided data [15].
Amit Klein [16] identified and defined a third type of XSS, which is termed as Document
Object Model (DOM) Based XSS. In this type of XSS, the entire tainted data flow from source to
9

sink takes place in the browser, i.e., the source and sink of the data is in the DOM and the data
flow never leaves the browser. For instance, the source could be the URL of the page or it could
be an element of the HTML, and the sink is a sensitive method call that causes the execution of
the malicious data.
A fourth type of XSS, which was identified and defined in 2007, is known as Induced XSS
[17]. XSS of this type can be launched when the Webserver has HTTP Response splitting
vulnerability. An attacker can change the entire HTML content by manipulating the HTTP header
of the server’s response to include a request parameter that has not been validated.
The four categories of XSS attacks overlap, i.e., it is possible to have both Stored and
Reflected DOM-Based XSS, as well as Stored and Reflected Non-DOM Based XSS. Around mid2012, the OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) with involvement of the cybersecurity research community proposed two new terms to organize and classify the types of XSS
attacks that can occur: Server XSS and Client XSS [15].
Server XSS occurs when untrusted user supplied data is included in an HTML response
generated by the server. The source of this data could be from the request, or from a stored location.
This leads to two types of server XSS: Reflected Server XSS and Stored Server XSS. In this case,
the entire vulnerability is in server-side code, and the browser is simply rendering the response
and executing any valid script embedded in it [15].
Client XSS occurs when untrusted user supplied data is used to update the DOM with an
unsafe JavaScript call. A JavaScript call is considered unsafe if it can be used to introduce val id
JavaScript into the DOM. The source of this data could be from the DOM, or it could have been
sent by the server (via an AJAX call, or a page load). The ultimate source of the data could have
been from a request, or from a stored location on the client or the server that leads to two types of
client XSS: Reflected Client XSS and Stored Client XSS [15].
With these new definitions, DOM-Based XSS simply becomes a subset of Client XSS,
where the source of the data is somewhere in the DOM, rather than from the Server. The induced
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XSS would also fit into this classification proposed by OWASP [15]. It would be a subset of
Reflected Server XSS.
To launch any type of aforementioned XSS-attacks there are three generic steps that need
to occur in sequential order: locate vulnerability, inject attack script, and execute attack script [18].
With XSS, every input and output has the potential to be an attack vector, which does not occur
with other vulnerability types. In addition, XSS has numerous subtleties and variants which makes
its detection and/or prevention difficult.
2.2
TECHNIQUES
VULNERABILITIES

AND METHODS FOR

DETECTING

AND PREVENTING XSS

Fig. 2.2 presents a categorization and classification that is based on a thorough and
systematic review of literature on techniques and methods for detecting and/or preventing XSS
vulnerabilities. We classify the work into three broad categories: server-side, client-side, and
generic that addresses the work that that is geared towards detecting and/or preventing server-side,
client-side or in general XSS-attacks. The work that did not specify whether the approach was
geared towards server-side or client-side is classified under a generic category. Each of these
categories are further refined into stored, reflected and general type of XSS attacks, which are
further refined into approaches for detecting, preventing, or supplementary. Each of the approaches
are further refined into whether they are used for detecting or preventing vulnerabilities or attacks.
Further refinement is based on whether static analysis, dynamic analysis, modeling, secure
programming, or other technique is used to detecting or preventing vulnerabilities and attacks.
Static analysis involves reviewing the source code or byte code of an application to find faults.
Dynamic analysis entails examining the behavior of an application in runtime. Secure
Programming involves using libraries that take care of security attributes or following
programming guidelines or rules and practices for secure development of Web applications.
Modeling involves using different modeling notations for detection or prevention of XSS related
vulnerabilities and attacks. The approaches that did not fall into any of the above mentioned
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categories are categorized as “Others”. In Fig. 2.2, the classification is shown only for server-side
stored XSS as an example; however, a similar classification scheme can be followed for others.
The research included a survey of 131 research papers on techniques for detection and
prevention of XSS-related attacks and vulnerabilities. The results of the survey are summarized in
tables for each of the following categories: server-side, client-side, and generic XSS as identified
in Fig. 1. For a detailed description of the summarized work, please refer to Appendix A. Tables
2.2 to 2.4 provide summaries of the techniques for prevention and detection of XSS-related to
attacks and vulnerabilities on the server-side, client-side, and generic XSS, respectively. The
summary of all techniques for detection and prevention of XSS-related vulnerabilities and attacks
and supplementary work is presented in Table 2.5.
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Figure 2.2: Classification categories for approaches to detect and prevent XSS-attacks.
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Vulnerability
Removal

Others

Table 2.2: Summary of Server-Side XSS prevention and detection approaches.
General Approaches

Stored

Vulnerability Detection

Static: [19], [20], [21]
Dynamic: [22]
Dynamic: [31], [32], [33], [34]

Attack Detection

Reflected
Detection
Static: [19], [21]
Dynamic: [22]
Dynamic: [32], [33], [34]

General
Static: [23] , [24], [25], [26], [27], [28]
Dynamic: [27], [29], [30]
Dynamic: [35], [36], [37], [38], [39],
[40], [41], [42]
Modeling: [43], [44], [45], [46]
Others: [47]

Prevention
Vulnerability Prevention

Static: [48]

Attack Prevention

Dynamic: [31], [49], [50], [33], [51],
[52], [53], [54], [34]
Others: [55]

Vulnerability Removal

Static: [20]

Dynamic: [56], [49], [50], [33],
[51], [52], [53], [54], [34]
Others: [55]

Static: [48], [28], [57], [58]
Dynamic: [59], [60], [61], [39], [40],
[41], [30], [62], [42], [63], [64], [65]
Modeling: [66], [67], [68], [63], [65]
Secure Programming: [69], [70]

Supplementary
Static: [23]
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Table 2.3: Summary of Client-Side XSS prevention and detection approaches.

General Approaches

Stored

Vulnerability
Detection

Static: [21]
Dynamic: [71], [72]

Attack Detection

Dynamic: [77], [34]

Attack Prevention

Dynamic: [79], [77], [80], [81],
[52], [53]¸ [54], [34]

Reflected
Detection
Static: [21]
Dynamic: [71], [72]
Dynamic: [77], [34]
Prevention
Static: [82]
Dynamic: [82], [77], [80], [81], [52],
[53], [54], [34]

General
Static: [73]
Dynamic: [74]
Modeling: [75], [76]
Static: [78]
Static: [83]
Dynamic: [84], [85], [86], [87], [88], [89], [90],
[91], [92], [83], [74], [63], [93], [94], [65]
Modeling: [63], [65]

Table 2.4: Summary of Generic XSS prevention and detection approaches.
General Approaches

Stored

Vulnerability Detection

Static: [95], [96]
Dynamic: [97]

Attack Detection

Static: [120]
Dynamic: [120]

Reflected
Detection
Static: [98], [99]
Dynamic: [100], [97]
Modeling: [101]

Static: [120]
Dynamic: [120]

Vulnerability Detection
Indexing and
Benchmarking

General
Static: [102], [103], [104], [105], [106],
[107], [108], [109], [110], [111], [112],
[113]
Dynamic: [114], [115], [116], [110],
[111], [117], [113]
Modeling: [118], [117], [112], [119]
Static: [121], [112]
Dynamic: [122], [123]
Modeling: [123], [124], [125], [112]
Others: [126]
Others: [127], [128]

Prevention
Vulnerability Prevention

Secure Programming: [129], [130]
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General Approaches
Vulnerability Prevention
Benchmarking
Attack Prevention

Stored

Reflected

General
Others: [131]

Static: [132]
Dynamic: [133], [132]

Static: [132]
Dynamic: [133], [132]
Modeling: [134]

Attack Prevention
Auditing and
Benchmarking

Modeling: [143]

Modeling: [143]

Static: [113]
Dynamic: [135], [136], [137], [113],
[138]
Modeling: [139], [140]
Secure Programming: [141]
Others: [142]
Modeling: [144]
Others: [145], [146]

Attack Implementation

Dynamic: [97]
Modeling: [147]

Supplementary
Dynamic: [97]

Dynamic: [117]
Modeling: [117]
Modeling: [148], [149]

Vulnerability Prediction

Table 2.5: Summary of All XSS prevention and detection approaches.
Server-Side XSS

Client-Side XSS

General
Approaches

Stored

Reflected

General

Stored

Vulnerability
Detection

Static:
[19], [20],
[21]
Dynamic:
[22]

Static:
[19], [21]
Dynamic:
[22]

Static:
[23] , [24],
[25], [26],
[27], [28]
Dynamic:
[27], [29],
[30]

Static:
[21]
Dynamic:
[71], [72]

Reflected
Detection
Static: [21]
Dynamic:
[71], [72]
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Generic XSS
General

Stored

Reflected

General

Static: [73]
Dynamic:
[74]
Modeling:
[75], [76]

Static:
[95], [96]
Dynamic:
[97]

Static:
[98], [99]
Dynamic:
[100], [97]
Modeling:
[101]

Static: [102],
[103], [104],
[105], [106],
[107], [108],
[109], [110],
[111], [112],
[113]
Dynamic: [114],
[115], [116],
[110], [111],
[117], [113]

Server-Side XSS
General
Approaches

Attack
Detection

Stored

Dynamic:
[31], [32],
[33], [34]

Reflected

Dynamic:
[32], [33],
[34]

Client-Side XSS
General

Dynamic:
[35], [36],
[37], [38],
[39], [40],
[41], [42]
Modeling
: [43],
[44], [45],
[46]
Others:
[47]

Stored

Dynamic:
[77], [34]

Reflected

Dynamic:
[77], [34]

Generic XSS
General

Static: [78]

Stored

Static:
[120]
Dynamic:
[120]

Reflected

Static:
[120]
Dynamic:
[120]

Vulnerability
Detection
Indexing and
Benchmarking

General
Modeling: [118],
[117], [112],
[119]
Static: [121],
[112]
Dynamic: [122],
[123]
Modeling: [123],
[124], [125],
[112]
Others: [126]

Others: [127],
[128]
Prevention

Vulnerability
Prevention
Vulnerability
Prevention
Benchmarking
Attack
Prevention

Static:
[48]

Dynamic:
[31], [49],
[50], [33],
[51], [52],
[53], [54],
[34]
Others:
[55]

Dynamic:
[56], [49],
[50], [33],
[51], [52],
[53], [54],
[34]
Others:
[55]

Static:
[48], [28],
[57], [58]
Dynamic:
[59], [60],
[61], [39],
[40], [41],
[30], [62],
[42], [63],
[64], [65]

Secure
Programming:
[129], [130]
Others: [131]
Dynamic:
[79], [77],
[80], [81],
[52], [53]¸
[54], [34]

Static: [82]
Dynamic:
[82], [77],
[80], [81],
[52], [53],
[54], [34]
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Static: [83]
Dynamic:
[84], [85],
[86], [87],
[88], [89],
[90], [91],
[92], [83],
[74], [63],
[93], [94],
[65]

Static:
[132]
Dynamic:
[133],
[132]

Static:
[132]
Dynamic:
[133],
[132]
Modeling:
[134]

Static: [113]
Dynamic: [135],
[136], [137],
[113], [138]
Modeling: [139],
[140]
Secure
Programming:
[141]
Others: [142]

Server-Side XSS
General
Approaches

Stored

Reflected

Client-Side XSS
General

Stored

Reflected

Modeling
: [66],
[67], [68],
[63], [65]
Secure
Program
ming:
[69], [70]

Generic XSS
General

Stored

Reflected

General

Modeling:
[143]

Modeling:
[143]

Modeling: [144]
Others: [145],
[146]

Dynamic:
[97]
Modeling:
[147]

Dynamic:
[97]

Dynamic: [117]
Modeling: [117]

Modeling:
[63], [65]

Attack
Prevention
Auditing and
Benchmarking
Supplementary
Attack
Implementatio
n
Vulnerability
Removal
Vulnerability
Prediction

Static:
[20]

Static:
[23]
Modeling: [148],
[149]

18

2.3

CYBER-ENHANCED TECHNOLOGIES

2.3.1

Knowledge representation, Classifications, and Ontologies
The continual rise in cyber-attacks, which pose a threat to CIA concerns denting cyber-

security, has created the need to formally and systematically document security domain knowledge
that can be used and shared. One of the ways is to develop an ontology that captures knowledge in
related fields, provides a common understanding of domain knowledge, identifies common
recognition vocabularies, and gives a clear definition of the relationship between these
vocabularies from different levels of formal patterns [150]. This subsection describes efforts to
define ontologies that capture security domain knowledge.
Mylopoulos et al. [151] described merging knowledge base and information system
management at an early level of development using a language called Telos for representing
knowledge about systems. The knowledge base is divided into four sub-worlds namely, subject
world, usage world, system world, and development world.
Avizienis et al. [152] provide a detailed taxonomy that contains classes of faults, fault
modes, classification of fault tolerance techniques, and verification approaches. In this taxonomy,
the main threats to dependability and security are defined as failures, errors, and faults. They
classify the main means to attain security and dependability attributes into fault prevention, fault
tolerance, fault removal, and fault forecasting.
Landwehr et al. [153] provide a taxonomy that is based on three basic questions about each
observed security flaw: genesis (how did it enter the system?), time of introduction (when did it
enter the system?), and location (where in the system did it manifest?).
In [154], the authors propose a data model that characterizes the domain of computer
attacks and intrusions as an ontology and implement that data model with an ontology
representation language. At the topmost level of the ontology, they define the class Host that is
victim of Attack class. Attack class is described by the properties Directed to, Effected by, and
Resulting in that correspond to System Component, Input, and Consequence class objects
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respectively. The System Component class is comprised of the subclasses (Network, System, and
Process). The class Consequence is comprised of several subclasses which include (Denial of
Service, User Access, and Probe). Finally, the class Input is characterized by the predicates
Received from and Causing, where Causing defines the relationship between the Means of attack
and some input. Received from links Input and Location. The class Location is an instance of
System Component and is restricted to instances of the Network and Process classes. Means of
attack contains the subclasses: Input Validation Error, Logic Exploits that are further refined.
Viljanen [155] analyzed thirteen different computational trust models and derived a
common vocabulary for describing facts that are considered for trust calculation in the reviewed
trust models. The models can be classified as identity-aware, action-aware, business value aware,
capability-aware, competence-aware, confidence-aware, context-aware, history-aware and thirdparty-aware in their input factors. The trust ontology comprises many ontological structures; trust
is a relationship between two principals, the subject, trustor, and the target, trustee.
Geneiatakis and Lambrinoudakis [156] described an ontology for SIP-VoIP (Session Initial
Protocol-VoIP) based services that can be applied either to find a countermeasure against attacks
or to test the security robustness of SIP-VoIP infrastructure. SIP_attack and SIP_message are the
two main concepts of the ontology. Specifically, any SIP attack employs a SIP message that is
forwarded to a target node trying to cause a specific consequence. The SIP_attack is directed by a
target and causes a consequence. It has two subclasses: malformed and flood.
Denker et al. [157-159] developed several ontologies for security annotations of agents and
web services, using DAML (DARPA Agent Markup Language) and later OWL (Web Ontology
Language). The defined ontology is composed of two sub-ontologies: security mechanisms that
capture high-level security notations and credential that defines authentication methods. The goal
of these ontologies is to enable high-level markup of Web resources, services, and agents while
providing a layer of abstraction on top of various web service security standards. These ontologies
represent well-known security concepts and enable their users to interconnect security standards.
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The NRL Security Ontology presented in [160] is organized around seven separate
ontologies (Main Security Ontology, Credential Ontology, Security Algorithms Ontology, Security
Assurance Ontology, Service Security Ontology, Agent Security Ontology, Information Object
Ontology). Three of them are based on existing ontologies in DAML: Service security ontology,
describes security annotation of semantic web services; Agent security ontology, enables querying
of security information; and Information object ontology, describes security of input and output
parameters of web services. The four remaining ontologies: Main security ontology, describes
security protocols, mechanisms and policies; Credentials ontology, specifies authentication
credentials; Security algorithms ontology, describes various security algorithms; and Security
assurance ontology, specifies different assurance standards.
Vorobiev and Han presented a security attack ontology for Web services [161]. The
ontology brings together a set of attacks (attacks on Web services, probing attacks, CDATA Field
attacks, WS DoS attacks, WS DoS attacks, Application attacks, SOAP attacks, XML attacks,
semantic WS attacks).
Ekelhart et al. [162] described a security ontology framework based on four parts: the first
part is the security and dependability taxonomy from [152], the second part presents the underlying
risk analysis methodology, the third part describes concepts of the IT infrastructure domain, and
the fourth part provides a simulation enabling enterprises to analyze various policy scenarios. The
ontology ‘knows’ which threats endanger which assets and which countermeasures could lower
the probability of occurrence, the potential loss or the speed of propagation for cascading failures.
Assali et al. [163] presented work that develops a knowledge base containing ontologies
for the analysis of industrial risks describing concepts used for the achievement of a risk analysis.
Dobson and Sawyer [164] presented an ontology of dependability by merging two
conceptualization models (IFIP model: described by the IFIP Working Group 10.4 on Dependable
Computing and Fault Tolerance & UMD model: Unified Model of Dependability). Some of the
IFIP attributes are themselves goals of security (Availability, Integrity, Maintainability, and
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Confidentiality). The ontology covers some security aspects such as Failure, Dependability Threat
(Error, Fault), Dependability Attributes (Availability, Integrity, and Confidentiality)
Tsoumas et al. [165] define a security ontology that is constructed by using Asset,
Stakeholder, Vulnerability, Countermeasure, and Threat concepts in OWL and propose security
framework of an arbitrary information system which provides security acquisition and knowledge
management. The security ontology acts as a container for the IS security requirements.
Karyda et al. [166] use OWL to propose a security ontology for developing secure
applications. The described ontology is composed of assets (data asset, hardware data);
countermeasures (e.g., identification and authentication, network management, auditing services,
and physical protection); objectives, persons (e.g., insider, stakeholder, and attacker); and threats
(e.g., attacks and technical failures). They validate their ontology using nRQL queries to
demonstrate its use in various contexts. They apply it to e-government scenarios: e-tax and evoting.
Firesmith [167] presents a taxonomy of safety-related requirements: “Safety requirements”
are requirements obtained from threats analysis. “Safety-significant requirements” includes nonsafety requirements that can cause hazards and safety incidents. “Safety constraints” are
constraints that directly impact safety and are derived from laws, policies, standards, and industrial
practices. “Safety system requirements” specify aspects of the primary system.
Mouratidis et al. [168] introduce the concept of security constraint as a separate concept to
the existing concepts of Tropos. Existing concepts, such as goals, tasks, resources, are defined with
and without security in mind. For example, a goal should be differentiated from a secure goal, the
latter representing a goal that affects the security of the system. Widely used security-engineering
concepts such as security features, protection objectives, security mechanisms and threats are
introduced in the Tropos ontology to make the methodology applicable by software engineers, as
well as security engineers.
Massacci et al. [169] described an extended ontology for security requirements. The top of
the taxonomy is adapted from DOLCE, a foundational ontology intended to account for basic
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concepts that underlie natural language and human cognition. Some of their presented concepts
include: Objects (Proposition, Situation, Entity, Relationship) – Entities (Actor, Action, Process,
Resources, Assets) – Relationships (do-dependency, can-dependency, trust-dependency) –
Propositions (Fact, Claim, Argument, Domain-Assumption, Quality Proposition, Goal).
Herzog et al. [170] described an OWL-based ontology of information security. The
ontology is built around the following top-level concepts: assets, threats, vulnerabilities and
countermeasures. These general concepts together with their relations form the core ontology
which presents an overview of the information security domain in a context-independent and
application neutral manner. In order to be practically useful, the core ontology is populated with
domain-specific and technical vocabulary that constitute the core concepts and implement the core
relations. The ontology contains 88 threat classes, 79 asset classes, 133 countermeasure classes,
and 34 relations between these classes.
Similar to Herzog et al. work, Fenz and Ekelhart [171] presented an ontology (500
concepts) that aims to cover a broader spectrum: their ontology models a larger part of the
information security domain, including non-core concepts such as the infrastructure of
organizations. In the high level concepts of the ontology, there is a threat that can give rise to
follow-up threats, representing a potential danger to organization's assets and affects specific
security concerns (confidentiality, integrity, availability) by exploiting a vulnerability in the form
of a physical, technical, or administrative weakness causing damage to certain assets.
Laclavik et al. [172] described a semi-automatic ontology based text annotation tool –
OnTeA. It works on text, in particular domain as described by domain ontology and uses regular
expression patterns for semi-automatic semantic annotation.
Gandhi et al. [173] developed a semantic template for each conceptually distinct weakness
type of CWE to facilitate its use in organizing and integrating vulnerability information recorded
in large project repositories. Gandhi et al. [174] presented a methodology to develop precise and
accurate nature language descriptions of common software weaknesses based on CWE through
lightweight formal modeling using Alloy.
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2.3.2

Attack Trees (AT)
Attack trees provide a formal, methodical way of describing security of the system based

on varying attacks. Attack trees are represented in a tree structure with a goal at the root node and
different ways of achieving that goal as leaf nodes [175].
Attack trees have been used to model diverse security systems in different settings.
Camtepe and Yener [176] presented a formal methodology for modeling and detection of complex
attacks in three phases: a) extending AT to capture temporal dependencies between components
and expiration of an attack, b) using enhanced AT build tree automation that accepts sequence of
actions from input message streams, and c) construct enhanced parallel automation that has each
tree automation as a subroutine. Dewri et al. [177] use an attack tree model of the network to
address system administrator’s dilemma of selecting a subset of security hardening measures
ensuring cost of implementation is minimal and within budget along with minimizing cost of
residual damage. Morais et al. [178] presented a model-based attack injection approach for security
protocol testing aiming at vulnerability detection. They use attack tree models to describe known
attacks and derive injection test scenarios that are later converted into specific fault injector script
to test security properties. Ning et al. [179] built a penetration attack tree model that can describe,
organize, classify, manage and schedule attacks for attack resistance test by defining node of attack
tree model and re-describing the relation of attack tree nodes.
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CHAPTER 3: APPROACH
The goal of the work is to reduce successful XSS attacks through a unified approach that identifies
malicious and suspicious inputs/outputs based on customized application-specific knowledge.
The goal of the work aligns with the aim of software assurance, whereby the system under
development will be protected from known XSS vulnerabilities. The definition [180] of software
assurance follows: “Application of technologies and processes to achieve a required level of
confidence that software systems and services function in the intended manner, are f ree from
accidental or intentional vulnerabilities, provide security capabilities appropriate to the threat
environment, and recover from intrusions and failures.”
3.1

INTRODUCTION
The first step to prevention of an intrusion or security breach is to detect it. There are two

broad ways to detect intrusion: anomaly detection and misuse detection. The anomaly detection is
based on detecting intrusions by looking for activity that is different from a users’ or systems’
normal behavior. The misuse detection is based on detecting intrusion by looking for activity that
corresponds to known intrusion techniques (signatures) and system vulnerabilities. The described
Intrusion Detection Approach (IDA) addresses both.
The data flow diagram of the framework for intrusion prevention method is depicted in
Fig. 3.1.1. In Fig. 3.1.1, all processes and external interactors highlighted in green are dynamic
and application-specific and form the crux for anomaly detection. All processes and external
interactors highlighted in blue are not application-specific, they are information-specific and hence
mostly static, i.e., done less frequently, only when there are any new versions or updates available
in any of the data sources. These static processes form the crux for the approach and in particular
misuse detection.
The five main steps in the IDA are:
1. Identify and capture application-specific asset information.
2. Build the knowledge base (KB).
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3. Derive threat-specific blacklist patterns from knowledge.
4. Customize application-specific knowledge.
5.

Process the input/output (IO).

The data for anomaly detection is based on the validated specification of acceptable input
values (in the case of XSS). The data for misuse detection is derived from the knowledge inferred
using data acquired and integrated from disparate data sources such as Common Attack Pattern
Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC), Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), Open Web
Application Security Project (OWASP) XSS cheat-sheets, and attack payloads. All the data from
disparate sources is acquired, integrated, and formalized along with capture of associated
provenance and later inferred knowledge is maintained in a KB to support sharing and reuse. The
captured provenance provides trust, credibility, and recency about data. The KB stores the CAPEC
information as a “threat” entity, the CWE is stored as a “weakness,” and the XSS cheat-sheet
information is stored as a “blacklist character set.”
The formalized knowledge from anomaly detection model and misuse detection model is
used to scan the inputs coming from the user and outputs sent to the user. If an intrusion or security
breach is detected in an application, the structured and customized prevention for the intrusion or
security breach is performed based on the inputs from stakeholders and experts on how to handle
intrusions and violations for that particular application.
The detailed description of each of the steps that constitute the approach is provided in the
following sections of this chapter. Section 3.2 presents and describes the structure for storing the
data, its associated provenance and the application-specific information required for preventing
XSS-related intrusions and it is the crux for all the steps of the described approach and supports
sharing and reuse. Sections 3.3 to 3.7 present and describe each step of the described approach.
3.2

STRUCTURE FOR REPRESENTING KNOWLEDGE
To manage a complex domain such as cyber-security for Web applications, a non-trivial

amount of information is captured from various sources. Knowledge is then derived from this
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captured information. To facilitate collection, sharing, and reuse, it should be acquired using
appropriate techniques and tools, such as ontologies and provenance and expressed using standard
formats.
As described in Chapter 2, an ontology provides a formal description of concepts and
entities along with the relations between them. It is founded on Description Logics (DL) and
expressed using languages defined by the Web Ontology Language (OWL). The current standard
is OWL 2. OWL is intended to be used when the information contained in the documents needs to
be processed by applications as opposed to situations where the content only needs to be presented
to humans.
Provenance plays an integral role in enhancing trust and credibility of information and data
especially, when information and data retrieved from various sources undergoes processing and
changes by different security experts using the described method. Provenance refers to the sources
of information such as entities and processes involved in producing or delivering an artifact.
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Figure 3.1.1: Dataflow Diagram for the Intrusion Detection Approach.
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Prov-O [181]defines the OWL 2 Web Ontology Language encoding of the Prov Data
Model. It is a lightweight ontology that can be adopted in a wide range of applications. Prov-O is
used for representing the information that is captured and retrieved from various sources. Fig.
3.2.1 depicts the structure of the security ontology that is built on the Prov-O. The Entity, Agent,
and Activity classes and their relations model the provenance that needs to be captured for
credibility, trust, and decision-making purposes. All the classes capturing information about XSS
are all designed as sub-classes of the Entity class in the Prov-O model. Person, Organization, and
Software Agent are three sub-classes of the Agent class, and appropriate sub-classes are used to
capture information about the agent influencing an Entity. Three sub-classes are added to the
Activity class to capture specific information about an activity. The Creation, Modification, and
Retrieval sub-classes of the Activity class capture information about creation, updates, and retrieval
of Entity. Provenance can be captured at different levels of granularity; the decision about the level
of granularity of information that needs to be captured for IDA is based on the provenance
information that is captured in sources such as CAPEC and CWE.
The source information and version numbers of the data sources (CAPEC, CWE, OWASP
cheat-sheets, etc.) provide information about the recency of data and supports decision-making
about credibility and trustworthiness of data. The IDA ontology is used for knowledge
management of the information retrieved and captured from various sources. Specifically, the
ontology stores generic knowledge about XSS and application-specific knowledge. The generic
knowledge includes information from sources such as, CAPEC, CWE, online payload resources,
OWASP cheat-sheets, and security experts. The application-specific knowledge source includes
experts and stakeholders. The benefits of the IDA ontology are that it supports reuse and,
whenever new attacks or new ways of launching attacks come into use, updating the security
knowledge base can be done easily without changes to the monitored application.
There are several security ontologies described in the literature, the details can be found in
Section 2.3.1. Some of the key differences between the ontologies presented in literature and the
ontology designed include: a) structure to support capture and use of provenance of the data and
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information stored in the ontology, b) use of the Characters entity to specify allowed characters
for each asset of the application to support customization of generic security knowledge to detect
input validation vulnerabilities, and c) capture and use of severity and likelihood information of
Threats, Weaknesses, and Effect (of the threat) to customize and prioritize based on user needs.
The designed ontology can be found at the link: tps://github.com/bgurijala/SecurityOntology and
is published through http://ontology.cybershare.utep.edu/security/ida-o. The main entities of the
diagram include the following:
1. Asset: This is subclass of Entity as described in Prov-O. Asset can be categorized as a
tangible or intangible asset. Tangible assets are physical objects that are not applicable
here. In this case, the focus is on intangible assets that include Web forms, database, and
software that are used to access the Web application. Software includes virtual el ements
that possess processing characteristics such as browser, text editor, or operating system.
Asset belongs to an Organization (subclass of Agent entity that comes from Prov-O) which
in this case is Web application. Vulnerable Assets entity “is a” Asset that is vulnerable to a
XSS-attack. The assets can be ranked based on sensitivity and risk analysis, which will be
useful for prioritization and test case generation. Each asset has its associated provenance
captured.
2. Asset Range: This is a subclass of Entity as described in Prov-O. The range information for
each of the assets of the application is captured using this entity.
3. Asset Format: This is a subclass of Entity as described in Prov-O. The format information
for each of the assets of the application is captured using this entity.
4. Server Locations: This is a subclass of Entity as described in Prov-O. This entity captures
all trusted and allowed server locations information for each of the assets of the application.
5. IO Locations: This is a subclass of Entity as described in Prov-O. This entity captures all
allowed IO locations information for each of the assets of the application.
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6. Characters: This is a subclass of Entity as described in Prov-O. This entity captures all
allowed characters’ information for each of the assets of the application, including the
representation of the character and its malicious representations.
7. CharacterSet: This is a subclass of Entity as described in Prov-O. This entity captures the
set of characters formed by incrementally combining Characters and their possible
malicious representations.
8. Weakness: This is a subclass of Entity as described in Prov-O. Weakness is associated with
an asset. Each weakness can be mitigated in various ways, which is captured by Control
Measures. The weakness information is captured along with its provenance. The “is
derived from” relation captures the weaknesses from which a particular weakness is
derived, which will help in multiple levels of checking for possible and applicable
weaknesses that may not be readily visible. This provides a relatively comprehensive way
of checking for known possible weaknesses.
9. Threat: This is a subclass of Entity as described in Prov-O. The weaknesses of the assets
are exploited by threats. In this case, threats are mostly in the form of malicious scripts.
The threat related information is captured along with their provenance. The “is derived
from” relation of the threats captures the threats from which a particular threat is derived,
which will help in multiple levels of checking for possible exploits that may not be readily
visible. This provides a relatively comprehensive way of checking for known possible
exploits.
10. Control Measures: This is a subclass of Entity as described in Prov-O. The weaknesses of
the assets can be mitigated by implementing control measures on vulnerable assets to
protect them against possible threats.
11. Effect: This is a subclass of Entity as described in Prov-O. This entity captures the effect
related information of a Threat. The effect of a security threat can be broadly categorized
into its effect on confidentiality, integrity, or availability.
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12. Effect Severity: This is a subclass of Entity as described in Prov-O. This entity captures the
severity of the Effect entity. This information can be used for filtering and/or prioritizing.
13. Pattern: This is a subclass of Entity as described in Prov-O. Each threat can be formalized
as patterns, which is captured by the Pattern class. These formalized patterns of threats
will guide the process of looking for possible malicious representations of a particular
threat under consideration.
14. Severity: This is a subclass of Entity as described in Prov-O. This entity captures the
severity information of the Threat and Weakness entities. This information can be used for
filtering and/or prioritizing.
15. Likelihood: This is a subclass of Entity as described in Prov-O. This entity captures the
likelihood information of the Threat and Weakness entities. This information can be used
for filtering and/or prioritizing.
16. Creation: This is a subclass of the Activity entity as described in Prov-O. This entity
captures the information associated with the creation of an Entity.
17. Modification: This is a subclass of the Activity entity as described in Prov-O. This entity
captures the information associated with the modification of an Entity.
18. Retrieval: This is a subclass of the Activity entity as described in Prov-O. This entity
captures the information associated with the retrieval of an Entity.
The other entities shown in Fig. 3.2.1 are those entities that are described in Prov-O [181].
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Figure 3.2.1: The IDA ontology for documenting XSS-attacks knowledge.
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3.3

STEP 1: IDENTIFY AND CAPTURE APPLICATION-SPECIFIC ASSET INFORMATION
The attributes of each of the related real-world objects are considered as assets. For each

attributes of the related real-world objects, the approach documents information that include the
Five Primary Security Input Validation (FPSIV) attributes (i.e., type, length, character-set, format,
and range) [182]. The FPSIV information can be gleaned from the Software Requirements
Specification (SRS) or from the stakeholders’ inputs. The FPSIV captured for each of the assets
of an application form the integral part of the anomaly detection model. The Asset Character-Set
is used as input for attaching and customizing blacklist patterns for misuse detection. All the assetspecific information captured is stored in the KB. Other information captured about the assets such
as sensitivity level, what kind of scripts can be accepted (inline or called), trusted server names
and IO locations, and script names guide the anomaly detection model. The trusted server and IO
locations information captured help remediate introduction of untrusted or malicious scripts from
third party Web sites or locations. The format information of an asset depicts the allowable patterns
of IO, which we reference as whitelist patterns. This application-specific information is stored in
the KB, which is later used to customize knowledge for monitoring. A sample template capturing
all the necessary asset-specific information described above for one of the related real-world
objects for an open-source project management (OPM) Web applilcation, is presented in Table
3.3.1. Provenance of the creator or modifier or retriever is captured accordingly, which will be
used for credibility, trust, and decision-making purposes.
3.4

STEP 2: BUILD THE KNOWLEDGE BASE
This step involves retrieving XSS-related information such as CAPEC, CWE, OWASP

XSS cheat-sheets, and attack payloads from various online sources and populating the KB. This
step is done once at the start and is updated only when new versions or updates are available in the
sources.
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3.4.1

Populate Attack (Threat) Information into KB
Automated process retrieves the user-specified version of attack patterns’ xml and xsd files

maintained

by

MITRE

Corporation

from

their

Website

(http://capec.mitre.org/data/

index.html#downloads). The xml file is parsed to retrieve attack-related useful information along
with its associated provenance to populate the KB. The implementation automated the xml file
loading, parsing and populating the KB with attack information along with provenance. When
threat-related information is retrieved from the xml file, the Retrieval sub-class of Activity
captures the provenance about the retriever along with the provenance retrieved from the xml file.
The threat-related information that is retrieved from CAPEC xml file includes: ID, name,
summary, severity, likelihood, related weaknesses, related attack patterns, CIA impact, technical
context, and content history.
Content history provides useful provenance about the creation/modification of the attack
pattern. Architectural paradigm, framework, platforms, and languages information part of the
technical context is retrieved to determine the applicability of the threat depending of the technical
context of the application under consideration. The CIA impact captures the effect a particular
threat has on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the assets and/or the application. This
helps prioritize threats in order of what the stakeholders consider most important attribute for the
application under consideration. Related attack patterns provide information about the threats that
derive the threat under consideration and the threats that can be derived from threat under
consideration. These drive the testing for threats that are related to the threat under consideration.
Related weaknesses captures all weaknesses that the threat under consideration is known to
exploit. The Severity and Likelihood of a threat captured guides the prioritization process. The
summary information is one of the information that is used for construction of threat patterns,
which means they help in formalizing threats as patterns that guide the detection of similar attacks
that can be launched.
All the information retrieved from CAPEC xml file is stored in the security ontology (KB)
as data properties or object properties of threat entity. Severity, Likelihood, related attack patterns,
35

related weaknesses, technical context, and content history are stored as object properties of Threat.
Other retrieved information such as ID, name, and summary are stored as data properties of the
Threat Entity.
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Table 3.3.1: Information gathered from related real-world objects associated with the OPM.
Related
RealWorld
Object

Projekte

Fields

Type

Length

Characterset

Format

Range

Sensit
ivity
Level

Script

Called/
Inline

Server

Script
Name

IO
Locs

ID

Int*

10

Numeric

[0-9]{1,10}

0 to
4,294,96
7,295

2

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Name

Varchar

25

[a-zA-Z ]{1,25}[‘.][a-zA-Z ]{1,25}

4

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Desc

Text

4

Yes

Both

X, Y, Z

convImg

A, B,
C

Start

Varchar

10

4

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

End

Varchar

10

Alphanumer
ic,
Apostrophe,
period,
hyphen
Alphanumer
ic, all
special
characters,
images,
links
Numeric, /,
., and Numeric, /,
., and -

4

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Status
Budget

Tinyint
Float

1
12

2
8

No
No

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

Numeric,
period,
comma

0 to
+3.4E+3
8
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3.4.2

Populate Weakness Information into KB
Automated process retrieves the user-specified version of weakness enumerations’ xml

and

xsd

files

maintained

by

MITRE

Corporation

from

their

Website

(https://cwe.mitre.org/data/index.html#downloads). The xml file is parsed to retrieve weaknessrelated information along with its provenance to populate the KB. The current implementation
automates the xml file loading, parsing, and populating the KB with weakness information along
with provenance. When weakness-related information is retrieved from the xml file, the Retrieval
sub-class of Activity captures the provenance about the retriever along with the provenance
retrieved from the xml file. The weakness-related information that is retrieved from CWE xml file
includes: ID, name, description summary, applicable platforms, likelihood, relationships, related
attack patterns, and content history.
The content history provides useful provenance about the creation/modification of the
weakness. Applicable platforms contain languages, operating systems, hardware architectures,
architectural paradigms, environment, technology or common platforms on which the weakness
may exist. Related attack patterns contain all threats that can exploit the weakness under
consideration. This information drives the testing for threats that are related to the weakness under
consideration. Relationships captures all weaknesses that derive the weakness under consideration
and all weaknesses that can be derived from weakness under consideration. The likelihood of a
weakness captured guides the prioritization process.
All the information retrieved from CWE xml file is stored in the security ontology (KB) as
data properties or object properties of Weakness entity. Likelihood, related attack patterns,
applicable platforms, relationships, content history are stored as object properties of Weakness.
Other retrieved information such as ID, name, and description summary are stored as data
properties of the Weakness entity.
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3.4.3

Populate XSS-related Cheat-Sheets Information into KB
The latest version of XSS-related cheat-sheets is retrieved from OWASP Website. XSS

filter evasion cheat-sheet includes various representations that can be used to bypass trivial checks
for malicious strings. This information is categorized based on the character-set. Each of the
possible malicious representations of a particular character using a character-set is captured in the
KB and organized based on categories of the character-set. The possible malicious representations
are added as data properties to the KB. The character-sets are categorized based on the minimal
set of characters needed to construct a malicious string. Characters are incrementally added to the
set, yielding a hierarchy of character-sets. Provenance of the retrieval is captured and added to aid
in enhancing credibility, trust, and decision-making process.
3.4.4

Categorize and Populate Identified XSS Attack Payloads Information into KB
The XSS attack payloads retrieved from online sources are identified and categorized based

on the character-set that is used in them. Each of the identified attack payload categories are
associated/attached to their respective character-set categories created in Step 3.3 based on the
characters used in the payload. The pairs of character-set categories and associated attack payloads,
referred to as CSAP, are stored in the KB. The categorized attack payloads are added as object
properties to the Characters entity. The attack payloads (specific examples/instances of attack
strings used to launch XSS-attacks) are primarily obtained from online sources. Other sources of
attack payloads include the output from fuzzers used in tools like Burp or Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP).
Fuzz testing or fuzzing is a black-box software testing technique that involves using malformed or
semi-malformed data injection in an automated fashion to find implementation bugs. A fuzzer is a
program that injects automatically the fuzz inputs into a program to detect bugs. In case of security
testing, the attack payloads are used to generate fuzz inputs. Provenance of the retrieval is captured
and added to provide the capability to make decisions based on credibility and trust. Table 3.4.4
presents example categories and associated attack payloads.
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Table 3.4.4: Character-Set and Associated Attack Payloads
Category
Name
C1
C2

CharacterSet Category
Alphanumeric
U {&, ;, =, /,
#, \, “, `}
Alphanumeric
U {&, ;, =, /,
#, \, “, ‘}

X1

Alphanumeric
U {&, ;, =, /,
#, \, “}

X2

Alphanumeric
U {&, ;, =, /,
#}

Attack-Payload Set (APS)

CSAP

{ P1}, where P1 =
&lt;SCRIPT a=`&gt;`
SRC=\"http&#58;//ha&#46;ckers&#46;org/xss&#46;js\"&gt;&lt;/SCRIPT&gt;
{Q1, Q2, Q3}, where Q1= &lt;SCRIPT a=\"&gt;\" ''
SRC=\"http&#58;//ha&#46;ckers&#46;org/xss&#46;js\"&gt;&lt;/SCRIPT&gt;
Q2 = &lt;SCRIPT \"a='&gt;'\"
SRC=\"http&#58;//ha&#46;ckers&#46;org/xss&#46;js\"&gt;&lt;/SCRIPT&gt;
Q3 = &lt;SCRIPT a=\"&gt;'&gt;\"
SRC=\"http&#58;//ha&#46;ckers&#46;org/xss&#46;js\"&gt;&lt;/SCRIPT&gt;
{R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6}, where R1 =
&lt;SCRIPT/SRC=\"http&#58;//ha&#46;ckers&#46;org/xss&#46;js\"&gt;&lt;/SCRIP
T&gt;
R2 = &lt;SCRIPT
SRC=\"http&#58;//ha&#46;ckers&#46;org/xss&#46;jpg\"&gt;&lt;/SCRIPT&gt;
R3 = &lt;SCRIPT a=\"&gt;\"
SRC=\"http&#58;//ha&#46;ckers&#46;org/xss&#46;js\"&gt;&lt;/SCRIPT&gt;
R4 = &lt;SCRIPT =\"&gt;\"
SRC=\"http&#58;//ha&#46;ckers&#46;org/xss&#46;js\"&gt;&lt;/SCRIPT&gt;
R5 = &lt;SCRIPT/XSS
SRC=\"http&#58;//ha&#46;ckers&#46;org/xss&#46;js\"&gt;&lt;/SCRIPT&gt;
R6 = &lt;SCRIPT&gt;document&#46;write(\"&lt;SCRI\");&lt;/SCRIPT&gt;PT
SRC=\"http&#58;//ha&#46;ckers&#46;org/xss&#46;js\"&gt;&lt;/SCRIPT&gt;
{S1, S2}, where S1 = &lt;SCRIPT SRC=//ha&#46;ckers&#46;org/&#46;js&gt;
S2 = &lt;SCRIPT
SRC=http&#58;//ha&#46;ckers&#46;org/xss&#46;js&gt;&lt;/SCRIPT&gt;

(C1,APSC1)
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(C2, APSC2)

(X1, APSX1)

(X2, APSX2)

3.5

STEP 3: DERIVE THREAT-SPECIFIC BLACKLIST PATTERNS FROM KNOWLEDGE
Attack payloads are often directly used in penetration testing; however, using attack

payloads directly in an intrusion-detection system is not practical or scalable because of the
variations that can occur. Defining a pattern addresses this issue by generalizing similar attackpayloads aiding in detection of similar intrusions/attacks.
The blacklist patterns are derived for each of the threats using threat-related knowledge
from CAPEC, CWE knowledge attached to threats, and populated knowledge from OWASP cheatsheets stored in the KB. The generic blacklist patterns derived for each of the threats are
represented as regular expressions. Currently, the derivation of blacklist patterns for each of the
threats is performed manually using the example attack strings, summary, and known
vulnerabilities of the threat. The derived patterns are checked/verified for accuracy using the CSAP
knowledge to ensure patterns’ coverage and feedback is provided to make the blacklist patterns
precise. The verified/checked blacklist patterns representing formalized attack payloads are stored
in the KB to facilitate detection of intrusions through pattern matching.
A threat can be formalized as multiple blacklist patterns using the knowledge base, e.g.,
attack pattern CAPEC 199, which documents that XSS exploits case insensitivity. If filters look
for the word “script,’ then using “Script” or “ScRiPT” could bypass the filter. Similarly, having
<scriscriptpt> can also bypass and turn out to be potentially malicious if filter replaces script by
empty string. An example of one such threat-specific pattern derived for CAPEC 199 is shown in
Fig. 3.5.1:
(leftAngularParenthesis{1,2})(?i)s((?i)(script)*)(?i)c((?i)(script)*)(?i)r((?i)(script)*)(?i)i((?i)(scri
pt)*)(?i)p((?i)(script)*)(?i)t((?i)(script)*)(rightAngularParenthesis{1,2})
Figure 3.5.1 Blacklist pattern sample
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3.6

STEP 4: APPLICATION-SPECIFIC CUSTOMIZATION

3.6.1

Infer Knowledge

OF KNOWLEDGE

Once all the information is retrieved from data sources and application-specific information
is captured from stakeholders and experts, we infer knowledge from the ontology. Pellet reasoner
(Version 2.4.0) is used to infer knowledge from the ontology. The inferences are performed and
axioms are generated for subclasses, property assertions, class assertions, data property and object
property characteristic, equivalence class, and inverse object properties. All the generated
inferences in the form of axioms are added to the existing knowledge in the ontology. The
inferences are saved and used in all the subsequent steps of the process. For instance, if there is an
object property “isExploitedBy” between the Weakness and Threat entities, then inverse object
property axiom adds an object property “exploits” between the Threat and Weakness entities.
3.6.2

Retrieving Possible Malicious String Representations Based On Character-Set
Based on the character-set allowed by an asset (for instance, consider the allowed

character-set to be: alphanumeric and &, ;, =, /, #, \, “, `) and acceptable provenance (e.g., date, or
creator), possible ways of representing <script> tag and/or JavaScript element is retrieved from
the KB. The results of the retrieval also include possible malicious representations of all characters
that are proper subset of the allowed character-set. As an example, consider the different ways of
expressing < and > based on the allowed character-set as shown in Table 3.6.2.
Table 3.6.2 Possible representations of <and > based on the allowed character-set
Possible Representations of <
&lt
&LT
&lt;
&LT;
&#60
&#060
&#0000060
&#x3c
&#x03c
&#x000003c &#X3c
&#X03c
&#X000003c &#x3C
&#x03C
&#x003C
&#X3C
&#X03C
\x3c
\x3C
\u003c
\u003C
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Possible Representations of >
&gt
&GT
&gt;
&GT;
&#62
&#062
&#0000062
&#x3e
&#x03e
&#x000003e &#X3e
&#X03e
&#X000003e &#x3E
&#x03E
&#x003E
&#X3E
&#X03E
\x3e
\x3E
\u003e
\u003E

3.6.3

Construct Character-Set Specific Blacklist Patterns Using Threat-Specific Blacklist
Patterns
The possible malicious string representations retrieved based on the allowed character -set

in Step 3.5.2 is used to construct character-set-specific blacklist patterns (represented as regular
expressions) using each of the derived threat-specific blacklist patterns from Step 3.4. The
character-set-specific blacklist pattern is constructed for all XSS threats. For simplicity, using the
same example attack pattern CAPEC 199 from Step 3.4, which exploits case insensitivity, we
customize the threat-specific pattern using the knowledge retrieved for leftAngularParenthesis and
rightAngularParenthesis in Step 3.5.3 to build a customized pattern as shown in Fig. 3.6.3. The
regular expressions are used to perform pattern matching after transforming them into
deterministic finite automata (DFA).
3.6.4

Formalize Character-Set Specific Blacklist Patterns for Pattern Matching
The customized character-set-specific blacklist patterns described in Section 3.5.3 are

automatically converted into NFA (non-deterministic finite automata) and then to DFA
(deterministic finite automata). The corresponding payloads (from CSAP) are then matched
against the generated DFAs to check the accuracy of generated patterns in identifying malicious
inputs and document the feedback i.e., the number of payloads, if any that were undetected by the
pattern. The feedback is stored as log file for experts to review the accuracy of generated patterns
and fine-tune it, if needed. The generated and verified DFAs for each of the blacklist patterns are
stored in the KB for future use in monitoring in the IDA. The DFAs are used to perform pattern
matching on the IO and flag them as described in Section 3.7.
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leftAngularParenthesis = ((&lt | &LT | &lt; | &LT; | &#60 | &#060 | &#0060 | &#00060 | &#000060
| &#0000060 | &#60; | &#060; | &#0060; | &#00060; | &#000060; | &#0000060; | &#x3c | &#x03c
| &#x003c | &#x0003c | &#x00003c | &#x000003c | &#x3c; | &#x03c; | &#x003c; | &#x0003c; |
&#x00003c; | &#x000003c; | &#X3c | &#X03c | &#X003c | &#X0003c | &#X00003c |
&#X000003c | &#X3c; | &#X03c; | &#X003c; | &#X0003c; | &#X00003c; | &#X000003c; |
&#x3C | &#x03C | &#x003C | &#x0003C | &#x00003C | &#x000003C | &#x3C; | &#x03C; |
&#x003C; | &#x0003C; | &#x00003C; | &#x000003C; | &#X3C | &#X03C | &#X003C |
&#X0003C | &#X00003C | &#X000003C | &#X3C; | &#X03C; | &#X003C; | &#X0003C; |
&#X00003C; | &#X000003C; | \x3c | \x3C | \u003c | \u003C))

rightAngularParenthesis = ((&gt | &GT | &gt; | &GT; | &#62 | &#062 | &#0062 | &#00062 |
&#000062 | &#0000062 | &#62; | &#062; | &#0062; | &#00062; | &#000062; | &#0000062; |
&#x3e | &#x03e | &#x003e | &#x0003e | &#x00003e | &#x000003e | &#x3e; | &#x03e; | &#x003e;
| &#x0003e; | &#x00003e; | &#x000003e; | &#X3e | &#X03e | &#X003e | &#X0003e |
&#X00003e | &#X000003e | &#X3e; | &#X03e; | &#X003e; | &#X0003e; | &#X00003e; |
&#X000003e; | &#x3E | &#x03E | &#x003E | &#x0003E | &#x00003E | &#x000003E | &#x3E; |
&#x03E; | &#x003E; | &#x0003E; | &#x00003E; | &#x000003E; | &#X3E | &#X03E | &#X003E
| &#X0003E | &#X00003E | &#X000003E | &#X3E; | &#X03E; | &#X003E; | &#X0003E; |
&#X00003E; | &#X000003E; | \x3e | \x3E | \u003e | \u003E))
(leftAngularParenthesis{1,2})(?i)s((?i)(script)*)(?i)c((?i)(script)*)(?i)r((?i)(script)*)(?i)i((?i)(scri
pt)*)(?i)p((?i)(script)*)(?i)t((?i)(script)*)(rightAngularParenthesis{1,2})
Figure 3.6.3 Customized blacklist pattern sample
3.6.5

Store Formalized Character-Set Specific Blacklist Patterns for Monitoring
Character-set-specific blacklist patterns formalized in Step 3.6.4 are stored in the KB for

their use in monitoring IO. The formalized patterns are stored for reuse in monitoring IO of the
Web application. Formalizations are performed again only if there is a change to the KB or
customization requirements. This storage and reuse enhances the performance.
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3.6.6

Attach Applicable Blacklist Patterns to Assets
All applicable blacklist patterns are retrieved from the KB and customized based on the

allowed asset character-set for a given application. The whitelist pattern associated with an asset
is also retrieved for monitoring. For each of the assets in an application, the combination of
whitelist and blacklist patterns of assets involved in those use-cases are used for monitoring IO.
3.7

STEP 5: PROCESS IO
The processing of IO is performed in two sub-steps. The first step involves processing the

IO and flagging those that need further processing. The second step involves processing the
flagged IO.
The processing of IO involves the use of both the anomaly detection model and misuse
detection model. The anomaly detection model encompasses the whitelist (derived from input
constraints specified including FPSIV attributes and other information captured for assets)
matching, length check, range check, and comparing with allowed locations, if applicable. The
misuse detection model encompasses the customized blacklist (derived from CAPEC, CWE, and
other XSS-related information) matching. The inputs and outputs of an application are compared
with formalized whitelists and blacklists using pattern matching. The pattern matching is
performed using DFAs representing whitelists and customized blacklists. Based on the result of
pattern matching, IO is flagged. Each flagged IO is then processed using the inputs of
experts/stakeholders regarding how to proceed. The details of the steps are outlined in Steps 3.6.1
and 3.6.2.
3.7.1

Flag IO
The IO is compared with the formalized whitelist and blacklist DFAs using pattern

matching. This pattern matching identifies compliant, potentially malicious, malicious, and
suspicious IO and flags them appropriately. The flag value for all IO is by default “Unmarked”.
Identifying and flagging is performed as follows:
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1. All applicable patterns' potential sub-string (that can lead to attack) will be searched for in
the IO of the field. If a sub-string match is found, then the input string will be marked as
"Malicious."
2. If the input string matches the described format and range for the field and, if it is not
already marked as “Malicious”, then it is marked as “Compliant”.
3. If the IO matches the described format of the field and is already marked as “Malicious,”
then the flag value is changed to “Potentially Malicious.”
4. If the input string neither matches sub-string of blacklist pattern nor allowable format, then
it will be marked as "Suspicious."
3.7.2

Process Flagged IO
Inputs on how to process the IO for each of the flag values is captured from the

stakeholders/experts. While monitoring IO and after the flagging step, the IO is processed based
on the flag value. If the flag value is “Compliant,” then the normal processing of the application
occurs. If the flag values are “malicious”, “potentially malicious”, or “suspicious” then the IO is
processed according to the inputs captured on how to process in such cases.
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CHAPTER 4: IMPLEMENTATION
This chapter presents the design, implementation, and verification of the implementation
of a tool, XSSMon, that is designed to monitor the IO traffic of the Web application using the
approach described in Chapter 3. Section 4.1 presents the design; Section 4.2 presents the detailed
design and test strategy.
4.1

DESIGN
The design of XSSMon is performed in such a way that there is high cohesion and low

coupling. High-level collaboration diagram of the implementation is as depicted in Fig. 4.1.1. The
design of the tool can be broadly categorized into the following packages and classes:
1. UserInput class is responsible for accepting and storing user inputs for futher processing.
2. MonitorIO class is responsible for accepting, processing, and flagging IO.
3. reToDFA: This package contains class(es) essential for defining/creating regular
expressions, transforming regular expressions to non-deterministic finite automata (NFA),
and then to deterministic finite automata (DFA). It is also responsible for building the
customized application-specific regular expressions and transforming them to DFAs using
knowledge from ontology.
4. secKMgmt: This package contains class(es) essential for reading data from various data
sources, parsing the data retrieved from all data sources, and managing (loading, updating,
inferring, and querying) the ontology.
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UserInput
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Figure 4.1.1: Collaboration diagram.
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OM3

The Class-Responsibility-Collaboration (CRC) cards for the classes of XSSMon as
depicted in Fig. 4.1.1 can be found in Appendix C. Summary of the contracts provided by each of
the classes is presented below:
1. UserInput class provides four contracts. A brief description of each of the contracts is
as follows:
a. Knows Data Source Locations (UI1): The user-input URL locations for loading
source (CAPEC and CWE) xml and xsd files.
b. Knows Source Files Saved Location (UI2): The user-input locations for saving
the loaded source (CAPEC and CWE) xml and xsd files.
c. Knows Ontology Location (UI3): The user-input location for loading the
security ontology and saving the updated and inferred ontology.
d. Knows DFA Saved Location (UI4): The user-input location for saving the
formalized patterns (customized DFAs) for reuse.
2. DataReader class provides two contracts. A brief description of each of the contracts is
as follows:
a. Load attack pattern files Contract (xml and xsd files) (DR1): The CAPEC xml
and xsd files are read from the user-specified URL locations and saved into
user-specified locations.
b. Load weakness files (xml and xsd files) (DR2): The CWE xml and xsd files are
read from the user-specified URL locations and saved into user-specified
locations.
3. DataParser class provides two contracts. A brief description of each of the contracts is
as follows:
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a. Parse attack pattern file (xml) Contract (DP1): The saved CAPEC xml file is
parsed and relevant information is retrieved for each of the attack patterns.
b. Parse weakness file (xml) Contract (DP2): The saved CWE xml file is parsed
and relevant information is retrieved for each of the weaknesses.
4. OntologyManager class provides three contracts. A brief description of each of the
contracts is as follows:
a. Initialize Contract (OM1): The ontology is loaded from the user-specified
location to update with the retrieved attack pattern and weakness information.
The ontology is inferred and the inferred ontology is saved in user-specified
location.
b. Retrieve applicable malicious representations Contract (OM2): The assetspecific and applicable malicious representations are retrieved from the inferred
ontology.
c. Retrieve applicable attack patterns Contract (OM3): The applicable attack
patterns are retrieved.
5. Dfa class provides two contracts. A brief description of each of the contracts is as
follows:
a. Save DFA Contract (D1): The customized blacklist and whitelist DFAs
generated are saved in the user-specified location for reuse.
b. Match Patterns Contract (D2): The formalized whitelist and blacklist patterns
are matched against IO.
6. Nfa class provides two contracts. A brief description of each of the contracts is as
follows:
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a. Convert NFA to DFA Contract (N1): The NFA constructed from regular
expression is converted to DFA.
b. Knows NFA Contract (start state, accept states, and transitions) (N2): The start,
accept, and transitions of NFA for processing.
7. The Regex class provides two contracts. A brief description of each of the contracts is
as follows:
a. Make NFA Contract (R1): NFA is constructed for the regular expression.
b. Set regular expressions (R2): The regular expressions are set to be used in
construction of NFA.
8. The RegexGenerator class provides one contracts. A brief description of the contract is
as follows:
a. Customize Contract (RE1): The attack patterns are customized and formalized
using asset-specific knowledge and building of regular expressions using
formats of assets.
4.2

DETAILED DESIGN AND TEST STRATEGY
The verification of the implementation is performed at unit-level. In this case, each of the

methods of the classes are considered as unit. To perform unit-level verification pre- and postconditions for each of the methods are defined. Black-box testing is performed using the pre- and
post-conditions. The test suite is designed using test strategy that ensures coverage of all scenarios
captured by the pre- and post-conditions. The details of the pre- and post-conditions for each of
the methods along with the test strategy for designing test suite can be found in Appendix D.
4.3

SYSTEM TESTING
Big bang integration strategy was used to integrate all the unit tested modules. System

testing was performed on the system resulting from all the integrated unit tested modules. The
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purpose of system testing is to check that the system as a whole works, i.e., given a set of inputs,
the system yields the expected outputs.
The system level testing was performed using inputs generated from two different sources:
a) string inputs generated using the xeger tool, and b) string inputs generated using ZAP’s XSS
file fuzzer. The asset information is used to retrieve information for performing system testing that
involves anomaly detection and misuse detection by customizing blacklist patterns. The malicious
inputs are derived from ZAP’s XSS file fuzzer and the non-malicious inputs are derived from xeger
tool. The combination of these inputs were used for system testing.
A total of 317 inputs were used to perform system testing out of which 150 input strings
were derived using the xeger tool and 167 input strings were derived from ZAP’s XSS file fuzzer.
The number of test cases for malicious inputs were determined by the fuzz inputs generated using
ZAP’s XSS file fuzzer that is known to have the most comprehensive list of payloads. The ZAP’s
XSS file fuzzer performs fuzzing on these payloads using the processor selected to yield fuzz
inputs that are used for system testing. These fuzzed inputs derived from fuzzing most
comprehensive list of payloads known avoids subjective judgement as well as covers known types
of malicious strings. Therefore, we believe that the number of fuzz inputs generated by the ZAP’s
XSS file fuzzer are good and valid to perform system-level testing and draw conclusions.
The JavaScript Unescape processor was used to generate the fuzz inputs. All 317 input
strings were processed and flagged by the system. The asset on which the system level testing was
performed has the same asset information as the “project description” asset of the OPM Web
application presented in Chapter 5. This is because the asset information allows alphanumeric
character-set including all possible special characters. This means such information would help
test all possible malicious scripts generated by the fuzzer to check/measure the effectiveness of the
tool in detecting XSS-related malicious inputs. The results of performing system testing are given
in Table 4.3.1. All the 150 input strings generated by the xeger tool were flagged correctly as
expected. This means that there were no false negatives. A total of 14 strings out of 167 input
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strings were flagged incorrectly (false positives), i.e., 10.77% of malicious string generated by the
fuzzer were flagged incorrectly as compliant.
Investigations were performed to determine the reasons for incorrect flagging. It was
identified that the reason 14 strings were incorrectly flagged was because of incomplete knowledge
in the ontology. For instance, some of the possible representations of HTML coded character-set
for alphabets was not part of the ontology, which caused some of the inputs to be flagged
incorrectly. Incorporating that knowledge led to correct flagging of input strings. This oversight
highlights an important point: the more comprehensive the knowledge included in the ontology
is, then the more precise the system is in detecting XSS-related attacks. This means that with more
knowledge, the system becomes more robust against XSS-related attacks.
As described in Chapter 3, the IO is assigned a flag value of: a) suspicious if it neither
matches whitelist patterns nor blacklist patterns, b) malicious if it matches only blacklist patterns
and does not match whitelist patterns, c) compliant if it matches only whitelist patterns and does
not match blacklist patterns, and d) potentially malicious if it matches both whitelist and blacklist
patterns.
Table 4.3.1: XSSMon version 1 system test results for compliant and malicious inputs.
Input
#

Compliant

Percent
Success

Potentially
Malicious

Percent
Success

Malicious

Percent
Success

Suspicious

Percent
Success

150

150
14

100

0

100

0

100

0

100

91.62
95.58

116
Total
112

100
100

20
Total
20

100
100

17
Total
17

100
100

167
Total
317

(false positives)

Total
303

To affirm the results of investigations for inputs, which were incorrectly flagged as
compliant, were indeed incomplete knowledge in the ontology, the HTML coded character-set for
alphabets and other information were added to the ontology. The second run of system testing was
performed on XSSMon version 2 and the results were recorded. The results of the system-level
testing are given in Table 4.3.2. The results of the second run validate the results of the
investigations for incorrect flagging of inputs was incomplete knowledge in the ontology.
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Table 4.3.2: XSSMon version 2 system test results for compliant and malicious inputs.
Input
#
150
167
Total
317

Compliant
150
0
Total
150

Percent
Success
100
100
100

Potentially
Malicious
0
125
Total
125

Percent
Success
100
100
100

Malicious
0
23
Total
23

Percent
Success
100
100
100

Suspicious
0
19
Total
19

Percent
Success
100
100
100

Another set of fuzz inputs was generated using JavaScript Escape processor on the ZAP’s
XSS file fuzzer and system-level testing was performed. A total of 221 fuzzed inputs were used to
perform system testing. The results of system-level testing are as depicted in Table 4.3.3. None of
the fuzz inputs were flagged as Compliant implying that there were no false positives. The ability
of the system to correctly identify and flag two different sets of fuzz inputs generated using two
different processors on ZAP’s XSS file fuzzer further strengthened the correctness of the system.
Table 4.3.3: Additional results of XSSMon version 2 testing results for malicious inputs.
Input
#
221

4.4

Compliant
0

Percent
Success
100

Potentially
Malicious
158

CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION

Percent
Success
100

OF XSSMON

Malicious
34

Percent
Success
100

Suspicious
29

Percent
Success
100

TOOL

The current implementation include the following features: a) loading user-specified
version of CAPEC and CWE xml and xsd files, b) parsing of CAPEC and CWE xml files to
retrieve relevant information, c) populating CAPEC and CWE information into ontology, d)
inferring knowledge after populating and updating information, e) retrieving knowledge based on
user-requested provenance, f) customizing and formalizing blacklist patterns based on allowed
character-set of assets for misuse detection, g) prioritizing attack patterns based on likelihood and
severity, h) retrieving asset-specific information for anomaly detection, i) formalizing formats as
whitelist, and j) processing and flagging IO based on information for anomaly detection, whitelists,
and blacklists.
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The current implementation of XSSMon tool has the following features missing that are
described in Chapter 3: a) saving the categorized attack payloads based on character-set (CSAP)
used in the ontology, b) automated checking of the accuracy of generated blacklist patterns on
CSAP and providing feedback, and c) saving CSBP in the ontology for reuse.
4.5

LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION
One of the limitations of the current implementation of XSSMon tool is the way DFAs are

derived from regular expressions. The DFAs are constructed after the knowledge is retrieved and
stored. Depending on the asset under consideration, the applicable DFAs are used for pattern
matching. This may pose a problem if the regular expression for which DFA is being constructed
is of the form: (a | b) a ((a | b) {n}). The time complexity of the approach used in the current
implementation to construct DFA would take O(2 n). Based on our current knowledge, this situation
is not common and, therefore, the approach used in the current implementation is expected to work
in all the practical situations under which the system is used. However, if the above mentioned
scenario should ever occur, then a possible solution is to generate the DFA states as needed on the
fly. That is to say, when such a regular expression is encountered, the DFA states that are needed
are generated while processing the IO string based on the character of the IO read. This approach
would impact performance and slow down processing of that particular scenario, but would help
overcome the time complexity issue.
The DFAs generated from regular expressions in the current implementation are not
minimal. A candidate for future work to improve the XSSMon tool is to generate minimal DFAs
from regular expressions.
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CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY
This chapter presents the results of an exploratory case study that was conducted to
evaluate the effectiveness of the XSSMon tool in detecting XSS attacks on an open-source project
management (OPM) Web application. A case study is defined as “a technique for detailed
exploratory investigations, both prospectively and retrospectively, that attempts to understand and
explain phenomenon or test theories, using primarily qualitative analysis” [183]. Case studies can
support testing complex theories in settings where there is little control over the variables, provide
insights into cause and effect relationships, and answer how and why questions. The design and
implementation of the case study follows the guidelines given by Easterbrook and Aranda [183].
5.1

CASE-STUDY RESEARCH DESIGN
The OPM Web application was chosen for the case study because one of its versions has

been well documented to be vulnerable to XSS attacks on National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
and Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE) Websites. For the sake of anonymity and privacy,
we refer to it as the OPM original version. The tool, which is written in PHP 5, is intended for
small to medium-sized businesses and freelancers. It provides an open source alternative to
proprietary tools like Basecamp. The OPM was launched in November 2007, and it has been
downloaded more than 500,000 times since its first release. A later version of the tool was released
in 2015 to address the known XSS vulnerabilities. This version of OPM, referred to in the case
study as the “OPM latest version” is not documented to be XSS vulnerable in NVD and CVE.
HTMLPurifier was used in the latest version of OPM to identify, filter, and/or sanitize XSS-related
malicious inputs.
The case study design is as depicted in Fig. 5.1.1. Apache server serves as the Web server,
and the OPM Web application uses Mozilla Firefox browser. All the user inputs to the Web
application are provided in this environment. The “add project” functionality of the application
that is known to have XSS-related vulnerability is chosen. The required inputs for the fields come
from the are randomly generated strings by xeger using the format information of the assets or
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ZAP fuzzer generated strings. These inputs are given to the application and the requests and
responses are captured. A total of 317 projects were added to the application using “add project”
functionality. In these projects about 150 projects used random information generated by xeger for
all the fields and the remaining 167 projects used random information generated by xeger for all
fields except “desc” field for which the information generated by ZAP’s file fuzzer that are known
to be malicious strings. The types of input to the OPM Web application are described in Section
5.1.3.
The requests from the application and the responses from the Web-server to the application
are monitored using the Network Monitor of the Firefox browser. All the requests and responses
are saved as HTTP Archive format (HAR) file (JSON-formatted) from the Network Monitor of
the browser to the “traffic-log file”. Two traffic-log files were created: one with 150 projects and
the other with 167 projects information. The traffic-log files with 150 projects can be found at the
link:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ik41p11bqli9ytn/AACP4Uvl3NDsmG74Igag4US1a?dl=0.
The traffic-log files with 167 projects can be found at the link:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/nxhacjiakmao602/AADF1b_t_GK6DkKN_FOj9vjda?dl=0.
In addition, the user input is saved to the “input-log file” prior to being processed by the
application. The user input files corresponding to the 150 projects can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/InputFiles/tree/master/WhitelistFiles.
The user input files corresponding to the 167 projects can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/InputFiles/tree/master/BlacklistFiles.
The traffic-log file is parsed to create a file for each of the requests and responses. Every such
created file stores the following information: time stamp, input data (as name-value pair) i.e.,
processed data applicable for request files, response data (name-value pair) applicable for response
files, and a flag indicator for each of the asset information (name-value pairs). The flag indicator
can have the following values: 00=Suspicious; 01=Malicious; 10=Compliant; and 11=Potentially
Malicious. The input–log file will have an additional field indicating whether the input was
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generated by the Fuzzer, indicating that it comes from a black-list pattern. The implementation for
processing network traffic saved as HAR file and creating request and response files can be found
at the link: https://github.com/bgurijala/NetworkIOProcess.
Another comparison was done with the OPM latest version by creating 166 projects with
malicious inputs. The traffic-log files with 166 projects can be found at the link:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/li8ooaefe24w34t/AABXFMX5JnpalNr94beneWTOa?dl=0.
All the IO will be flagged by the tool. The analysis will determine how effective was the
OPM Web application was in detecting and/or dealing with malicious inputs. The results will be
analyzed to determine the effectiveness of the XSSMon tool in identifying malicious and/or invalid
inputs. A comparison of the effectiveness of Web application and XSSMon tool in identifying
XSS-related malicious inputs is then conducted.

Network
Monitor

Request 1

Web
Application

Interceptor

Request 2

Request 1

Response

Flagged IO

Request and
Response Files

XSSMon
Tool

Log of
Inputs

Flagged Files

Save Traffic
Request and
Response Files
Log of Requests and
Responses

Figure 5.1.1: Dataflow diagram of case-study design.
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Web Server

5.1.1

Research Questions

The following are the research questions that are being posed for the case study:
1. How effective is the Web application in identifying, detecting and/or sanitizing XSSrelated threats (malicious inputs) in terms of percentage of identified threats?
2. How effective is the XSSMon tool in identifying XSS-related malicious inputs in terms
of percentage of identified threats?
3. How many false-positives or false-negatives does the XSSMon tool produce and why?
5.1.2

Propositions
The propositions of the case study are as follows:
1. The case study supports the finding that the OPM Web application is not effective in
identifying, detecting, and/or sanitizing XSS-related threats.
2. The XSSMon tool is effective in identifying XSS-related malicious inputs that may
pass due to lack or improper sanitization performed by the application.
3. The number of false positives and false negatives produced by the tool are less than
5%.

5.1.3

Units of Analysis
The possible types of inputs to the application include: a) compliant and safe strings, b)

compliant and potentially malicious strings, c) non-compliant and malicious strings, and d) noncompliant and non-malicious strings. The malicious strings for the input are derived from XSS file
fuzzer of Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP). The randomized XSS fuzz inputs from ZAP are used as attack
strings. These form the inputs for categories of inputs b) and d) described above. The strings
generated by xeger using format information of assets along with some inputs from fuzzer after
removing malicious part is used as input for categories a) and c) described above. Randomized
inputs from fuzzer and xeger are used to avoid subjective judgement.
The equivalence classes involving the assets of the application considered for the case
study include: a) numeric characters only fields, b) alpha characters only fields, c) alphanumeric
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characters only fields, d) numeric characters with some allowed special characters (such as -, /, ,
etc.) that cannot result in malicious inputs, e) numeric characters with some allowed special
characters that can result in malicious inputs, f) alpha characters with some allowed special
characters that cannot result in malicious inputs, g) alpha characters with some allowed special
characters that can result in malicious inputs, h) alphanumeric characters with some allowed
special characters that cannot result in malicious inputs, and i) alphanumeric characters with some
allowed special characters that can result in malicious inputs. Web pages involving assets from
these equivalence classes are considered in the case study that will be representative of all assets
of the application. IO for assets belonging to these classes are collected at three levels as depicted
in Fig. 5.1 and fed to the designed monitor for processing and flagging IO.
5.1.4

Logic Linking the Data to the Propositions
The IO captured at three levels as mentioned should be marked as follows by the tool: a)

All inputs that match blacklist patterns and do not match whitelist patterns defined for an asset
under consideration should be marked as malicious, b) All inputs that do not match blacklist
patterns and whitelist patterns defined for an asset under consideration should be marked as
suspicious, c) All inputs that match both blacklist and whitelist patterns defined for an asset under
consideration should be marked as potentially malicious, and d) All inputs that do not match
blacklist patterns and match whitelist patterns defined for an asset under consideration should be
marked as compliant.
The following two comparisons are performed to determine the effectiveness of the
application in identifying, filtering, and/or sanitizing XSS-related malicious IO: a) A comparison
is performed between the flagged application unprocessed IO (user inputs to application) and
flagged application processed IO (requests from application to server), and b) A comparison is
performed between the flagged application unprocessed IO (user inputs to the application) and
flagged application processed IO (responses from server to the application).
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The number of application-processed IO marked as malicious, potentially malicious, and
suspicious provides a tally of how well IO validation is performed by the designed tool in
comparison to the application under consideration.
The percentage of IO that is not malicious and contains allowed character-set but is marked
as malicious, potentially malicious, or suspicious gives an estimate of the false positive generated
by the tool. Similarly, the percentage of IO that is malicious but is not marked as malicious or
potentially malicious gives an estimate of the false negatives generated by the tool.
5.1.5

Criteria for Interpreting the Findings
Analytical generalization is performed. The false positives and false negatives of the

misuse detection approach of the method are determined as follows: a) the flag values of IO that
are known to be malicious are checked to determine how many of those are marked as compliant
which represents the number of false positives, and b) the flag values of IO that are known to be
compliant are checked to determine how many of those are marked as malicious or potentially
malicious which represents the number of false negatives. Similar check is performed for
determining false positives and false negatives of the anomaly detection approach of the method.
5.2

CASE STUDY SETUP
The related-real world objects information of OPM along with other necessary information

about assets that needs to be captured as described by the template in Chapter 3 is presented in
Table 5.2. The table depicts the information about all assets that belong to the Project object which
is stored in the ontology as application-specific information. This information is used by the
anomaly detection part of the approach and supports customization of blacklist patterns.
The “add project” Web page captures: a) project name, b) project description, c) due date
of the project, and d) budget of the project. The inputs for all these assets were generated in two
ways: (Process a) inputs for all assets were generated by xeger using the format information of the
assets, and (Process b) inputs for project name, due date, and budget w generated using format
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information for these assets and the input for project description comes from the ZAP’s XSS file
fuzzer generated strings.
A total of 150 project-related non-malicious inputs were generated using (Process a) and
167 project-related malicious inputs were generated using (Process b). All the 317 inputs for “add
project” were saved as “input-log” files. The requests corresponding to 150 non-malicious projectrelated inputs were not intercepted, and the network traffic was recorded. The requests
corresponding to 167 malicious project-related inputs were intercepted using the Burp suite tool,
and the requests (processed user inputs) were changed back to original user inputs and passed to
the server and the network traffic is recorded. A similar setup was used for conducting the case
study on the latest version of OPM. A total of 166 project-related malicious inputs were generated
using (Process b).
All the recorded network traffic was processed and for each of the projects added two files
were created: a) a file with the request information along with the time stamp, and b) a file with
corresponding response information along with time stamp.
All the “input-log” files, request files, and response files were then processed by the
XSSMon tool. The XSSMon tool processed (performs anomaly and misuse detection) each of the
asset IO and flags them. The flag value of each of the asset IO was then written to the
corresponding files.
5.3

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
This section presents all the results of performing the case study as described in Sections

5.1 and 5.2. The processed and flagged “input-log” files (unprocessed user input) for 150 projects
using XSSMon tool can be found at the link: https://github.com/bgurijala/ProcessedFiles/
tree/master/Input/Whitelist. The processed and flagged “input-log” files for 167 projects can be
found at the link: https://github.com/bgurijala/ProcessedFiles/tree/master/Input/Blacklist. The
processed and flagged request (processed user input by application) and response (server processed
user input) files for 150 projects using XSSMon tool for the first run of the case study can be found
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at the link: https://github.com/bgurijala/ProcessedFiles/tree/master/Whitelist/First%20Run. The
processed and flagged request and response files for 167 projects using XSSMon tool for the first
run

can be found

at the

link:

https://github.com/bgurijala/ProcessedFiles/tree/master/

Blacklist/First%20Run. The processed and flagged request and response files for 150 projects
using XSSMon tool for the second run of the case study can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/ProcessedFiles/tree/master/Whitelist/Second%20Run. The processed
and flagged request and response files for 167 projects using XSSMon tool for the second run of
the case study can be found at the link: https://github.com/bgurijala/ProcessedFiles/tree/master/
Blacklist/Second%20Run. The processed and flagged request and response files for 166 projects
using the XSSMon tool for the latest version of OPM can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/ProcessedFiles/tree/master/LatestVersion/Blacklist.
A summary of the results is provided in Table 5.3.1. The results presented in Table 5.3.1
correspond to the case study results using XSSMon version 1 tool (with incomplete ontology
knowledge as described in Section 4.3). As shown in Table 5.3.1, a total of 12 requests were
successfully identified/filtered/sanitized out of the known 167 malicious inputs, which implies that
the client-side of OPM original version application has a success rate of 7.19%. The server-side of
OPM original version identified/filtered/sanitized 4 out of 167 malicious inputs that it received
yielding a success rate of 2.4 percent. The XSSMon version 1 tool identified 130 out of 155 (167
– 12 sanitized) malicious inputs in requests with a success rate of 83.87 percent. It identified 151
out of 163 (167 – 4 sanitized) malicious inputs in responses with a success rate of 92.63%. The
combined malicious inputs identified in both request and responses by the OPM original version
Web application is 16 out of a total of 334 malicious inputs, yielding a success rate of 4.79 percent.
In comparison, the XSSMon version 1 tool identified a total of 281 out of 318 malicious request
and response inputs resulting in a success rate of 88.36 percent. The statistical significance of the
results is discussed later.
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Table 5.3.1: Summary of XSS detection effectiveness results for OPM original version and
XSSMon tool version 1.
Processed by

Malicious
Inputs Total

Total
Malicious
Inputs

Successfully
Identified/Filtered/
Sanitized Responses

Percent
Success

167

Successfully
Percent
Identified/Filtered Success
/Sanitized
Requests
12
7.19

OPM Original
Version
Client-Side

N/A

N/A

N/A

OPM Original
Version
Server-Side

167

N/A

N/A

167

4

2.4

XSSMon
version 1

167 – 12 =
155

130

83.87

167 – 4 =
163

151

92.63

Table 5.3.2: Breakdown of flagged malicious requests and responses identified by
XSSMon tool version 1.
Input #
N = 167
Requests
Responses
Total = 334

Compliant
37
16
53

Potentially
Malicious
92
115
207

Malicious

Suspicious

17
12
29

21
24
45

The summary of the flagged malicious inputs in requests and responses by XSSMon tool
version 1 is given in Table 5.3.2. The 37 requests that were flagged as compliant are the requests
that were sanitized by the client-side of the Web application and the 16 responses that were flagged
as compliant are the responses that were sanitized by the server-side of the Web application. Some
of the requests and responses are flagged due to incomplete/missing knowledge in the ontology.
We consider these as false positives; thus, at least 25 out 167 requests and 12 out of 167 responses
are incorrectly flagged as compliant. This implies the false-positives for requests is 14.97 percent
and the false-positives for responses is 7.19 percent. The overall false-positives of the XSSMon
version 1 tool is 11.07 percent. All the requests and responses that are known to be compliant are
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correctly flagged as compliant. This implies that the tool did not yield any false negatives in this
case study.
Table 5.3.3: Summary of flagged malicious input-log files by XSSMon version 1 tool.
Inputs #

Compliant

Potentially Malicious

Malicious

Suspicious

167

14

116

17

20

The summary of the flagged malicious inputs in the input-log files (unprocessed inputs) by
the XSSMon version 1 tool is shown in Table 5.3.3. As mentioned previously, the 14 inputs are
flagged incorrectly (as compliant) due to lack of knowledge in the ontology about various possible
malicious representations. Thus, the false positives are 8.38 percent. None of the known compliant
inputs in the input-log files were incorrectly flagged for the first run of the case study resulting in
zero percent false-negatives.
The results depicted in the tables of this section use formats of the assets, i.e., the white
list, that were generally defined, that is to say the formats were defined to include any possible
sequence of allowed character-set. In practical situations, if the formats are defined to accept only
certain possible sequence of allowed characters based on the need, then the results are expected to
be more promising as the approach described in Chapter 3 uses both anomaly and customized
misuse detection approaches to enhance security of the Web application. The formats for the assets
are defined generally on purpose to avoid bias and subjective judgement.
Further tests were run using XSSMon version2. The results are depicted in Table 5.3.4.
The number of malicious inputs for XSSMon tool version 2 were obtained by deducting number
of request and responses sanitized by the OPM original version because the sanitized requests and
responses are no longer malicious. The XSSMon version 2 tool identified and flagged a total of
155 requests as non-compliant out of 155 un-sanitized requests and 163 were flagged as noncompliant out of 163 responses. This means the tool has a 100 percent success rate in identifying
XSS-related attacks. The XSSMon tool identified and flagged all malicious inputs that were not
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sanitized by the OPM original version application (both client-side and server-side). The
percentage of false-positives and false-negatives were zero.
Table 5.3.4: Summary of XSS detection effectiveness results for OPM original version and
XSSMon tool version 2.
Processed by

Malicious
Inputs
Total

Percent
Success

Total
Malicious
Inputs

167

Successfully
Identified/Filte
red/Sanitized
Requests
12

OPM Original
Version
Client-Side

Percent
Success

N/A

Successfully
Identified/Filtere
d/Sanitized
Responses
N/A

7.19

OPM Original
Version
Server-Side

167

N/A

N/A

167

4

2.4

XSSMon Tool

167 – 12 =

155

100

167 – 4 = 163

163

100

N/A

155

Table 5.3.5: Breakdown of flagged malicious requests and responses identified by
XSSMon tool version 2.
Inputs #
N = 167
Requests
Responses
Total = 334

Compliant
12
4
16

Potentially
Malicious
112
124
236

Malicious

Suspicious

21
14
35

22
25
47

The summary of the flagged malicious inputs in requests and responses by the XSSMon
version 2 tool is given in Table 5.3.5. The 12 requests that are flagged as compliant are the requests
that are sanitized by the client-side of the Web application and 4 responses that are flagged as
compliant are the responses that are sanitized by the server-side of the Web application.
Table 5.3.6: Summary of flagged malicious input-log files by XSSMon version 2 tool.
Inputs #

Compliant

167

0

Potentially
Malicious
125

66

Malicious

Suspicious

23

19

The summary of the flagged malicious inputs in the input-log files (unprocessed inputs) by
the XSSMon tool version 2 is given in Table 5.3.6. After updating knowledge in the ontology none
of fuzzer generated malicious inputs were flagged as Compliant as expected.
The statistical significance of the results obtained from the case study was determined by
computing binomial proportion confidence interval for: a) the number of malicious inputs sanitized
or filtered by OPM original version (the Web application), and b) the number of malicious inputs
identified by XSSMon tool versions 1 and 2. If the two computer binomial proportion confidence
intervals do not overlap, we can conclude that there is statistically significant difference between
OPM original version and XSSMon tool in identifying XSS attacks at the given level of
confidence. The binomial proportion confidence interval calculator used to computer the intervals
used the Clopper-Pearson (exact) method. There are a total of 334 files (167 request and 167
response files) with malicious inputs. The binomial proportion confidence intervals are computed
for both versions of XSSMon. The values used for computing are as shown in Table 5.3.7.
Table 5.3.7: Summary of flagged malicious Requests and Responses by OPM original version
and XSSMon tool for versions 1 and 2.
Processed by

Inputs #

Sanitized/Filtered

Unidentified

OPM Original Version

334

16

318

XSSMon version 1

318

281

37

XSSMont version 2

318

318

0

The binomial proportion confidence interval with 99% confidence level for OPM original
version is between 0.022 and 0.086. The binomial proportion confidence interval with 99%
confidence level for XSSMon version 1 is between 0.83 and 0.93. The binomial confidence
interval with 99% confidence level for XSSMon version 2 is between 0.98 and 1. The confidence
intervals of the XSSMon tool for both versions do not overlap with the confidence interval of OPM
original version. In addition, the confidence interval for both versions of the XSSMon tool is
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higher than the OPM original version. Thus, both versions of the XSSMon tool detected XSS
attacks at a higher probability of success than the OPM original version.
To further substantiate the findings, the latest version of OPM Web application, which is
currently not documented as having XSS vulnerability, was compared to XSSMon version 2. The
results are given in Table 5.3.8, which shows that the latest version of OPM is still vulnerable to
XSS attacks. The use of HTMLPurifier, which was incorporated into the latest version of OPM,
helped in identifying, filtering, and/or sanitizing XSS attacks better than its previous version.
However, the XSSMon version 2 tool identified all XSS-related malicious inputs that were
unidentified by the Web application. The OPM latest version client-side identified, filtered, or
sanitized only 11 out of 166 requests correctly which results in success of 6.63 percent. The OPM
latest version server-side identified, filtered, or sanitized 82 out of 166 responses correctly which
resulted in a success of 49.4 percent. The XSSMon version 2 tool identified and flagged a total of
155 as non-compliant out of 155 un-sanitized requests and 84 are flagged as non-compliant out of
84 responses. This means XSSMon version 2 had a 100% success rate in identifying XSS-related
attacks. The XSSMon tool identified and flagged all malicious inputs that were not sanitized by
the OPM latest version application (both client-side and server-side). The percentage of falsepositives and false-negatives is zero.
Table 5.3.8: Summary of OPM latest version and XSSMon tool version 2 detection
effectiveness.
Processed by

Malicious
Inputs
Total

Percent
Success

Total
Malicious
Inputs

166

Successfully
Identified/Filte
red/Sanitized
Requests
11

OPM Latest
Version
Client-Side
OPM Latest
Version
Server-Side
XSSMon version
2 Tool

Percent
Success

N/A

Successfully
Identified/Filtere
d/Sanitized
Responses
N/A

6.63

166

N/A

N/A

166

82

49.4

166 – 11 =
155

155

100

166 – 82 = 84

84

100
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N/A

The statistical significance of the results obtained from the case study is determined using
the computing binomial proportion confidence interval as described earlier. There are a total of
332 files (166 request and 166 response files) with malicious inputs. The binomial proportion
confidence intervals were computed for both OPM latest version and XSSMon version 2 tool. The
values used for the computation are given in Table 5.3.9.
Table 5.3.9: Summary of flagged malicious requests and responses by OPM latest version and
XSSMon version 2 tool.
Processed by

Inputs #

Sanitized/Filtered

Unidentified

OPM Latest Version

332

93

239

XSSMon version 2

239

239

0

The binomial proportion confidence interval with 99 percent confidence level for OPM
latest version is between 0.22 and 0.35. The binomial confidence interval with 99 percent
confidence level for second run of the tool is between 0.98 and 1. The confidence intervals of the
XSSMon version 2 tool does not overlap with confidence interval of OPM latest version, and the
confidence interval for the XSSMon version 2 tool is higher than OPM latest version. This
confirms that the XSSMon tool can detect XSS attacks with a higher probability of success than
OPM latest version.
According to the 2015 EdgeScan report [184], XSS density is 4.87 per Web application.
The likelihood of XSS vulnerability being discovered in Web applications is 52% [184]. The most
vulnerable application had 220 instances of XSS [185].
5.4

THREATS TO VALIDITY
This section presents the threats to validity of the case study performed as described in

Section 5.1. There are four primary types of validity: construct validity, internal validity, external
validity, and reliability. The construct validity issues arise when there are errors in measurement.
Errors in measurement are not an issues in the case study since xeger and ZAP’s XSS file fuzzer
are used to automatically generate random inputs for the assets of the Web application under
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consideration. The internal validity applies to explanatory and causal type of case studies; thus, it
is not applicable to this case study. The external validity issues may arise from the fact that all the
data of the case study is from one Web application. Extending the case study to other Web
applications can strengthen the results of the case study. The reliability aspect of the validity of
the case study involves demonstrating that the operations of the case study can be repeated with
the same results. A prerequisite for reliability is documented procedures for the case study.
Another aspect of the validity of case study is addressed by detailed and comprehensive
documentation of the case study research design with all the five parts of the case study: a) research
questions, b) propositions, c) units of analysis, d) logic linking the data to the propositions, and e)
criteria for interpreting the findings. All the files used and produced by the case study are stored
in the github and dropbox and the links for the files are provided in corresponding sections of this
chapter.
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Table 5.2: Related Real-World Objects along with other necessary information.
Related
Real-World
Object

Fields

Type

Length

Character
-set

Format

Range

Sensitivity
Level

Script

Called Server Script
/Inline
Name

IO
Loc

ID

Int

10

Numeric

[09]{1,10
}

0 to
4,294,
967,29
5

2

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Name

Varchar

255

Alphanum
eric,
Apostroph
e, period,
colon

4

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Desc

Text

500

Alphanum
eric, all
special
characters,
images,
links

[[((alp)|
|(ALP)||
(num)||(
ws)||(')||
(.)||(:))+
]]
[[((alp)|
|(ALP)||
(num)||(
ws)||(<)
||(>)||(!)
||(@)||(#
)||($)||(
%)||(^)||
(&)||(*)|
|(()||())||
({)||(})||
(|)||(\)||(/
)||(;)||(:)|
|(')||(")||
()||(_)||(=
)||(+)||(,

4

Yes

Both

X, Y,
Z*

Name
*

A,
B,
C*

Projekte

71

Users

Related
Real-World
Object

Fields

Type

Length

Character
-set

Start

Varchar

10

Numeric,
/, ., and -

End

Varchar

10

Numeric,
/, ., and -

Status
Budget

Tinyint
Float

1
9

Numeric,
decimal
point,
comma

Format

Range

)||(.)||(?)
)+]]
[[(num)
{1,2}]][
[(.){1,1
}]][[(nu
m){1,2
}]][[(.){
1,1}]][[
(num){
4,4}]]
[[(num)
{1,2}]][
[(.){1,1
}]][[(nu
m){1,2
}]][[(.){
1,1}]][[
(num){
4,4}]]
[[(num) 0 to
{1,3}]][ +3.4E
[(,){0,1 +38
}]][[(nu
m){3,3
}]]

Sensitivity
Level

Script

Called Server Script
/Inline
Name

IO
Loc

4

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

4

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

2
8

No
No

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

N/A
N/A

* Place holder. Actual values of allowed script name, server locations and IO locations are not mentioned
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Users

5.5

GENERALIZATION

OF CASE STUDY

To understand the effectiveness of the approach and the XSSMon tool, it is essential to be
able to generalize the conclusion of the case study. Two approaches are applicable to the case
study: analytical generalization and analogical generalization.
Analytical generalization requires a two-step process: a) the first step involves a conceptual
claim whereby investigators show how their case study findings bear upon a particular theory,
theoretical construct, or theoretical sequence of events, and b) the second step involves applying
the same theory to implicate other, similar situations where analogous events also might occur
[186]. Smaling [187] points out that analogical generalization, which is based on analogical
reasoning, may be more suitable when research results obtained from one case study are to be
generalized to another. Analogical generalization is plausible when there are solid arguments that,
when a particular researched case has characteristics that are relevant for the research conclusions,
another case that has not been researched also has these relevant characteristics. The six quality
criteria for analogical reasoning include: a) the relative degree of similarity, b) the relevance for
the conclusion, c) support by other, similar cases, d) support by means of variation, e) the relative
plausibility of the conclusion on its own, and f) empirical and theoretical support. When all these
six qualities have been fulfilled analogical reasoning can be stronger than inductive reasoning
based on statistical representative sample, theory-carried generalization, or variation-based
generalization.
To apply analytical generalization or analogical generalization and generalize the results
to similar cases, it is important to identify the characteristics of the case study that influenced the
results. The work uses anomaly and misuse detection to enhance security. The characteristics of
the case study that mainly influence the results is the allowed character-set of an asset. This
character-set is used in retrieving applicable blacklist patterns and customizing them. The main
aim of the work is to detect XSS-attacks therefore; the identification of potential attack strings is
of highest priority. The other characteristics that influence the results are: formats of the assets,
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range, and other information of application-specific asset information that is used for anomaly
detection. These asset-specific characteristics influence the overall flag value assigned but do not
impact the detection of malicious or potentially malicious strings. Therefore, the character-set of
an asset is the main characteristic that influences the results and conclusions. The character-set
equivalence classes considered as part of the case study, as described in Section 5.1.3, include: a)
numeric only fields, b) alpha only fields, c) alphanumeric only fields, d) numeric with some
allowed special characters (such as -, /, , etc.) that cannot result in malicious inputs, e) numeric
with some allowed special characters that can result in malicious inputs, f) alpha with some
allowed special characters that cannot result in malicious inputs, g) alpha with some allowed
special characters that can result in malicious inputs, h) alphanumeric with some allowed special
characters that cannot result in malicious inputs, and i) alphanumeric with some allowed special
characters that can result in malicious inputs. These equivalence classes considered as part of the
case study are representative of many inputs that can be tampered to launch attacks. That said, the
results of the malicious inputs detection presented in the case study can be extended to other Web
applications that accept similar equivalence class as inputs on Web pages.
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CHAPTER 6: RELATED WORK
Various approaches have been presented to detect and prevent XSS attacks. A total of 131
research papers on techniques for detection and prevention of XSS-related attacks and
vulnerabilities were identified and surveyed. Detailed description of the surveyed papers and their
categorization based on the classification given in Chapter 2 is presented in Appendix A.
This section presents other work more closely related to the dissertation work. None of the
four examples listed below use the reliable knowledge sources of CAPEC and CWE to drive the
detection of XSS. Other differences are the use of provenance and ontologies to reason and infer
new knowledge, as well as the ability to update the knowledge bases as new attacks are identified.
Furthermore, the XSSMon tool is platform and programming language independent.
Venkatakrishnan et al. [83] described WebAppArmor, a framework that incorporates static
and dynamic analysis techniques, symbolic execution, and execution monitoring to prevent XSS,
SQL injection, and CSRF on existing (legacy) Web applications.
A monitor embedding framework DESERVE (DEtecting program SEcurity Vulnerability
Exploitations) [120] identifies exploitable statements from source code based on static backward
slicing and embeds necessary code to detect attacks. DESERVE can be used for detecting buffer
overflow, SQL injection, and XSS attacks.
Li and Wang [137] presented FIRM, a system that embeds inline reference monitor (IRM)
in Web pages hosting Flash content and protects it by controlling DOM methods and randomizing
variables with sensitive data to prevent XSS attacks.
Ruse and Basu [113] described a two-phase technique that uses both static and dynamic
analysis to detect XSS vulnerabilities and prevent XSS attacks. The static analysis phase includes
application translation and concolic unit testing techniques whereas runtime monitoring phase
monitors relevant variables in the application.
All the described work in Appendix A are geared towards: server-side, client-side, or
generic, if it is not specified whether the work focuses or server-side, client-side, or both. The
75

dissertation work has the ability to detect both server-side and client-side XSS attacks. In addition,
none of the approaches surveyed are using the vast knowledge base available and maintained by
NVD, which includes CAPEC, CWE, and CVE. The dissertation work describes an approach that
uses the vast CAPEC and CWE knowledge to drive the detection of XSS attacks.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS
7.1

SUMMARY
The rapid growth in technology has resulted in the use of computers and the Web for

managing large amounts of data, increasing the need to address confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of computer-based applications and information. Cyber-attacks are placed among top
five risks the world is likely to face over the next decade [7, 8]. XSS, which is one of the most
common types of injection attacks exploiting input validation vulnerability [13], poses one of the
main challenges to ensure cyber-security. XSS has consistently stayed in the top 3 risks for Webapplications since 2002 [2-6], emphasizing how risky and difficult such attacks are to detect and
prevent.
To enhance cyber-security, the Intrusion Detection Approach (IDA) proactively prevents
XSS-attacks by documenting knowledge and defining software processes that support
incorporation of security concerns into Web application by customizing documented knowledge.
The customization of security knowledge to any Web application promotes reuse of knowledge
and allows software engineers to focus on business use-cases and functionality of the application.
The approach combines and uses cyber-enhanced technologies such as ontology, provenance,
formalizations, and security-related domain knowledge to specify application-specific patterns that
drive monitoring of the Web application particularly, preventing XSS-attacks. Whenever there are
new attacks or new ways of launching attacks, the mere update of new attack information into the
knowledge-base helps monitor, identify, and prevent such new attacks without any changes to the
Web application itself. The approach supports both prevention and detection of XSS-attacks by
using latest security information. The IDA provides similar benefits as MDD approaches coupled
with benefits of maintaining reusable security domain knowledge.
The case study showed the effectiveness of the XSSMon tool in identifying, detecting, and
flagging XSS attacks. The tool fared better than the considered Web application, i.e., XSSMon
had a higher success rate in identifying XSS-related attacks than the Web application’s inbuilt
security. The overall success rate of the original Web application under study was 4.79 percent
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and 28.01 percent for the latest version in comparison to the success rate of 88.36 percent of
XSSMon version 1 and 100 percent in detecting XSS attacks by XSSMon version 2. The XSSMon
tool relies on the completeness of knowledge that comes from various sources, such as CAPEC,
CWE, and OWASP cheat sheets. Keeping the knowledge base current and having accurate
representation of the application assets is essential for the effectiveness of the tool.
One of the important findings of the case study is that even if input is sanitized or filtered
by the Web application and a request is constructed, it is essential to process at the Web server
before constructing the response or saving data as it is possible that the sanitized or filtered request
is intercepted and malicious input is injected in the network. Similarly, it is essential to process the
response received from server before rendering the response. Therefore, it is imperative that the
IO is processed at both the client-side and server-side of the Web application to enhance security
further. The XSSMon tool performs processing both while sending and receiving, which enhances
the security of the Web applications. The results of the case study can be extended to other Web
applications that accept similar equivalence classes of IO.
7.2

SIGNIFICANCE
The dissertation addresses two important high-level problems: a) lack of properly

documented security domain knowledge that software engineers can use to develop and maintain
Web-applications, and b) lack of well-defined software engineering processes that support
prevention of vulnerabilities and threats. To this end, the work defines structures needed for storing
and deriving XSS-related knowledge and its provenance systematically and formally. This
knowledge drives the IDA for preventing successful XSS-attacks by helping build a layer between
Web-applications and its users to monitor and prevent XSS attacks. The work provides a
continuous focus on identification of vulnerabilities and threats allowing software engineers to
focus of the business use-cases of the Web applications. The work uses the vast source of
knowledge about attack patterns and weaknesses continuously and regularly maintained by NVD.
The work allows reuse of security knowledge by customizing it to various Web applications
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independent of the platform and programming language used. The work has the potential to
support security testing of the Web application as well. The IDA separates security concerns from
the business logic of the Web applications thereby, allowing customization of security to the latest
and most up-to-date knowledge without having to change/maintain the Web application frequently
to keep it abreast with ever growing security needs.
The use of cyber-enhanced technologies and techniques, such as ontologies and
provenance provides a way to capture information from various sources and infer knowledge from
them along with providing a way to customize and use security knowledge based on applicationspecific needs. The IDA provides similar benefits as model-driven development (MDD)
approaches along with the benefits of maintaining reusable security domain knowledge.
The contributions of the dissertation work include the following:
1. A way to separate security concerns and maintaining higher level of security of Web
applications independent of platforms and programming languages used against XSS
attacks.
2. An IDA ontology, which is published through http://ontology.cybershare.utep.edu/security/ida-o, that
captures XSS-attack specific security domain knowledge along with provenance information on
vulnerability and threats.
a. Automated loading, parsing, and populating of relevant information from userspecified version of CAPEC and CWE files.
b. Automated application-specific customization of general XSS knowledge.
c. Formalization of asset-specific whitelist.
3. A template to systematically capture all necessary application-specific information to
provide customized and enhanced security for the Web application.
4. Processes and algorithms for deriving XSS-related application-specific customized patterns
for monitoring and processing IO.
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5. Reusable formalized generic XSS knowledge and customized application-specific
formalized XSS knowledge.
6. Processes for customization based on provenance and prioritization of customized attack
patterns based on sensitivity of asset, and severity and likelihood of attack patterns.
7.3

FUTURE WORK
In the IDA, the derivation of blacklist patterns based on the information from threats,

weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and other online example sources is performed manually. This is not
only tedious, but may also be error-prone and requires the knowledge or expertise in creation of
patterns. The automation of the derivation of blacklist patterns using the information would be a
candidate for future work. However, to automate this process AI technique(s) will likely need to
be introduced.
Although CWE is comprehensive by aggregating weakness categories from many different
vulnerability taxonomies, software technologies and products, and categorization perspectives,
using its highly tangled web of weakness information and categories is a daunting task. Several
manual and semi-automated approaches are described that can be used to extract useful
information from sources such as CWE and CAPEC. The IDA uses partial information from CWE
and CAPEC. It may be interesting and worthwhile to explore how other readily available
information can be used to enhance security of Web applications.
The IDA predominantly considers and uses sources such as CWE, CAPEC, and OWASP ;
however, it would be intriguing to explore other reliable sources for security information and
merge all information to create a robust security knowledge base. Another approach is to include
sources that may not be as reliable, e.g., published information on the Web. With the use of
provenance, it will be possible for the user to determine the level of trust to be placed on the source.
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APPENDIX A
DETAILED SURVEY OF DETECTION

AND PREVENTION OF XSS

VULNERABILITIES

AND ATTACKS

The results of literature review on the current state of art for detection and prevention of
XSS-related vulnerabilities and attacks is classified into different categories as depicted Fig. A1.
The summary of the classification in presented as tables in the document. The details of the
literature review are presented in this appendix.
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Figure A.1: Classification Categories for approaches to detect and prevent XSS-attacks.

94

A survey, which included review of over 130 research papers, was conducted, and the
results were classified into the categories identified in Fig. A.1. The details of the literature review
are summarized using the categories from Fig. A.1.
Server-Side
Stored XSS: Both Detection and Prevention: Dynamic Analysis
Barhoom and Kohail [31] described a server-side solution to detect and block stored XSS
attacks using XML and XSD to enforce input type integrity by preventing untrusted user input
from altering the structure of trusted code.
Reflected XSS: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Dynamic Analysis
Kerschbaum [56] presented a lightweight gateway solution at the server to prevent
reflected XSS attacks by using Web page classification, referrer string, and cookies techniques. It
ensures that input to a Web-site originated in the users’ browser and has not been forged by an
attacker by following a link.
Both Stored and Reflected: Detection Methods/Approaches: Static Analysis
Wassermann and Su [19] present a server-side static analysis approach for finding XSS
vulnerabilities that address weak or absent input validation.
Shar and Tan [20] present an approach based on static analysis and pattern matching
techniques to identify potential XSS vulnerabilities in source code and to secure them with
appropriate escape mechanisms. They also developed a tool, saferXSS.
Both Stored and Reflected: Detection Methods/Approaches: Dynamic Analysis
Johns et al. [32] presented XSSDS, a server-side XSS passive detection system that uses
two novel detection approaches based on generic observation of XSS attacks and Web
applications.
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McAllister et al. [22] presented an automated testing tool that can find reflected and stored
XSS vulnerabilities in Web applications. The core of their system is a black-box vulnerability
scanner.
Both Stored and Reflected: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Dynamic Analysis
Bisht and Venkatakrishnan [49] described XSS-Guard, a new framework that is designed
as a prevention mechanism against XSS attacks on the server side.
Garcia-Alfaro and Navarro-Arribas [50] presented an approach to prevent stored and
reflected XSS attacks by enforcing security policies defined at the server-side through the use of
XACML and X.509 certificates.
Van Gundy and Chen [51] presented Noncespaces, a mechanism that allows server to
identify untrusted content and reliably convey this information to the client to allow it to enforce
security policy on untrusted content. Similar to BEEP, Noncespaces cannot handle client-side
XSS.
Both Stored and Reflected: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Others
Stamm et al. [55] presented content restriction and content restriction scheme called
Content Security Policy (CSP) for preventing XSS attacks. The content restriction rules are
activated and enforced by supporting Web browsers when a policy provided for a site via HTTP.
Both Detection and Prevention: Dynamic analysis
Wurzinger et al. [33] described a server-side solution for detecting and preventing XSS
attacks by introducing SWAP (Secure Web Application Proxy).
General: Detection Methods/Approaches: Static Analysis
Bathia et al. [23] presented an approach to detect and correct security vulnerabilities in
Java Web applications using program slicing and transformation. They implemented a prototype
as an Eclipse plugin, leveraging the WALA library to fix XSS vulnerabilities in an interactive
manner.
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Chaudhuri and Foster [24] implement Rubyx, a symbolic executor that analyzes Ruby-onRails Web applications for security vulnerabilities such as XSS, CSRF, insufficient authentication
and access control, and leaks of secret information. Rubyx specifications are built on assertions ,
assumptions, and object invariants.
Livshits and Lam [25] propose a static analysis approach to detect vulnerabilities based on
points-to analysis for analyzing byte-code of Java Web applications based on binary decision
diagrams. They use a high-level declarative language Program Query Language (PQL) for
specifying information flow and automating information flow analysis.
Minamide [26] presented a static string analyzer for PHP that detects XSS vulnerabilities
using context-free grammar to approximate dynamic Web pages generated by a program.
General: Detection Methods/Approaches: Dynamic Analysis
Shahriar and Zulkernine [35] described a server-side XSS-attack detection technique based
on the concept of boundary injection and policy generation. They presented another server-side
approach in [38] to detect XSS attacks by distinguishing injected JavaScript code from legitimate
JavaScript code via injecting comments for legitimate JavaScript code that encode them in terms
of method definition and call signatures.
Sekar [36] presented an approach for detecting injection attacks using taint inference
technique that operates by intercepting requests and reposes from Web application. Their approach
has significant low overhead compared to other taint-based approaches.
Hermosillo et al. [37] presented a security aspect called AProSec through the use of aspectoriented programming (AOP) for detecting SQL injection and XSS attacks.
Huang et al. [29] described WAVES, a testing framework for assessing the security of Web
applications by injecting attack vectors.

97

General: Detection Methods/Approaches: Combination of static and dynamic analysis
Balzarotti et al. [27] described an approach that combines static and dynamic analysis
techniques for analyzing the sanitization process and detecting vulnerabilities that stem from
incorrect or incomplete sanitization. The approach is implemented as a tool, Saner.
General: Detection Methods/Approaches: Modeling
Song et al. [43] presented Spectrogram, a machine learning based statistical anomaly
detection sensor for detecting Web-layer code-injection attacks. It uses a mixture of Markov chains
based on n-gram transitions.
Ingham et al. [44] described a method for detecting anomalous Web requests via
Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA). The method is used in combination with rules for reducing
variability among requests and heuristics for filtering and grouping anomalies.
Kruegel and Vigna [45] and Kruegel et al. [46] presented one of the first works that uses
different anomaly detection techniques to detect attacks against Web servers and Web-based
applications. Web-server log files in common log format (CLF) is provided as input from which
multiple statistical models to characterize different features of normal Web requests such as
attribute length, character distribution, and attribute order are derived. A decision is made by taking
into account all features of Web requests based of statistical models.
General: Detection Methods/Approaches: Others
Robertson et al. [47] presented an approach that addresses the limitations of anomaly-based
intrusion detection system to detect Web attacks by using generalization and characterization
techniques, which reduce the time required to pinpoint the location, make decisions about nature
of anomalies and their criticality.
General: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Static Analysis
Scholte et al. [48] presented IPAAS, technique for preventing exploitation of XSS and SQL
injection vulnerabilities based on automated data type detection of input parameters.
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Robertson and Vigna [58] presented a Web application framework that leverages existing
work on strong type systems to statistically enforce a separation between the structure and content
of both Web documents and database queries generated by a Web application to prevent
introduction of server-side XSS.
General: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Dynamic Analysis
Nguyen-Tuong et al. [59] presented a fully automated approach to securely hardening Web
applications based on precisely tracking taintedness of data and checking specifically for malicious
content only in parts of commands and output that came from untrustworthy sources.
Halder et al. [60] presented a framework for tagging, tracking, and preventing malicious
user inputs at runtime. The described technique applies to Java class files and does not require
source code.
Shanmugam and Ponnavaikko [61] presented a behavior-based anomaly detection
approach on server-side to prevent XSS attacks.
Jim et al. [62] described a mechanism for preventing script injection called BrowserEnforced Embedded Policies (BEEP), that embeds a whitelist of known-safe scripts into each Web
page and instructs the Web browser to filter suspicious scripts. BEEP cannot handle client-side
XSS.
Gebre et al. [64] presented a server-side ingress filter that aims to provide defense against
content-sniffing XSS attacks by protecting vulnerable browsers that treat non-HTML files as
HTML files.
General: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Combination of static and dynamic analysis
Samuel et al. [57] presented a context-sensitive auto-sanitization engine based on type
qualifiers that can be bolted onto existing Web template frameworks to prevent XSS attacks.
General: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Modeling
Shanmugam and Ponnavaikko presented a thread-based solution for efficient process
utilization of Web server and to prevent XSS threats [66]. They described signature based misuse
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detection approach in [68] as a security layer on top of the Web application so that existing Web
application remains unchanged whenever a new threat is introduced that demands new security
mechanisms.
Johns [67] identified Web application’s characteristics responsible for enabling single
attack methods which include: availability of session tokens via JavaScript, pre-knowledge of
application’s URL, and implicit trust relationship between Webpages of same origin. Three serverside techniques deferred loading, one-time URLs, and sub-domain switching were proposed to
prevent session hijacking attacks. The author also implements SessionSafe that is a combination
of the described approaches.
General: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Secure Programming
Chong et al. [70] presented Servlet Information Flow (SIF), a Web application framework
based on security-typed language Jif. SIF is able to label user input, track information flow and
enforce annotated security policies on them at both compile time and run-time. Parallel work by
Chong et al. [69] presented Swift framework that automatically and securely partitions Jif source
code into server-side and client-side code and enforces end-to-end information flow policies over
code at both sides. SIF is applicable to Web applications whose functionality is mainly
implemented as server-side code.
General: Both Detection and Prevention: Static Analysis
Huang et al. [28] presented WebSSARI (Web application Security by Static Analysis and
Runtime Inspection), an extension system to language’s type system that automatically inserts
runtime guards in potentially insecure sections of code determined by static analysis.
General: Both Detection and Prevention: Dynamic Analysis
Chin and Wagner [42] described character-level taint-tracking approach for Java Web
applications via instrumentation of Java library classes and Java Servlet to detect and block XSS
attacks.
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Benjamin et al. [39] designed and implemented S2MXS2 as a server-side XSS attack
detection and prevention system using regular expression.
Hidhaya and Geetha [40] presented a server-side solution to mitigate XSS and SQL
injection attacks using MD5 algorithm and grammar expressions manipulated in a reverse proxy.
Mule et al. [41] presented a policy-based proxy agent that classify user requests as scripted
or query-based request and detects SQL injection and XSS-attacks. The user inputs are sanitized
by the sanitizing application placed in the reverse proxy server.
Priyadarshini et al. [30] described an intrusion detection system that detects vulnerabilities
including XSS and prevents attacks exploiting them using inter-server communication techniques.
Client-Side
Stored XSS: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Dynamic Analysis
Bojinov et al. [79] presented SiteFirewall which is a client-side defense against cross
channel scripting (XCS), a form of stored XSS that affects embedded devices by injecting
malicious scripts through ftp, p2p, or file logs.
Reflected XSS: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Combination of static and dynamic analysis
Vogt et al. [82] described a novel client-side solution that combines static and dynamic
analysis techniques to prevent XSS attacks by tracking flow of sensitive information inside the
Web browser.
Both Stored and Reflected: Detection Methods/Approaches: Dynamic Analysis
Saxena et al. [71] presented a dynamic analysis technique to systematically discover clientside XSS vulnerabilities and implemented a prototype tool FLAX that incorporated their described
technique. Saxena et al. [72] described a system for exploring the execution space of JavaScript
code using symbolic execution and built an automatic end-to-end tool Kudzu for detecting clientside XSS vulnerabilities. Kudzu automatically generates a test-suite that explores the execution
space.
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Both Stored and Reflected: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Dynamic Analysis
Kirda et al. [80] presented Noxes, a client-side solution for preventing XSS attacks. Noxes
acts as a Web proxy and uses both manual and automatically generated rules mitigate XSS attacks.
Kirda et al. [81] extended their previous work by dynamically enhancing protection mechanism
and presented an approach against attacks based on n-ary alphabets.
Both Stored and Reflected: Both Detection and Prevention: Dynamic analysis
Zhang et al. [77] present an execution-flow based method at client-side for detecting XSS
attacks by modeling the client-side behavior under normal execution as finite-state automate
(FSA). The system is deployed in proxy mode that analyzes the execution flow of client-side
JavaScript to prevent from potential malicious scripts that do not conform to FSA.
General: Detection Methods/Approaches: Static Analysis
Li et al. [73] presented an approach called perturbation-based interactive user-inputvalidation testing (PIUIVT) that improves the effectiveness of vulnerability scanners for userinput-validation (UIV) testing of Web applications by generating test inputs that detect XSS and
other vulnerabilities.
Arulsuju [78] described XHunter, automata-based detection tool that employs forward and
backward symbolic string analysis to detect XSS, SQL injection, and malicious file execution in
Web applications.
General: Detection Methods/Approaches: Modeling
Zhenyu et al. [75] presented a client-side system that automatically detects XSS
vulnerability by manipulating either primitive or advanced models.
Weinberger et al. [76] described a model of the Web browser and characterized the
challenges of XSS sanitization provided by frameworks quantifying the gap between what
frameworks provide and what applications require.
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General: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Dynamic Analysis
Stock et al. [84] described a filter design for DOM-based XSS that utilizes run-time taint
tracking and taint aware parsers to stop the parsing of attacker controlled syntactic content.
Tang et al. [85] presented Alhambra, a browser-based system designed to enforce and test
Web browser security policies. They also present two security policies, one that uses taint-tracking
engine to prevent XSS attacks and other that uses browsing history to create policies that restrict
the contents of document and prevent the inclusion of malicious content.
Ter Louw and Venkatakrishnan [86] presented the design and implementation of
BLUEPRINT, a robust prevention approach to XSS attacks by addressing browser inconsistencies
in parsing Web contents. Parse tree generated from untrusted HTML with precautions taken to
ensure absence of dynamic content on application server is conveyed to client browser.
Iha and Doi [87] described and implemented a binding mechanism in the Web browser for
preventing XSS attacks.
Chandra and Selvakumar [88] presented BIXSAN, a Browser Independent XSS SANitizer
for prevention of XSS attacks by filtering out harmful HTML content.
Tiwari et al. [89] described a client-side solution that uses step-by-step approach to detect
XSS without much degrading of users’ browsing experience. Similar step-by-step solution was
presented by Shalini and Usha [90] to protect Web applications against XSS attacks without
degrading users’ browsing experience.
Nikiforakis et al. [91] presented SessionShield, a lightweight client-side protection
mechanism against session hijacking, which is one of the main attack vectors of XSS.
Livshits and Erlingsson [92] presented a toolkits that help in preventing injection
vulnerabilities including XSS in applications built on AJAX framework by refining the sameorigin policy (SOP) in the browser.
Reis et al. [93] presented a vulnerability-driven filtering approach for static and dynamic
content implemented into BrowserShield, a general framework that rewrites HTML pages and any
embedded scripts to enforce policies on run-time behavior.
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Yu et al. [94] presented CoreScript, an operational semantics of a subset of JavaScript
useful for understanding and preventing sophisticated exploits that employ higher-order scripts.
Edit automata is used to express security policies.
General: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Combination of dynamic and static analysis
Venkatakrishnan et al. [83] described WebAppArmor, a framework that incorporates static
and dynamic analysis techniques, symbolic execution, and execution monitoring to prevent XSS,
SQL injection, and CSRF on existing (legacy) Web applications.
General: Both Detection and Prevention: Dynamic Analysis
Ismail et al. [74] presented a client-side system that automatically detects and collects XSS
vulnerabilities by manipulating either request or server response using user side local proxy servers
and uses the information to prevent XSS attacks.
Combination of server-side and client-side
Both Stored and Reflected: Detection Methods/Approaches: Static Analysis
Shahriar and Zulkernine [21] described a mutation-based technique to generate adequate
test data sets for detecting XSS vulnerabilities in Web applications that use PHP and JavaScript
code. The approach is implemented into MUTEC, a mutation-based testing tool to automatically
generate mutants.
Both Stored and Reflected: Detection Methods/Approaches: Dynamic Analysis
Sundareswaran and Squicciarini [34] present a hybrid client-server solution. The proxybased solution leverages the strengths of both anomaly detection and control flow analysis to
provide accurate detection.
Both Stored and Reflected: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Dynamic Analysis
Mui and Frankl [52] presented complementary character coding, a new approach to
character level dynamic tainting that allows efficient and precise taint propagation across the
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boundaries of server components and also between servers and clients over HTTP. This approach
offers precise protection against stored XSS attacks.
Nadji et al. [53] presented an approach that models XSS as privilege escalation
vulnerability rather than a sanitization problem by combining randomization of Web application
code and runtime tracking of untrusted data both on server and the browser to combat XSS attacks.
The technique ensures fundamental integrity property document structure integrity (DSI) that
prevents untrusted data from altering the structure of trusted code throughout the execution lifetime
of the Web application.
Cao et al. [54] described a new approach to blocking the two main propagation paths of
JavaScript worms, DOM access to different view and unauthorized HTTP requests to the server.
Both Stored and Reflected: General: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Combination of
dynamic analysis and modeling
Hooimeijer et al. [63] presented BEK, a language and a compiler for writing, analyzing
string manipulation routines, and converting them to general-purpose languages. BEK can
determine if a target string is a valid output of a sanitizer.
Barth et al. [65] presented an upload filter for Web sites to protect from content-sniffing
attacks based on the models extracted from browsers using string-enhanced white-box exploration
of binaries. They also presented a two-principled security enhanced browser content-sniffing
algorithm that helps to avoid privilege escalation and to use prefix disjoint signatures to prevent
content-sniffing attacks.
Generic
Stored: Detection Methods/Approaches: Static Analysis
Galan et al. [95] presented a multi-agent system for automatic scanning of Web-sites to
detect the presence of XSS vulnerabilities exploitable by stored XSS-attacks.
Wang et al. [96] described a static analysis algorithm integrated with program slicing
method to detect stored XSS vulnerabilities. The slices are composed of two parts, threat injection
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and threat release, which reconstruct a stored XSS attack scenario. They also present a prototype
implementation of their technique by extending Pixy [104], a tool that performs data flow analysis
on PHP code to detect stored XSS vulnerabilities.
Supplementary: Attack Implementation: Modeling
Faghani and Saidi [147] suggested a general model of propagation of XSS worms in virtual
social network along with simulation of propagation to verify conformation of described model.
Reflected: Detection Methods/Approaches: Static Analysis
Avancini and Ceccato [98, 99] integrated static analysis with genetic algorithms to suggest
candidate false positives reported by static analysis and provide input vectors that expose actual
vulnerabilities.
Reflected: Detection Methods/Approaches: Dynamic Analysis
Kals et al. [100] developed SecuBat, a generic and modular security vulnerability scanner
that automatically scans Websites to find SQL injection and XSS vulnerabilities.
Reflected: Detection Methods/Approaches: Modeling
Duchene et al. [101] presented an approach to detect reflected XSS vulnerabilities by
generating test inputs using a combination of model inference and evolutionary fuzzing. The
knowledge about application behavior obtained from model inference is used by genetic algorithm
to generate inputs. Kameleon-Fuzz is a work in progress implementation of their described
approach.
Reflected: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Modeling
Sharma et al. [134] described an integrated model to prevent reflected XSS and SQL
injection attacks in PHP Web applications.
Both Stored and Reflected: Detection Methods/Approaches: Dynamic Analysis
Kieyzun et al. [97] presented a technique for creating SQL injection and XSS attacks in
Web applications and an automated tool Ardilla that implements the technique for PHP. The
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technique is based on input generation, dynamic taint propagation, and input mutation to find a
variant of the input that exposes a vulnerability. The tool is capable of detecting stored secondorder XSS.
Both Stored and Reflected: Detection Methods/Approaches: Combination of dynamic and
static analysis
Similar to work in [96], work [120] presents a monitor embedding framework DESERVE
(DEtecting program SEcurity Vulnerability Exploitations) that identifies exploitable statements
from source code based on static backward slicing and embeds necessary code to detect attacks.
DESERVE can be used for detecting buffer overflow, SQL injection, and XSS attacks.
Both Stored and Reflected: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Dynamic Analysis
Putthacharoen and Bunyatnoparat [133] presented dynamic cookie rewriting technique
implemented in a Web proxy to render the cookie useless for stored and reflected XSS attacks.
Both Stored and Reflected: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Combination of dynamic and
static analysis
Phung et al. [132] described a method that combines static and dynamic analysis to prevent
or modify inappropriate behavior caused by malicious scripts during JavaScript execution. The
approach is based on modifying the code so as to make it self-protecting.
Both Stored and Reflected: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Modeling
Shar and Tan presented code-auditing approach that recovers the defense model
implemented in source code and suggests guidelines for checking the adequacy of recovered model
against XSS attacks [143]. After extracting all defenses implemented based on possible
implementations patterns of defensive coding methods, tainted-information flow graph, a variant
of control flow graph is introduced as a model to audit the adequacy of XSS defense artefacts.
General: Detection Methods/Approaches: Static Analysis
Al-Amro and El-Qawasmeh [102] described an algorithm that scans ASP.NET programs
for the detection of XSS and SQL injection security vulnerabilities.
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Agosta et al. [103] present a methodology and tool for vulnerability identification based on
symbolic code execution exploiting static taint analysis to improve the efficiency of the analysis.
Jovanovic et al. [104] described a static source code analysis technique that includes flowsensitive, inter-procedural, and context-sensitive data flow analysis combined with literal analysis
and alias analysis for PHP-based Web applications that can be used to detect SQL injection, XSS,
or command injection. They also implemented Pixy, an open source tool for detecting XSS attacks.
They also presented an approach to detect Web vulnerabilities based on static source code analysis
that uses precise alias analysis targeted at unique reference semantics commonly found in scripting
languages [105].
Yu et al. [106] presented an automata-based string analysis tool, Stranger for finding and
eliminating string-related security vulnerabilities in PHP applications. It uses symbolic backward
and forward reachability analysis to compute possible values the string expression can take during
program execution. It is capable of identifying XSS, SQL injection, and malicious file execution
(MFE) vulnerabilities in the program.
Choi et al. [107] presented an approach that enables the detection of XSS and SQL injection
vulnerabilities through the use of N-Gram analysis to extract malicious code and Support Vector
Machines (SVM) to classify it as XSS or SQL injection.
Nunan et al. [121] presented a classification of XSS attacks using Web document-based
and URL-based features. They also presented a method that employs machine learning technique s
to detect XSS attacks in Web pages.
Komiya et al. [108] described an approach based on machine learning techniques to learn
patterns of existing malicious codes and uses the information to classify new code as either
malicious or not that helps detecting XSS and SQL injection vulnerabilities.
Perez et al. [109] presents LAPSE+, an enhanced version of Eclipse plugin LAPSE along
with its command-line version making it independent of Eclipse IDE which is based on static
analysis for detecting XSS vulnerabilities.
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General: Detection Methods/Approaches: Dynamic Analysis
Chen and Wu [114] implemented an automated vulnerability scanner for injection attacks
in particular SQL injection and XSS capable of detecting vulnerability based on injection point
using black-box testing and crawling technique.
Zhang et al. [115] presented an approach to detect Web application vulnerabilities like XSS
and SQL injection by analyzing characteristics of Web form and assigning test values to each of
the fields for generating test suites, given URL. They implement D-Wav, a tool that incorporates
their approach.
Tang et al. [116] described L-WMxD (Lexical based Webmail XSS Discoverer), a
Webmail XSS fuzzer that uses lexical-based mutation engine to discover XSS vulnerabilities in
Webmail applications.
Frenz and Yoon [122] presented XSSmon, a perl-based an intrusion detection system for
XSS that captures potential client-side executable content and its hashing and later reprocessed for
any difference that will indicate XSS attack.
General: Detection Methods/Approaches: Combination of static and dynamic analysis
Van Acker et al. [110] presented FlashOver, a system to automatically scan Rich Internet
Applications for XSS vulnerabilities using a combination of static and dynamic code analysis.
Lucca et al. [111] described an approach that combines static and dynamic analysis. They
define static analysis based criteria is used to detect potential vulnerabilities in server pages and
dynamic analysis to detect actual vulnerabilities in a Web application.
General: Detection Methods/Approaches: Combination of dynamic analysis and modeling
Coppolino et al. [123] presented an ontology-based intrusion detection approach that
includes diagnostic features and is used to detect XSS and SQL injection attacks.
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General: Detection Methods/Approaches: Combination of static analysis and modeling
Yu et al. [112] present a set of abstractions for string and string operations that allow
efficient and precise verification of string manipulating programs in particular, properties that
involve implicit string relations among string variables.
General: Detection Methods/Approaches: Modeling
Avacini et al. [124] described a security oracle for XSS vulnerabilities based on safe model,
which is abstraction of the parse trees of HTML code resulting from safe executions.
Shahriar and Zulkernine [125] describe trustworthiness testing of XSS-based phishing
Websites based on behavioral model described using notion of finite state machines (FSM). They
implement PhishTester, a tool to automate the testing process.
Xiong et al. [118] presented a model-based testing (MBT) approach using data model that
describes relationship between Web security knowledge, business domain knowledge, and test
case development for penetration testing using TTCN-3.
Li [119] described a model checking technique using Java source code model checker
Bandera to check whether some security programming guidelines are followed and
correspondingly detect related security vulnerabilities.
General: Detection Methods/Approaches: Others
Matsuda et al. [126] presented a new XSS detection algorithm considering the appearance
frequency and position of characters in an input string.
Fonseca et al. [127] propose a method to evaluate and benchmark automatic Web
vulnerability scanners using software fault injection techniques.
Petkov [128] identified 15 vulnerability categories of programming flaws and indexed
existing vulnerabilities in OSVDB and CVE databases into those categories.
General: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Dynamic Analysis
Saxena et al. [135] propose ScriptGard, a system that employs dynamic analysis approach
to detect and auto-correct context-inconsistency errors in sanitization.
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Nanda et al. [136] presented the design, implementation, and evaluation of a dynamic
checking compiler called WASC that automatically adds checks into Web applications used in
three-tier Internet services to protect them from SQL injection and XSS attacks. WASC compiler
uses accurate dynamic information flow tracking and comprehensive HTML/SQL parsing to
effectively stop SQL injection and XSS. Extends GIFT compiler.
Li and Wang [137] presented FIRM, a system that embeds inline reference monitor (IRM)
in Web pages hosting Flash content and protects it by controlling DOM methods and randomizing
variables with sensitive data to prevent XSS attacks. Somorovsky et al. [138] devise a black-box
analysis methodology for public cloud interfaces.
General: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Modeling
Brinhosa et al. [139] presented a way to implement an input validation model for Web
services to prevent XSS and SQL injection through use of predefined models that speci fy valid
inputs. Their described model consists of an XML schema, an XML specification, and a module
for performing input validation according to the schema.
Sun and He [140] presented a model checking method for defense against XSS-attacks.
They propose an automatic modeling algorithm for HTML code.
Shar and Tan [144] described an approach for extracting XSS defense features in code to
facilitate thorough examination and auditing of code to defend against XSS attacks.
General: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Secure Programming
Grabowski et al. [141] presented a type system for a Java-like language that is refined with
extended string types, output effects, and polymorphic method types to automatically verify
adherence to programming guidelines.
Johns et al. [129] presented a general approach to outfit modern programming languages
with mandatory means for explicit and secure code generation providing strict separation between
data and code using embedded language encapsulation type (ELET).
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Juillerat [130] presented how a properly designed library can be used to enforce security
resulting in creation of robust and secure applications. The author uses “Stones” Java library to
validate his approach.
General: Prevention Methods/Approaches: Others
Sivakumar and Garg [131] organized errors into taxonomy and mapped common
vulnerability exposures (CVE) with common weakness enumeration (CWE) of Mitre Corp, to
construct a common XSS vulnerability enumeration (CXE) that can help security practitioners in
recognizing common coding patterns leading to XSS vulnerability along with helping developers
identify and rectify existing errors in application. Stuckman and Purtilo [145] propose a
benchmarking test-bed for automatic evaluation of Web intrusion prevention systems in a
standardized and reproducible way.
Shanmugam and Ponnavaikko [142] described a solution to block XSS attacks independent
of languages used to develop Web applications and addresses XSS vulnerabilities that arise from
other interfaces. The solution is based on service-oriented architecture (SOA) and makes use of
XML and XSD for inter operations of the services. The solution involves generating an XML
document based on all form controls submitted by the user which will be validated against a
schema at the server side. Wang et al. [146] provide a scheme to collect evidence after suffering
XSS attacks from network systems along with management strategies to prevent XSS attacks from
network intrusions.
General: Both Detection and Prevention: Combination of static and dynamic analysis
Ruse and Basu [113] presented a two-phase technique that uses both static and dynamic
analysis to detect XSS vulnerabilities and prevent XSS attacks. The static analysis phase includes
application translation and concolic unit testing techniques whereas runtime monitoring phase
monitors relevant variables in the application.
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General: Both Detection and Prevention: Combination of dynamic analysis and modeling
Martin and Lam [117] presented QED, a goal-directed model-checking system that
automatically generates attacks exploiting taint-based vulnerabilities like XSS and SQL injection.
General: Neither Detection nor Prevention: Modeling
Shar and Tan built vulnerability predictors from static code attributes that characterize
input sanitization and validation code patterns for predicting SQL injection and XSS attacks [148].
The authors classify various input sanitization methods and propose a set of static code attributes
to represent these types and later use data mining methods to predict SQL injection and XSS
vulnerabilities in Web applications [149].
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APPENDIX B
TEST PLAN
This test plan documents the unit test plan for the methods in the implementation.

secKMgmt Package

DataParser Class Methods

Table B-1: Test Plan for parseCAPEC method.
Test #
PA-1

Input
userInput.getCapecT
estXmlLoc() =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\
\\OneDrive\\\\Resear
ch\\\\Ontology\\\\So
urce\\\\CAPEC\\\\ca
pecParsing0.xml

Expected Output
capecPattern.size = 0

Actual Output
The output matched the
expected output.

PA-2

userInput.getCapecT
estXmlLoc() =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\
\\OneDrive\\\\Resear
ch\\\\Ontology\\\\So
urce\\\\CAPEC\\\\ca
pecParsingTest1.xml

capecPattern.size = 1
The contents of the resulting
ArrayList should match the
contents specified in file that
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/Tes
tFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Test
ing/Expected%20Outputs/Data
Parser/parseCAPEC/capecParsi
ngTest1.txt

The output matched the
expected output.
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Comments
The passed xml file has no
attack pattern tags. The xml
file used as test input can be
found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/Te
stFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Te
sting/Inputs/DataParser/parseC
APEC/capecParsingTest0.xml
The passed xml file has exactly
1 attack pattern tags. The xml
file used as test input can be
found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/Te
stFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Te
sting/Inputs/DataParser/parseC
APEC/capecParsingTest1.xml

Test #
PA-3

Input
userInput.getCapecT
estXmlLoc() =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\
\\OneDrive\\\\Resear
ch\\\\Ontology\\\\So
urce\\\\CAPEC\\\\ca
pecParsingTest2.xml

PA-4

userInput.getCapecT
estXmlLoc() =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\
\\OneDrive\\\\Resear
ch\\\\Ontology\\\\So
urce\\\\CAPEC\\\\ca
pecFile.xml
userInput.getCapecT
estXmlLoc() =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\
\\OneDrive\\\\Resear
ch\\\\Ontology\\\\So
urce\\\\CAPEC\\\\ca
pecParsingTest3.xml

PA-5

Expected Output
capecPattern.size = 5
The contents of the resulting
ArrayList should match the
contents specified in file that
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/Tes
tFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Test
ing/Expected%20Outputs/Data
Parser/parseCAPEC/capecParsi
ngTest2.txt
FileNotFoundException

Actual Output
The output matched the
expected output.

Comments
The passed xml file has exactly
5 attack pattern tags. The xml
file used as test input can be
found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/Te
stFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Te
sting/Inputs/DataParser/parseC
APEC/capecParsingTest2.xml

The output matched the
expected output.

The xml file is not found in the
specified location.

XMLStreamException

The output matched the
expected output.

The passed xml file is
malformed. The xml file used
as test input can be found at
the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/Te
stFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Te
sting/Inputs/DataParser/parseC
APEC/capecParsingTest3.xml

Table B-2: Test Plan for parseCWE method.
Test #
PW-1

Input
userInput.getCweTe
stXmlLoc() =

Expected Output
Cwe.Enum.size = 0

Actual Output
The output matched the
expected output.
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Comments
The passed xml file has no
weakness tags. The xml file

Test #

Input
C:\\\\Users\bhanu\\\\
OneDrive\\\\Researc
h\\\\Ontology\\\\Sour
ce\\\\CWE\\\\cweTes
t0.xml

Expected Output

Actual Output

PW-2

userInput.getCweTe
stXmlLoc() =
C:\\\\Users\bhanu\\\\
OneDrive\\\\Researc
h\\\\Ontology\\\\Sour
ce\\\\CWE\\\\cweTes
t1.xml

The output matched the
expected output.

PW-3

userInput.getCweTe
stXmlLoc() =
C:\\\\Users\bhanu\\\\
OneDrive\\\\Researc
h\\\\Ontology\\\\Sour
ce\\\\CWE\\\\cweTes
t2.xml

PW-4

userInput.getCweTe
stXmlLoc() =
C:\\\\Users\bhanu\\\\
OneDrive\\\\Researc
h\\\\Ontology\\\\Sour

cweEnum.size = 1
The contents of the resulting
ArrayList should match the
contents specified in file that
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/Tes
tFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Test
ing/Expected%20Outputs/Data
Parser/parseCWE/cweParsingT
est1.txt
Cwe.Enum.size = 5
The content of the ArrayList
should match the contents
specified in file that can be
found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/Tes
tFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Test
ing/Expected%20Outputs/Data
Parser/parseCWE/cweParsingT
est2.txt
FileNotFoundException

Comments
used as test input can be found
at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/Tes
tFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Test
ing/Inputs/DataParser/parseCW
E/cweParsingTest0.xml
The passed xml file has exactly
1 weakness tag. The xml file
used as test input can be found
at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/Tes
tFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Test
ing/Inputs/DataParser/parseCW
E/cweParsingTest1.xml

The output matched the
expected output.

The passed xml file has exactly
5 weakness tags. The xml file
used as test input can be found
at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/Tes
tFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Test
ing/Inputs/DataParser/parseCW
E/cweParsingTest2.xml

The output matched the
expected output.

The xml file is not found in the
specified location.
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Test #
PW-5

Input
ce\\\\CWE\\\\cweFil
e.xml
userInput.getCweTe
stXmlLoc() =
C:\\\\Users\bhanu\\\\
OneDrive\\\\Researc
h\\\\Ontology\\\\Sour
ce\\\\CWE\\\\cwePar
singTest3.xml

Expected Output

Actual Output

Comments

XMLStreamException

The output matched the
expected output.

The passed xml file is
malformed. The xml file used
as test input can be found at the
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/Tes
tFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Test
ing/Inputs/DataParser/parseCW
E/cweParsingTest3.xml

DataReader Class Methods
Table B-3: Test Plan for loadLatestCAPEC method.
Test #
LA-1

Input
userInput.getCapecXmlUrl =
http://capec.mitre.org/data/xml/capec_v2.8.x
ml
userInput.getCapecXsdUrl =
http://capec.mitre.org/data/xsd/ap_schema_v
2.7.1.xsd
userInput.getCapecXmlLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\
\\\Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CAPEC\\\\capecXml
.xml userInput.getCapecXsdLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\
\\\Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CAPEC\\\\capecXsd.
xsd

Expected Output
Actual Output
Files with names capecXml.xml and The output
capecXsd.xsd are saved at the
matched the
specified location. The contents of
expected output.
the saved xml file can be found at the
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/DataReader/loadLat
estCAPEC/capecXml.xml
The contents of the saved xsd file
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/DataReader/loadLat
estCAPEC/capecXsd.xsd
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Comments
The capec
xml and xsd
files from
the
specified
URLs are
saved at the
specified
locations.

Test #
LA-2

LA-3

LA-4

Input
Expected Output
userInput.getCapecXmlUrl =
IOException
http://capec.mitre.org/data/xml/capec_v2.8.x
ml
userInput.getCapecXsdUrl =
http://capec.mitre.org/data//ap_schema_v2.7.
1.xsd
userInput.getCapecXmlLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\
\\\Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CAPEC\\\\capecXml
.xml userInput.getCapecXsdLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\
\\\Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CAPEC\\\\capecXsd.
xsd
userInput.getCapecXmlUrl =
IOException
http://capec.mitre.org/data/xml/capec_v2.8.x
ml
userInput.getCapecXsdUrl =
http://capec.mitre.org/data/xsd/ap_schema_v
2.7.1.xsd
userInput.getCapecXmlLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\
\\\Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CAPEC\\\\capecXml
.xml userInput.getCapecXsdLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\Bhanukiran\\\\OneDrive\\\\Rese
arch\\\\Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CAPEC\\\\capec
Xsd.xsd
userInput.getCapecXmlUrl =
IOException
http://capec.mitre.org/data/xml/capec_v2.8.x
ml
userInput.getCapecXsdUrl =
http://capec.mitre.org/data//ap_schema_v2.7.
1.xsd
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Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected output.

Comments
The capec
xml URL is
correct but
capec xsd
URL is
incorrect.

The output
matched the
expected output.

The capec
xml and xsd
URLs are
correct but
the xsd file
save
location is
incorrect

The output
matched the
expected output.

The capec
xml URL is
correct but
xsd URL is
incorrect.
The

Test #

Input
userInput.getCapecXmlLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\SkyDrive\\\\Research\\
\\Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CAPEC\\\\capecXml.
xml userInput.getCapecXsdLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\
\\\Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CAPEC\\\\capecXsd.
xsd

Expected Output

Actual Output

Comments
location for
saving
capec xml
is incorrect
but location
for saving
xsd is
correct.

Table B-4: Test Plan for loadLatestCWE method.
Test #
LW-1

Input
userInput.getCweXmlUrl =
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/xml/cwec_v2.9.xml.
zip
userInput.getCweXsdUrl =
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/xsd/cwe_schema_v5
.4.2.xsd
userInput.getCweXmlLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\
\Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CWE\\\\cweXml.xml
userInput.getCweXsdLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\
\Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CWE\\\\cweXsd.xsd

LW-2

userInput.getCweXmlUrl =
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/xml/cwec_v2.9.xml.
zip

Expected Output
Actual Output
Files with names capecXml.xml and The output
capecXsd.xsd are saved at the
matched the
specified location. The contents of
expected output.
the saved xml file can be found at
the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFil
es/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Exp
ected%20Outputs/DataReader/load
LatestCWE/cweXml.xml
The contents of the saved xsd file
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFil
es/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Ex
pected%20Outputs/DataReader/loa
dLatestCWE/cweXsd.xsd
IOException
The output
matched the
expected output.
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Comments
The cwe xml
and xsd files
from the
specified
URLs are
saved in the
specified
locations.

The cwe
xml URL is
correct but

Test #

LW-3

LW-4

Input
userInput.getCweXsdUrl =
http://cwe.mitre.org/data//cwe_schema_v5.4.2
.xsd
userInput.getCweXmlLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\
\Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CWE\\\\cweXml.xml
userInput.getCweXsdLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\
\Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CWE\\\\cweXsd.xsd
userInput.getCweXmlUrl =
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/xml/cwec_v2.9.xml.
zip
userInput.getCweXsdUrl =
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/xsd/cwe_schema_v5
.4.2.xsd
userInput.getCweXmlLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\
\Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CWE\\\\cweXml.xml
userInput.getCweXsdLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\SkyDrive\\\\Research\\\
\Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CWE\\\\cweXsd.xsd
userInput.getCweXmlUrl =
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/xml/cwec_v2.9.xml.
zip
userInput.getCweXsdUrl =
http://cwe.mitre.org/data//cwe_schema_v5.4.2
.xsd
userInput.getCweXmlLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\Administrator\\\\OneDrive\\\\Re
search\\\\Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CWE\\\\cweX
ml.xml

Expected Output

Actual Output

Comments
cwe xsd
URL is
incorrect.

IOException

The output
matched the
expected output.

The cwe
xml and xsd
URLs are
correct but
the xsd file
save
location is
incorrect

IOException

The output
matched the
expected output.

The cwe
xml URL is
correct but
xsd URL is
incorrect.
The location
for saving
cwe xml is
incorrect but
location for
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Test #

Input
userInput.getCweXsdLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\
\Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CWE\\\\cweXsd.xsd

Expected Output

Actual Output

Comments
saving xsd
is correct.

OntologyManager Class Methods
Table B-5: Test Plan for updateCAPEC method.
Test #
UA-1

Input
userInput.getSecOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\secKOnt_Ver5.owl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2
015/10/untitled-ontology19
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov

UA-2

userInput.getSecOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\secKOnt_Ver5.owl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2
015/10/untitled-ontology19
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov

Expected Output
The resulting ontology after
updating with capec
information remains
unchanged. The resulting
owl file can be found at the
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit
%20Testing/Expected%20O
utputs/OntologyManager/up
dateCAPEC/updateCapecTe
st0.owl
The resulting ontology after
updating with capec
information with contents
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit
%20Testing/Expected%20O
utputs/OntologyManager/up
dateCAPEC/updateCapecTe
st1.owl
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Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected output.

Comments
The ontology file containing zero
threat individuals that is used as
input can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCAPEC/
updateCapecTest0.owl
The number of attack patterns
resulting from parsing xml file is
zero.

The output
matched the
expected output.

The ontology file containing zero
threat individuals that is used as
input can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCAPEC/
updateCapecTest0.owl
The number of attack patterns
resulting from parsing xml file is
one. The attack pattern information

Test #

Input

UA-3

userInput.getSecOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\secKOnt_Ver5.owl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2
015/10/untitled-ontology19
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov

UA-4

userInput.getSecOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\secKOnt_Ver5.owl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2

Expected Output
The Retrieval, Organization,
Person, Likelihood,
Severity, Pattern and Threat
Entity has the individuals
with data and object
properties created as shown
in the expected output file.
The resulting ontology after
updating with capec
information with contents
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit
%20Testing/Expected%20O
utputs/OntologyManager/up
dateCAPEC/updateCapecTe
st2.owl
The Retrieval, Organization,
Person, Likelihood,
Severity, Pattern and Threat
Entity has the individuals
with data and object
properties created as shown
in the expected output file.
The resulting ontology after
updating with capec
information remains
unchanged. The resulting
owl file can be found at the
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit
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Actual Output

Comments
used is same as attack pattern
information found at link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/DataParser/parseC
APEC/capecParsingTest1.txt

The output
matched the
expected output.

The ontology file containing zero
threat individuals that is used as
input can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCAPEC/
updateCapecTest0.owl
The number of attack patterns
resulting from parsing xml file is
five. The attack pattern information
used is same as attack pattern
information found at link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/DataParser/parseC
APEC/capecParsingTest2.txt

The output
matched the
expected output.

The ontology file containing one
threat individual that is used as input
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCAPEC/
updateCapecTest1.owl

Test #

UA-5

UA-6

Input
015/10/untitled-ontology19
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov
userInput.getSecOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\secKOnt_Ver5.owl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2
015/10/untitled-ontology19
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov

userInput.getSecOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\secKOnt_Ver5.owl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2
015/10/untitled-ontology19
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov

Expected Output
%20Testing/Expected%20O
utputs/OntologyManager/up
dateCAPEC/updateCapecTe
st3.owl
The resulting ontology after
updating with capec
information with contents
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit
%20Testing/Expected%20O
utputs/OntologyManager/up
dateCAPEC/updateCapecTe
st4.owl
The Retrieval, Organization,
Person, Likelihood,
Severity, Pattern and Threat
Entity has the individuals
with data and object
properties created as shown
in the expected output file.
The resulting ontology after
updating with capec
information with contents
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit
%20Testing/Expected%20O
utputs/OntologyManager/up
dateCAPEC/updateCapecTe
st5.owl
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Actual Output

Comments
The number of attack patterns
resulting from parsing xml file is
zero.

The output
matched the
expected output.

The ontology file containing one
threat individual that is used as input
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCAPEC/
updateCapecTest1.owl
The number of attack patterns
resulting from parsing xml file is
one. The attack pattern information
used is same as attack pattern
information found at link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/DataParser/parseC
APEC/capecParsingTest1.txt

The output
matched the
expected output.

The ontology file containing one
threat individual that is used as input
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCAPEC/
updateCapecTest1.owl
The number of attack patterns
resulting from parsing xml file is
five. The attack pattern information

Test #

Input

UA-7

userInput.getSecOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\secKOnt_Ver5.owl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2
015/10/untitled-ontology19
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov

UA-8

userInput.getSecOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\secKOnt_Ver5.owl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2
015/10/untitled-ontology19

Expected Output
The Retrieval, Organization,
Person, Likelihood,
Severity, Pattern and Threat
Entity has the individuals
with data and object
properties created as shown
in the expected output file.
The resulting ontology after
updating with capec
information remains
unchanged. The resulting
owl file can be found at the
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit
%20Testing/Expected%20O
utputs/OntologyManager/up
dateCAPEC/updateCapecTe
st6.owl

Actual Output

Comments
used is same as attack pattern
information found at link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/DataParser/parseC
APEC/capecParsingTest2.txt

The output
matched the
expected output.

The resulting ontology after
updating with capec
information with contents
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit
%20Testing/Expected%20O
utputs/OntologyManager/up

The output
matched the
expected output.

The ontology file containing one
threat individual that is used as input
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCAPEC/
updateCapecTest2.owl
The number of attack patterns
resulting from parsing xml file is
one. The attack pattern information
used is same as attack pattern
information found at link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/DataParser/parseC
APEC/capecParsingTest1.txt
The ontology file containing one
threat individual that is used as input
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCAPEC/
updateCapecTest2.owl
The number of attack patterns
resulting from parsing xml file is
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Test #

Input
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov

UA-9

userInput.getSecOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\secKOnt_Ver5.owl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2
015/10/untitled-ontology19
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov

UA-10

userInput.getSecOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\secKOnt_Ver5.owl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2

Expected Output
dateCAPEC/updateCapecTe
st7.owl
The Retrieval, Organization,
Person, Likelihood,
Severity, Pattern and Threat
Entity has the individuals
with data and object
properties created as shown
in the expected output file.
The resulting ontology after
updating with capec
information remains
unchanged. The resulting
owl file can be found at the
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit
%20Testing/Expected%20O
utputs/OntologyManager/up
dateCAPEC/updateCapecTe
st8.owl

Actual Output

Comments
five. The attack pattern information
used is same as attack pattern
information found at link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/DataParser/parseC
APEC/capecParsingTest2.txt

The output
matched the
expected output.

The resulting ontology after
updating with capec
information with contents
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit
%20Testing/Expected%20O

The output
matched the
expected output.

The ontology file containing five
threat individual that is used as input
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCAPEC/
updateCapecTest3.owl
The number of attack patterns
resulting from parsing xml file is
five. The attack pattern information
used is same as attack pattern
information found at link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/DataParser/parseC
APEC/capecParsingTest2.txt
The ontology file containing five
threat individual that is used as input
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCAPEC/
updateCapecTest4.owl
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Test #

Input
015/10/untitled-ontology19
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov

Expected Output
utputs/OntologyManager/up
dateCAPEC/updateCapecTe
st9.owl
The Retrieval, Organization,
Person, Likelihood,
Severity, Pattern and Threat
Entity has the individuals
with data and object
properties created as shown
in the expected output file.

Actual Output

Comments
The number of attack patterns
resulting from parsing xml file is
five. The attack pattern information
used is same as attack pattern
information found at link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/DataParser/parseC
APEC/capecParsingTest2.txt

Discussion:
During the first pass of testing, test case UA-9 did not pass and “Null Pointer Exception” was thrown. This was because some of the
fields being retrieved for the attack pattern did not have any value. This was fixed by checking if the value retrieved was not null before
inserting that value as property of an individual in the ontology.
Table B-6: Test Plan for updateCWE method.
Test #
UW-1

Input
userInput.getCapecUpdSav
OntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\capecUpdSavedOnt.o
wl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2
015/10/untitled-ontology19

Expected Output
The resulting ontology after
updating with cwe
information remains
unchanged. The resulting
owl file can be found at the
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%
20Testing/Expected%20Outp
uts/OntologyManager/update
CWE/updateCweTest0.owl
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Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected output.

Comments
The ontology file containing zero
weakness individuals that is used as
input can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCWE/up
dateCweTest0.owl
The number of weaknesses resulting
from parsing xml file is zero.

Test #
UW-2

UW-3

Input
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov
userInput.getCapecUpdSav
OntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\capecUpdSavedOnt.o
wl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2
015/10/untitled-ontology19
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov

userInput.getCapecUpdSav
OntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\capecUpdSavedOnt.o
wl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2
015/10/untitled-ontology19
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov

Expected Output

Actual Output

Comments

The resulting ontology after
updating with cwe
information with contents
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%
20Testing/Expected%20Outp
uts/OntologyManager/update
CWE/updateCweTest1.owl
The Retrieval, Organization,
Person, Likelihood, and
Weakness Entity has the
individuals with data and
object properties created as
shown in the expected output
file.
The resulting ontology after
updating with cwe
information with contents
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%
20Testing/Expected%20Outp
uts/OntologyManager/update
CWE/updateCweTest2.owl
The Retrieval, Organization,
Person, Likelihood, and
Weakness Entity has the
individuals with data and
object properties created as

The output
matched the
expected output.

The ontology file containing zero
weakness individuals that is used as
input can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCWE/up
dateCweTest0.owl
The number of weaknesses resulting
from parsing xml file is one. The
weakness information used is same
as weakness information found at
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/DataParser/parseC
WE/cweParsingTest1.txt
The ontology file containing zero
weakness individuals that is used as
input can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCWE/up
dateCweTest0.owl
The number of weaknesses resulting
from parsing xml file is five. The
weakness information used is same
as attack pattern information found
at link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
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The output
matched the
expected output.

Test #

Input

UW-4

userInput.getCapecUpdSav
OntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\capecUpdSavedOnt.o
wl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2
015/10/untitled-ontology19
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov
userInput.getCapecUpdSav
OntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\capecUpdSavedOnt.o
wl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2
015/10/untitled-ontology19
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov

UW-5

Expected Output
shown in the expected output
file.
The resulting ontology after
updating with cwe
information remains
unchanged. The resulting
owl file can be found at the
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%
20Testing/Expected%20Outp
uts/OntologyManager/update
CWE/updateCweTest3.owl

Actual Output

The resulting ontology after
updating with cwe
information with contents
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%
20Testing/Expected%20Outp
uts/OntologyManager/update
CWE/updateCweTest4.owl
The Retrieval, Organization,
Person, Likelihood, and
Weakness Entity has the
individuals with data and
object properties created as
shown in the expected output
file.

The output
matched the
expected output.
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The output
matched the
expected output.

Comments
cted%20Outputs/DataParser/parseC
WE/cweParsingTest2.txt
The ontology file containing one
weakness individual that is used as
input can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCWE/up
dateCweTest1.owl
The number of weaknesses resulting
from parsing xml file is zero.

The ontology file containing one
weakness individual that is used as
input can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCWE/up
dateCweTest1.owl
The number of weaknesses resulting
from parsing xml file is one. The
weakness information used is same
as weakness information found at
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/DataParser/parseC
WE/cweParsingTest1.txt

Test #
UW-6

Input
userInput.getCapecUpdSav
OntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\capecUpdSavedOnt.o
wl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2
015/10/untitled-ontology19
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov

UW-7

userInput.getCapecUpdSav
OntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\capecUpdSavedOnt.o
wl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2
015/10/untitled-ontology19
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov

Expected Output
The resulting ontology after
updating with cwe
information with contents
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%
20Testing/Expected%20Outp
uts/OntologyManager/update
CWE/updateCweTest5.owl
The Retrieval, Organization,
Person, Likelihood, and
Weakness Entity has the
individuals with data and
object properties created as
shown in the expected output
file.
The resulting ontology after
updating with cwe
information remains
unchanged. The resulting
owl file can be found at the
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%
20Testing/Expected%20Outp
uts/OntologyManager/update
CWE/updateCweTest6.owl
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Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected output.

The output
matched the
expected output.

Comments
The ontology file containing one
weakness individual that is used as
input can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCWE/up
dateCweTest1.owl
The number of weaknesses resulting
from parsing xml file is five. The
weakness information used is same
as weakness information found at
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/DataParser/parseC
WE/cweParsingTest2.txt
The ontology file containing one
weakness individual that is used as
input can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCWE/up
dateCweTest2.owl
The number of weaknesses resulting
from parsing xml file is five. The
weakness information used is same
as weakness information found at
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/DataParser/parseC
WE/cweParsingTest1.txt

Test #
UW-8

Input
userInput.getCapecUpdSav
OntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\capecUpdSavedOnt.o
wl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2
015/10/untitled-ontology19
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov

UW-9

userInput.getCapecUpdSav
OntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\capecUpdSavedOnt.o
wl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2
015/10/untitled-ontology19
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov

Expected Output
The resulting ontology after
updating with cwe
information with contents
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%
20Testing/Expected%20Outp
uts/OntologyManager/update
CWE/updateCweTest7.owl
The Retrieval, Organization,
Person, Likelihood, and
Weakness Entity has the
individuals with data and
object properties created as
shown in the expected output
file.
The resulting ontology after
updating with cwe
information remains
unchanged. The resulting
owl file can be found at the
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%
20Testing/Expected%20Outp
uts/OntologyManager/update
CWE/updateCweTest8.owl
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Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected output.

The output
matched the
expected output.

Comments
The ontology file containing one
weakness individual that is used as
input can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCWE/up
dateCweTest2.owl
The number of weaknesses resulting
from parsing xml file is five. The
weakness information used is same
as weakness information found at
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/DataParser/parseC
WE/cweParsingTest2.txt
The ontology file containing five
weakness individual that is used as
input can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCWE/up
dateCweTest3.owl
The number of weaknesses resulting
from parsing xml file is five. The
weakness information used is same
as weakness information found at
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/DataParser/parseC
WE/cweParsingTest2.txt

Test #
UW10

Input
userInput.getCapecUpdSav
OntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\One
Drive\\\\Research\\\\Ontolo
gy\\\\capecUpdSavedOnt.o
wl
userInput.getSecOntIRI =
http://www.semanticweb.o
rg/bhanukiran/ontologies/2
015/10/untitled-ontology19
userInput.getProvIRI =
http://www.w3.org/ns/prov

Expected Output
The resulting ontology after
updating with cwe
information with contents
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/
TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%
20Testing/Expected%20Outp
uts/OntologyManager/update
CWE/updateCweTest9.owl
The Retrieval, Organization,
Person, Likelihood, and
Weakness Entity has the
individuals with data and
object properties created as
shown in the expected output
file.

Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected output.

Comments
The ontology file containing five
weakness individual that is used as
input can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Input
s/OntologyManager/updateCWE/up
dateCweTest4.owl
The number of weaknesses resulting
from parsing xml file is five. The
weakness information used is same
as weakness information found at
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFile
s/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/DataParser/parseC
WE/cweParsingTest2.txt

Discussion:
During the first pass of testing, test case UW-9 did not pass and “Null Pointer Exception” was thrown. This was because some of the
fields being retrieved for the weakness did not have any value. This was fixed by checking if the value retrieved was not null before
inserting that value as property of an individual in the ontology.
Table B-7: Test Plan for testOrgExists method.
Test #
OE-1

Input
userInput.getsecInfOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive
\\\\Research\\\\Ontology\\\\infSa
vedOnt.owl

Expected Output
True

Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected
output.
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Comments
The owl ontology file contains “The Mitre
Corporation” as an Organization name. The
owl ontology file can be found at the link:

Test #

Input
agentName = “Mitre
Corporation”

Expected Output

Actual Output

OE-2

userInput.getsecInfOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive
\\\\Research\\\\Ontology\\\\infSa
vedOnt.owl
agentName = MITRE
Corporation
userInput.getsecInfOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive
\\\\Research\\\\Ontology\\\\infSa
vedOnt.owl
agentName = MiTrE
CoRpOrAtIoN
userInput.getsecInfOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive
\\\\Research\\\\Ontology\\\\infSa
vedOnt.owl
agentName = “ Mitre
Corporation “

False

The output
matched the
expected
output.

False

The output
matched the
expected
output.

True

The output
matched the
expected
output.

OE-3

OE-4

Comments
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/ma
ster/Unit%20Testing/Inputs/OntologyManager
/testExists/testExists0.owl
The owl ontology file contains “The Mitre
Corporation” as an Organization name. The
owl ontology file can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/ma
ster/Unit%20Testing/Inputs/OntologyManager
/testExists/testExists0.owl
The owl ontology file contains “The Mitre
Corporation” as an Organization name. The
owl ontology file can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/ma
ster/Unit%20Testing/Inputs/OntologyManager
/testExists/testExists0.owl
The owl ontology file contains “The Mitre
Corporation” as an Organization name. The
owl ontology file can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/ma
ster/Unit%20Testing/Inputs/OntologyManager
/testExists/testExists0.owl

Discussion:
During the first pass of testing, test case OE-4 did not result in expected output. If there were any preceding and/or succeeding spaces
in the same name, they were getting treated as different names. This was fixed by trimming the string before inserting into o ntology as
well as trimming the string before comparison.
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Table B-8: Test Plan for testPersonExists method.
Test #
PE-1

Input
userInput.getsecInfOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive
\\\\Research\\\\Ontology\\\\infSa
vedOnt.owl
agentName =
“CAPECContentTeam”
PE-2
userInput.getsecInfOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive
\\\\Research\\\\Ontology\\\\infSa
vedOnt.owl
agentName =
CapecContentTeam
PE-3
userInput.getsecInfOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive
\\\\Research\\\\Ontology\\\\infSa
vedOnt.owl
agentName =
CAPECContentTEAM
PE-4
userInput.getsecInfOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive
\\\\Research\\\\Ontology\\\\infSa
vedOnt.owl
agentName = “
CAPECContentTeam “
Discussion:

Expected Output
True

Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected
output.

False

The output
matched the
expected
output.

False

The output
matched the
expected
output.

True

The output
matched the
expected
output.

Comments
The owl ontology file contains
“CAPECContentTeam” as a Person name. The
owl ontology file can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/ma
ster/Unit%20Testing/Inputs/OntologyManager
/testExists/testExists0.owl
The owl ontology file contains
“CAPECContentTeam” as a Person name. The
owl ontology file can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/ma
ster/Unit%20Testing/Inputs/OntologyManager
/testExists/testExists0.owl
The owl ontology file contains
“CAPECContentTeam” as a Person name. The
owl ontology file can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/ma
ster/Unit%20Testing/Inputs/OntologyManager
/testExists/testExists0.owl
The owl ontology file contains
“CAPECContentTeam” as a Person name. The
owl ontology file can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/ma
ster/Unit%20Testing/Inputs/OntologyManager
/testExists/testExists0.owl

During the first pass of testing, test case PE-4 did not result in expected output. If there were any preceding and/or succeeding spaces in
the same name, they were getting treated as different names. This was fixed by trimming the string before inserting into onto logy as
well as trimming the string before comparison.
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Table B-9: Test Plan for testThreatExists method.
Test #
TE-1

Input
userInput.getsecInfOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive
\\\\Research\\\\Ontology\\\\infSa
vedOnt.owl
agentName = “CAPEC199”

Expected Output
True

Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected
output.

TE-2

userInput.getsecInfOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive
\\\\Research\\\\Ontology\\\\infSa
vedOnt.owl
agentName = Capec 199

False

The output
matched the
expected
output.

TE-3

userInput.getsecInfOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive
\\\\Research\\\\Ontology\\\\infSa
vedOnt.owl
agentName = Capec199

False

The output
matched the
expected
output.

TE-4

userInput.getsecInfOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive
\\\\Research\\\\Ontology\\\\infSa
vedOnt.owl
agentName = “ CAPEC199 “

True

The output
matched the
expected
output.

Comments
The owl ontology file contains “CAPEC199” as
name of Threat. The owl ontology file can be
found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/mast
er/Unit%20Testing/Inputs/OntologyManager/te
stExists/testExists0.owl
The owl ontology file contains “CAPEC199” as
name of Threat. The owl ontology file can be
found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/mast
er/Unit%20Testing/Inputs/OntologyManager/te
stExists/testExists0.owl
The owl ontology file contains “CAPEC199” as
name of Threat. The owl ontology file can be
found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/mast
er/Unit%20Testing/Inputs/OntologyManager/te
stExists/testExists0.owl
The owl ontology file contains “CAPEC199” as
name of Threat. The owl ontology file can be
found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/mast
er/Unit%20Testing/Inputs/OntologyManager/te
stExists/testExists0.owl

Discussion:
During the first pass of testing, test case TE-4 did not result in expected output. If there were any preceding and/or succeeding spaces in
the same name, they were getting treated as different names. This was fixed by trimming the string before inserting into onto logy as
well as trimming the string before comparison.
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Table B-10: Test Plan for retrieveThreatPatterns method.
Test #
RA-1

Input
None.

Expected Output
resultList.size = 0

RA-2

None.

resultList.size = 6

RA-3

None.

resultList.size = 3

RA-4

None.

resultList.size = 10

Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.

Comments
Considering, the number of individuals of Pattern entity in owl
file = 0
Considering, the number of individuals of Pattern entity in owl
file = 3 and each individual has 2 hasEntityDescription
DataProperty
Considering, the number of individuals of Pattern entity in owl
file = 3 and each individual has 1 hasEntityDescription
DataProperty
Considering, the number of individuals of Pattern entity in owl
file = 4 and each individual has 1, 2, 3, and 4
hasEntityDescription DataProperty respectively.

Table B-11: Test Plan for queryOntology method.
Test #
MR-1

Input
None.

Expected Output
resultList.size = 0

MR-2

None.

resultList.size = 6

Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.

Comments
Considering, the number of individuals of Characters entity that
are part of asset character-set in owl file = 0
Considering, the number of individuals of Characters entity that
are part of asset character-set in owl file = 3 and each individual
has 2 hasMaliciousRepresentations DataProperty
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Test #
MR-3

Input
None.

Expected Output
resultList.size = 3

MR-4

None.

resultList.size = 10

Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.

Comments
Considering, the number of individuals of Characters entity that
are part of asset character-set in owl file = 3 and each individual
has 1 hasMaliciousRepresentations DataProperty
Considering, the number of individuals of Characters entity that
are part of asset character-set in owl file = 4 and each individual
has 1, 2, 3, and 4 hasMalicious Representations DataProperty
respectively.

Table B-12: Test Plan for queryRetrieveAssetFormats method.
Test #
AF-1

Input
None.

Expected Output
resultList.size = 0

AF-2

None.

resultList.size = 1

AF-3

None.

resultList.size = 3

Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.

Comments
Considering, the number of formats defined by
hasEntityDescription of Format individual associated with asset
under consideration is zero.
Considering, the number of formats defined by
hasEntityDescription of Format individual associated with asset
under consideration is one.
Considering, the number of formats defined by
hasEntityDescription of Format individual associated with asset
under consideration is three.
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Table B-13: Test Plan for queryRetrieveAssetLocations method.
Test #
AL-1

Input
None.

Expected Output
resultList.size = 0

AL-2

None.

resultList.size = 1

AL-3

None.

resultList.size = 3

Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.

Comments
Considering, the number of allowed locations defined by
hasEntityDescription of Locations individual associated with
asset under consideration is zero.
Considering, the number of allowed locations defined by
hasEntityDescription of Locations individual associated with
asset under consideration is one.
Considering, the number of allowed locations defined by
hasEntityDescription of Locations individual associated with
asset under consideration is three.

Table B-14: Test Plan for queryRetrieveAssetIOLocations method.
Test #
IOL-1

Input
None.

Expected Output
resultList.size = 0

IOL-2

None.

resultList.size = 1

IOL-3

None.

resultList.size = 3

Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.

Comments
Considering, the number of allowed IO locations defined by
hasEntityDescription of IOLocations individual associated with
asset under consideration is zero.
Considering, the number of allowed IO locations defined by
hasEntityDescription of IOLocations individual associated with
asset under consideration is one.
Considering, the number of allowed IO locations defined by
hasEntityDescription of IOLocations individual associated with
asset under consideration is three.
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RegexGenerator Class Methods

secKToRE Package
Table B-15: Test Plan for buildRegex method.

Test #
BR-1

Input
None.

Expected Output
resultList.size = 1 and the dfa representation of the
resulting regular expression can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%2
0Testing/Expected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildReg
ex/buildRegex0.txt

Actual Output
The output matched the
expected output.

BR-2

None.

resultList.size = 1 and the dfa representation of the
resulting regular expression can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%2
0Testing/Expected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildReg
ex/buildRegex1.txt

The output matched the
expected output.

BR-3

None.

The output matched the
expected output.

BR-4

None.

resultList.size = 2 and the dfa representation of resulting
regular expression at 0th position can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%2
0Testing/Expected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildReg
ex/buildRegex0.txt
The dfa representation of resulting regular expression at
1st position can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%2
0Testing/Expected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildReg
ex/buildRegex1.txt
resultList.size = 0
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The output matched the
expected output.

Comments
Considering, only
< as symbol and
allowed charcterset to be
alphanumeric, &,
#, ;, and <
Considering, only
> as symbol and
allowed
character-set to be
alphanumeric, &,
#, ;, and >
Considering, both
< and > as
symbols and
allowed
character-set to be
alphanumeric, &,
#, ;, <, and >

Considering no
symbols

Table B-16: Test Plan for createRegex method.
Test #
CR-1

Input
&lt;

Expected Output
resRegex = seq(&, l, t, ;)

Actual Output
The output matched
the expected output.

CR-2

<

resRegex = sym(<)

The output matched
the expected output.

Comments
Builds regular expression representing string passed by
creating symbols and appending them one character at a
time in the same order in which they appear

Table B-17: Test Plan for getPatternRegex method.
Test #
PR-1

Input
builtRegex = result of test case 1.3
patterns[0] =
[[LT{0,2}]][[(?i)s]][[((?i)script)+]][[
(?i)c]][[((?i)script)*]][[(?i)r]][[((?i)s
cript){1,2}]][[(?i)i]][[((?i)script)]][[(
?i)p]][[((?i)script)*]][[(?i)t]][[((?i)sc
ript)*]][[GT{1,2}]][[LT?]][[GT+]][[
LT*]]

Expected Output
resultRegex, whose dfa
representation can be found at the
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFil
es/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Ex
pected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator
/getPatternRegex/getPatternRegex0
.txt

Actual Output
The output matched the
expected output.

Comments
Considering
the allowed
character-set
to be
alphanumeric
, &, #, ;, <,
and >

Table B-18: Test Plan for buildSymRegex method.
Test #
LT-1

Input
ltReps =
from test
case 1
patString =
[[LT*]]

Expected Output
resultRegex whose dfa representation can be found at the
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%2
0Testing/Expected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildLTR
egex/buildLTRegex0.txt
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Actual Output
The output matched the
expected output.

Comments
Considering
allowed characterset includes
alphanumeric, &,
#, ;, and <

Test #
LT-2

LT-3

LT-4

LT-5

LT-6

Input
ltReps =
from test
case 1
patString =
[[LT+]]
ltReps =
from test
case 1
patString =
[[LT?]]
ltReps =
from test
case 1
patString =
[[LT{1, 2}]]
ltReps =
from test
case 1
patString =
[[LT{0, 2}]]
ltReps =
from test
case 1
patString =
[[LT{1, 1}]]

Expected Output
resultRegex whose dfa representation can be found at the
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%2
0Testing/Expected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildLTR
egex/buildLTRegex1.txt
resultRegex whose dfa representation can be found at the
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%2
0Testing/Expected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildLTR
egex/buildLTRegex2.txt
resultRegex whose dfa representation can be found at the
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%2
0Testing/Expected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildLTR
egex/buildLTRegex3.txt
resultRegex whose dfa representation can be found at the
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%2
0Testing/Expected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildLTR
egex/buildLTRegex4.txt
resultRegex whose dfa representation can be found at the
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%2
0Testing/Expected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildLTR
egex/buildLTRegex5.txt

Actual Output
The output matched the
expected output.

Comments

The output matched the
expected output.

The output matched the
expected output.

The output matched the
expected output.

The output matched the
expected output.

Table B-19: Test Plan for buildBodyRegex method.
Test #
BB-1

Input
Expected Output
[[script] resultRegex = seq(s, c, r, i, p, t) whose resulting dfa representation can be
]
found at the link:
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Actual Output
The output
matched the

Comments
No range; Casesensitive

Test #
BB-2

BB-3

BB-4

BB-5

Input

Expected Output
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expec
ted%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildBodyRegex/buildBodyRegex0.txt
[[((?i)sc resultRegex = seq((s|S), (c|C), (r|R), (i|I), (p|P), (t|T)) whose resulting dfa
ript){1, representation can be found at the link:
1}]]
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expec
ted%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildBodyRegex/buildBodyRegex1.txt
[[script resultRegex = [seq(s, c, r, i, p, t) || [seq(s, c, r, i, p, t, s, c, r, i, p, t)] whose
{1,2}]] resulting dfa representation can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expec
ted%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildBodyRegex/buildBodyRegex2.txt
[[(script resultRegex = star(seq(s, c, r, i, p, t)) whose resulting dfa representation
)*]]
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expec
ted%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildBodyRegex/buildBodyRegex3.txt
[[(script resultRegex = plus(seq(s, c, r, i, p, t)) whose resulting dfa representation
)+]]
can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expec
ted%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildBodyRegex/buildBodyRegex4.txt

Actual Output
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.

Comments

Comments

Exact; Caseinsensitive
Fixed; Case
sensitive
Star; CaseSensitive
Plus; Case
Sensitive

Table B-20: Test Plan for buildWhitelistRegex method.
Test #
WR-1

Input
formats.get(0)
=
[[((alp)||(num))
+]]

Expected Output
resultList.size = 1 and the dfa representation of the resulting
regular expression can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testin
g/Expected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildWhitelistRegex/buil
dWhitelistRegex0.txt

Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected
output.

WR-2

formats.get(0)
= [[(num)*]]

resultList.size = 1 and the dfa representation of the resulting
regular expression can be found at the link:

The output
matched the
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Test #

Input

WR-3

formats.get(0)
=
[[((num)||(alp))
+]][[(<)+]]

WR-4

formats.get(0)
=
[[((num)||(alp))
+]][[(<)+]]
formats.get(0)
=
[[((num)||(alp)+
]][[(ALP)*]]

Expected Output
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testin
g/Expected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildWhitelistRegex/buil
dWhitelistRegex1.txt
resultList.size = 1 and the dfa representation of the resulting
regular expression can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testin
g/Expected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildWhitelistRegex/buil
dWhitelistRegex2.txt
resultList.size = 2 and the dfa representation of the resulting first
and second regular expressions can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testin
g/Expected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildWhitelistRegex/buil
dWhitelistRegex3.txt
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testin
g/Expected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/buildWhitelistRegex/buil
dWhitelistRegex4.txt

Actual Output
expected
output.

Comments

The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.

Table B-21: Test Plan for createSymb method.
Test #
CS-1

Input
patString
=<

CS-2

patString
= ws

Expected Output
resultRegex whose dfa representation can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/E
xpected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/createSymb/createSymb0.txt
resultRegex whose dfa representation can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/E
xpected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/createSymb/createSymb1.txt
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Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected output.
The output
matched the
expected output.

Comments

Table B-22: Test Plan for processOR method.
Test #
POR-1

Input
patString =
[[((alp)||(num)
){1,2}]]

Expected Output
resultRegex whose dfa representation can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testing
/Expected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/processOR/processOR0.txt

Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected output.

POR-2

patString =
[[((alp)||(num)|
|(ALP))+]]
patString =
[[((alp)||(num)
)*]]

resultRegex whose dfa representation can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testing
/Expected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/processOR/processOR1.txt
resultRegex whose dfa representation can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testing
/Expected%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/processOR/processOR2.txt

The output
matched the
expected output.
The output
matched the
expected output.

POR-3

Comments

Table B-23: Test Plan for processNoOR method.
Test #
NOR1
NOR2
NOR3
NOR4
NOR5

Input
patString =
[[(alp)+]]

Expected Output
resultRegex whose dfa representation can be found at the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/processNoOR/processNoOR0.txt
patString = resultRegex whose dfa representation can be found at the link:
[[(ALP)+]] https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/processNoOR/processNoOR1.txt
patString = resultRegex whose dfa representation can be found at the link:
[[(Alpha)+] https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
]
cted%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/processNoOR/processNoOR2.txt
patString = resultRegex whose dfa representation can be found at the link:
[[(num)+]] https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/processNoOR/processNoOR3.txt
patString = resultRegex whose dfa representation can be found at the link:
[[(>)+]]
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master/Unit%20Testing/Expe
cted%20Outputs/RegexGenerator/processNoOR/processNoOR4.txt
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Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected output.
The output
matched the
expected output.
The output
matched the
expected output.
The output
matched the
expected output.
The output
matched the
expected output.

Comments

Table B-24: Test Plan for getUserInput method.
Test #

Input

Expected Output

UI-1

capecXmlUrl =
http://capec.mitre.org/data/xml/capec_v
2.8.xml
capecXsdUrl =
http://capec.mitre.org/data/xsd/ap_sche
ma_v2.7.1.xsd
capecXmlLoc =
C:/Users/bhanu/OneDrive/Research/On
tology/Source/CAPEC/capecXml.xml
capecXsdLoc =
C:/Users/bhanu/OneDrive/Research/On
tology/Source/CAPEC/capecXsd.xsd
cweXmlUrl =
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/xml/cwec_v2.
9.xml.zip
cweXsdUrl =
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/xsd/cwe_sche
ma_v5.4.2.xsd
cweXmlLoc =
C:/Users/bhanu/OneDrive/Research/On
tology/Source/CWE/cweXml.xml
cweXsdLoc =
C:/Users/bhanu/OneDrive/Research/On
tology/Source/CWE/cweXsd.xsd
secOntLoc =
C:/Users/bhanu/OneDrive/Research/On
tology/secKOnt_TestVer6.owl

userInput.getCapecXmlUrl =
http://capec.mitre.org/data/xml/capec_v2.8.xm
l
userInput.getCapecXsdUrl =
http://capec.mitre.org/data/xsd/ap_schema_v2.
7.1.xsd
userInput.getCapecXmlLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\\
Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CAPEC\\\\capecXml.xml
userInput.getCapecXsdLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\\
Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CAPEC\\\\capecXsd.xsd
userInput.getCweXmlUrl =
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/xml/cwec_v2.9.xml.z
ip
userInput.getCweXsdUrl =
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/xsd/cwe_schema_v5.
4.2.xsd
userInput.getCweXmlLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\\
Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CWE\\\\cweXml.xml
userInput.getCweXsdLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\\
Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CWE\\\\cweXsd.xsd
userInput.getSecOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\\
Ontology\\\\secKOnt_TestVer6.owl
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Actual
Output
The
output
matched
the
expected
output.

Comments
The inputs
prompted for
include: a) URL
of CAPEC xml,
b) URL of
CAPEC xsd, c)
location for
saving CAPEC
xml, d) location
for saving
CAPEC xsd, e)
URL of CWE
xml, f) URL of
CWE xsd, g)
location for
saving CAPEC
xml, h) location
for saving CWE
xsd, and i)
location of
ontology file.

Test #

Input

Expected Output

UI-2

capecXmlUrl =
http://capec.mitre.org/data/xml/capec_v
2.8.xml
capecXsdUrl =
http://capec.mitre.org/data/xsd/ap_sche
ma_v2.7.1.xsd
cweXmlUrl =
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/xml/cwec_v2.
9.xml.zip
cweXsdUrl =
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/xsd/cwe_sche
ma_v5.4.2.xsd

UI-3

None are entered

userInput.getCapecXmlUrl =
http://capec.mitre.org/data/xml/capec_v2.8.xm
l
userInput.getCapecXsdUrl =
http://capec.mitre.org/data/xsd/ap_schema_v2.
7.1.xsd
userInput.getCapecXmlLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\\
Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CAPEC\\\\capecXml.xml
userInput.getCapecXsdLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\\
Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CAPEC\\\\capecXsd.xsd
userInput.getCweXmlUrl =
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/xml/cwec_v2.9.xml.z
ip
userInput.getCweXsdUrl =
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/xsd/cwe_schema_v5.
4.2.xsd
userInput.getCweXmlLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\\
Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CWE\\\\cweXml.xml
userInput.getCweXsdLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\\
Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CWE\\\\cweXsd.xsd
userInput.getSecOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\\
Ontology\\\\secKOnt_TestVer6.owl
userInput.getCapecXmlUrl =
http://capec.mitre.org/data/xml/capec_v2.8.xm
l
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Actual
Output
The
output
matched
the
expected
output.

Comments

The
output
matched
the

Same as above.

Same as above.

Test #

Input

Expected Output
userInput.getCapecXsdUrl =
http://capec.mitre.org/data/xsd/ap_schema_v2.
7.1.xsd
userInput.getCapecXmlLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\\
Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CAPEC\\\\capecXml.xml
userInput.getCapecXsdLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\\
Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CAPEC\\\\capecXsd.xsd
userInput.getCweXmlUrl =
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/xml/cwec_v2.9.xml.z
ip
userInput.getCweXsdUrl =
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/xsd/cwe_schema_v5.
4.2.xsd
userInput.getCweXmlLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\\
Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CWE\\\\cweXml.xml
userInput.getCweXsdLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\\
Ontology\\\\Source\\\\CWE\\\\cweXsd.xsd
userInput.getSecOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDrive\\\\Research\\\\
Ontology\\\\secKOnt_TestVer6.owl

Actual
Output
expected
output.

Comments

Table B-25: Test Plan for processUserInput method.
Test #

Input

Expected Output

PUI-1

No
Inputs.

userInput.getSecOntLoc =
C:\\\\Users\\\\bhanu\\\\OneDriv

Actual
Output
The output
matched the
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Comments
This method processes the values stored in userInput object
and puts them in proper format for further use in the system.

Test #

Input

Expected Output
e\\\\Research\\\\Ontology\\\\sec
KOnt_TestVer6.owl

PUI-2

No
Inputs.

userInput.getSecOntLoc =
SomeInvalidPathInput

Actual
Output
expected
output.

Comments

The output
matched the
expected
output.

Processing of one of the valid user input stored is considered
for unit testing. For instance, if userInput.getSecOntLoc =
C:/Users/bhanu/OneDrive/Research/Ontology/secKOnt_TestV
er6.owl
Processing of one of the invalid user input stored is considered
for unit testing. For instance, userInput.getSecOntLoc =
SomeInvalidPathInput

reToDFA Package
Alt Class Methods
Table B-26: Test Plan for mkNfa method.
Test #
ALT-1

ALT-2

ALT-3

Input
Names of type
Nfa.NameSou
rce (integer
counter for
states)
Names of type
Nfa.NameSou
rce (integer
counter for
states)
Names of type
Nfa.NameSou
rce (integer

Expected Output
The expected Nfa has the following
information:
start=4; exit=5; transitions = {0=[-p-> 1],
1=[-null-> 5], 2=[-@-> 3], 3=[-null-> 5],
4=[-null-> 0, -null-> 2], 5=[]}
The expected Nfa has the following
information:
start=8; exit=9; transitions = {0=[-p-> 1],
1=[-null-> 2], 2=[-@-> 3], 3=[-null-> 9],
4=[-k-> 5], 5=[-null-> 6], 6=[-:-> 7], 7=[null-> 9], 8=[-null-> 0, -null-> 4], 9=[]}
The expected Nfa has the following
information:
start=8; exit=9; transitions = {0=[-@-> 1],
1=[-null-> 9], 2=[-k-> 3], 3=[-null-> 7],
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Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected
output.

Comments
Both regular expressions contain only
one symbol. In this case, p and @ are
used as symbol for first and second
regular expression respectively.

The output
matched the
expected
output.

Both regular expressions contain have
more than one symbol. In this case, first
regular expression has p and @ symbols
in sequence and second regular
expression has k and : symbols in
sequence.
One regular expression contains only one
symbol and other regular expression
contains more than one symbol. In this
case, first regular expression has @

The output
matched the
expected
output.

Test #

Input
counter for
states)

Expected Output
4=[-:-> 5], 5=[-null-> 7], 6=[-null-> 2, null-> 4], 7=[-null-> 9], 8=[-null-> 0, -null> 6], 9=[]}

Actual Output

Comments
symbol and second regular expression
has k and : symbols in alternate ways
leading to accept state.

Dfa Class Methods
Table B-27: Test Plan for matchDfa method.
Test #

Input

Expected
Output
false

Actual Output

Comments

MD-1

MD-2

The Dfa used by the method can be found at the
link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/master
/Unit%20Testing/Inputs/Dfa/Dfa0.txt
Input = sSCRIPT
Input = sSCRIPT>

The output
matched the
expected output.

The pattern considered is
[[LT{0,2}]][[(?i)s]][[SCRIPT]]
[[GT{1,2}]].
The allowed character-set is
alphanumeric, &, #, ;, <, and >.

True

The output
matched the
expected output.
The output
matched the
expected output.
The output
matched the
expected output.
The output
matched the
expected output.
The output
matched the
expected output.

MD-3

Input = &lt;SSCRIPT&gt;&GT

True

MD-4

Input = <<<<<<<&#60sSCRIPT&#62&#x3E

True

MD-5

Input = sscript&gt;

False

MD-6

Input = &ltSsCrIpT&#62

False
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Table B-28: Test Plan for matchWhitelistFormat method.
Test #

Input

FM-1

The Dfa used by the method can be found at
the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/ma
ster/Unit%20Testing/Inputs/Dfa/Dfa2.txt
Input = abc12345zz
The Dfa used by the method can be found at
the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/ma
ster/Unit%20Testing/Inputs/Dfa/Dfa1.txt
Input = xpa76run>
The Dfa used by the method can be found at
the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/ma
ster/Unit%20Testing/Inputs/Dfa/Dfa1.txt
Input = < xpa76run
The Dfa used by the method can be found at
the link:
https://github.com/bgurijala/TestFiles/blob/ma
ster/Unit%20Testing/Inputs/Dfa/Dfa3.txt
Input = <<<<

FM-2

FM-3

FM-4

Expected
Output
True

Actual Output

Comments

The output
matched the
expected output.

The pattern considered is
[[((alp)||(num))+]].
The allowed character-set is
alphanumeric.

True

The output
matched the
expected output.

The pattern considered is
[[((alp)||(num))+]][[(>)+]].
The allowed character-set is
alphanumeric, and >.

False

The output
matched the
expected output.

The pattern considered is
[[((alp)||(num))+]][[(>)+]].
The allowed character-set is
alphanumeric, and >.

True

The output
matched the
expected output.

The pattern considered is
[[(<)+]].
The allowed character-set is <.

Nfa Class Methods
Table B-29: Test Plan for toDfa method.
Test #

Input

Expected Output

DFA1

N/A

The expected Dfa has the following
information:

Actual
Output
The output
matched the
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Comments
The Nfa that gets converted to Dfa is as follows:
start=0; exit=1;

Test #

Input

DFA2

N/A

DFA3

N/A

DFA4

N/A

Expected Output
start=0
accept=[1]
transitions = {0={$=1}, 1={}}
The expected Dfa has the following
information:
start=1
accept=[0, 2, 3]
transitions = {0={}, 1={$=3, :=2, k=0},
2={}, 3={}}
The expected Dfa has the following
information:
start=0
accept=[1, 2]
transitions = {0={$=3}, 1={}, 2={},
3={:=2, k=1}}
The expected Dfa has the following
information:
start=1
accept=[1, 2]
transitions = {0={:=2}, 1={k=0}, 2={k=0}}

Actual
Output
expected
output.

Comments

The output
matched the
expected
output.

The Nfa that gets converted to Dfa is as follows:
start=8; exit=9;
transitions = {0=[-$-> 1], 1=[-null-> 9], 2=[-k->
3], 3=[-null-> 7], 4=[-:-> 5], 5=[-null-> 7], 6=[null-> 2, -null-> 4], 7=[-null-> 9], 8=[-null-> 0, null-> 6], 9=[]}
The Nfa that gets converted to Dfa is as follows:
start=0; exit=7;
transitions = {0=[-$-> 1], 1=[-null-> 6], 2=[-k->
3], 3=[-null-> 7], 4=[-:-> 5], 5=[-null-> 7], 6=[null-> 2, -null-> 4], 7=[]}

The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.

transitions = {0=[-$-> 1], 1=[]}

The Nfa that gets converted to Dfa is as follows:
start=4; exit=4;
transitions = {0=[-k-> 1], 1=[-null-> 2], 2=[-:->
3], 3=[-null-> 4], 4=[-null-> 0]}

Seq Class Methods
Table B-30: Test Plan for mkNfa method.
Test #
SEQ-1

Input
Names of type
Nfa.NameSourc
e (integer
counter for
states)

Expected Output
The expected Nfa has the following
information:
start=0; exit=3; transitions = {0=[-c> 1], 1=[-null-> 2], 2=[-%-> 3],
3=[]}

Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected
output.
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Comments
Both regular expressions contain only one
symbol. In this case, c and % are used as
symbol for first and second regular
expression respectively.

Test #
SEQ-2

Input
Names of type
Nfa.NameSourc
e (integer
counter for
states)

SEQ-3

Names of type
Nfa.NameSourc
e (integer
counter for
states)

Expected Output
The expected Nfa has the following
information:
start=0; exit=7; transitions = {0=[-c> 1], 1=[-null-> 2], 2=[-%-> 3], 3=[null-> 4], 4=[-a-> 5], 5=[-null-> 6],
6=[-b-> 7], 7=[]}
The expected Nfa has the following
information:
start=0; exit=7; transitions = {0=[-c> 1], 1=[-null-> 6], 2=[-y-> 3], 3=[null-> 7], 4=[-z-> 5], 5=[-null-> 7],
6=[-null-> 2, -null-> 4], 7=[]}

Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected
output.

Comments
Both regular expressions contain have more
than one symbol. In this case, first regular
expression has c and % symbols in sequence
and second regular expression has a and b
symbols in sequence.

The output
matched the
expected
output.

One regular expression contains only one
symbol and other regular expression contains
more than one symbol. In this case, first
regular expression has c symbol and second
regular expression has y and z symbols in
alternate ways leading to accept state.

Star Class Methods
Table B-31: Test Plan for mkNfa method.
Test #

Input

Expected Output

ST-1

Names of type
Nfa.NameSource
(integer counter
for states)
Names of type
Nfa.NameSource
(integer counter
for states)
Names of type
Nfa.NameSource
(integer counter
for states)

The expected Nfa has the following information:
start=2; exit=2; transitions = {0=[-$-> 1], 1=[null-> 2], 2=[-null-> 0]}

ST-2

ST-3

The expected Nfa has the following information:
start=4; exit=4; transitions = {0=[-a-> 1], 1=[null-> 2], 2=[-<-> 3], 3=[-null-> 4], 4=[-null->
0]}
The expected Nfa has the following information:
start=6; exit=6; transitions = {0=[-x-> 1], 1=[null-> 5], 2=[-&-> 3], 3=[-null-> 5], 4=[-null->
0, -null-> 2], 5=[-null-> 6], 6=[-null-> 4]}
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Actual
Output
The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.

Comments
The regular expression contains
only one symbol. In this case, $ is
used as symbol.
The regular expression contains
more than one symbols in
sequence. In this case a, < symbols
are used in sequence.
The regular expression contains
more than one symbols in alternate
ways leading to accept state. In this
case, x and & are symbols used.

Sym Class Methods
Table B-32: Test Plan for mkNfa method.
Test #
SY-1

SY-2

Input
Names of type
Nfa.NameSource
(integer counter
for states)
Names of type
Nfa.NameSource
(integer counter
for states)

Expected Output
The expected Nfa has the following
information:
start=0; exit=1; transitions = {0=[- -> 1],
1=[]}
The expected Nfa has the following
information:
start=0; exit=1; transitions = {0=[-#-> 1],
1=[]}
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Actual Output
The output
matched the
expected
output.
The output
matched the
expected
output.

Comments
The symbol set in the object is whitespace.
The symbol set in the object is any
character (including special
symbols). In this case, # was used for
testing.

APPENDIX C
CRC CARDS FOR XSSMON TOOL
The Class-Responsibility-Collaboration (CRC) cards for the classes of XSSMon as
depicted in Fig. 4.1 can be found in Tables C-1 through C-13. Each table represents a CRC card
for a class.
Table C-1: CRC Card for MonitorIO class.
Class Name: MonitorIO
Super classes: None.
Subclasses: None.
Description: This class accepts, processes, and flags IO.
Responsibilities:
Collaborations:
- Initialize
OntologyManager (OM1)
- Customize
RegexGenerator (RE1)
- Flags IO
DFA (D3)
Comments:
Table C-2: CRC Card for UserInput class.
Class Name: UserInput
Super classes: None.
Subclasses: None.
Description: This class acts as an interface between the user and the system and is
responsible for accepting user inputs
Responsibilities:
Collaborations:
Knows Data Source Locations (UI1)
- Knows latest CAPEC xml and xsd
file URLs
- Knows latest CWE xml and xsd file
URLs
Knows Source Files Saved Location (UI2)
- Knows location to save CAPEC xml
and xsd files
- Knows location to save CWE xml
and xsd files
Knows Ontology Location (UI3)
- Knows location of security ontology
- Knows location to save inferred
ontology
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Knows DFA Saved Location (UI4)
- Knows location to save DFAs
Comments:
Table C-3: CRC Card for Alt class.
Class Name: Alt
Super classes: Regex
Subclasses: None.
Description: This class creates representation of NFA using two regular expressions that
matches when either of the regular expressions occur once.
Responsibilities:
Collaborations:
Make NFA that matches when either of the
Nfa (N2)
regular expressions occur once Contract
(R1)
R2 Contract
- Constructor accepts two regular
expressions for ORing
Comments:
Table C-4: CRC Card for Dfa class.
Class Name: Dfa
Super classes:
Subclasses:
Description: This class creates representation of DFA.
Responsibilities:
Collaborations:
- Knows location to save DFA
UserInput (UI4)
- Knows DFA Contract (start state, accept
state, and transitions)
Save DFA Contract (D1)
Match Patterns Contract (D2)
Comments:
Table C-5: CRC Card for Nfa class.
Class Name: Nfa
Super classes:
Subclasses:
Description: This class creates representation of NFA and converts NFA to DFA. This class
contains two nested classes: NameSource and Transition. NameSource class creates
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distinctly names states when constructing a NFA. Transition class represents a transition
from one state to another.
Responsibilities:
Collaborations:
- Computes composite Dfa transitions
None
- Computes epsilon closure
- Renames composite state
Convert NFA to DFA Contract (N1)
Knows NFA Contract (start state, accept
states, and transitions) (N2)
Comments:
Table C-6: CRC Card for Regex class.
Class Name: Regex (Abstract Class)
Super classes: None.
Subclasses: Alt, Seq, Star, Sym
Description: This is an abstract class that creates representation of NFA for a regular
expression.
Responsibilities:
Collaborations:
Make NFA Contract (R1)
Nfa (N2)
Comments:
Table C-7: CRC Card for Seq class.
Class Name: Seq
Super classes: Regex
Subclasses: None.
Description: This class creates representation of NFA from two regular expressions that
matches when the preceding regular expression is followed by the succeeding regular
expression.
Responsibilities:
Collaborations:
Makes NFA that matches when first regular Nfa (N2)
expression is followed by second regular
expression Contract (R1)
R2 Contract
- Constructor accepts two regular
expressions and puts them in sequence
Comments:
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Table C-8: CRC Card for Star class.
Class Name: Star
Super classes: Regex
Subclasses: None.
Description: This class creates a representation of NFA from a regular expression that
matches when the regular expression occurs 0 or more times.
Responsibilities:
Collaborations:
Makes NFA that matches when a regular
Nfa (N2)
expression occurs 0 to n times Contract (R1)
R2 Contract
- Constructor accepts one regular expression
to perform Star operation on it.
Comments:
Table C-9: CRC Card for Sym class.
Class Name: Sym
Super classes: Regex
Subclasses: None.
Description: This class creates representation of NFA for a symbol under consideration.
Responsibilities:
Collaborations:
Make NFA for a symbol Contract (R1)
Nfa (N2)
R2 Contract
- Constructor accepts a symbol as a String.
Comments:
Table C-10: CRC Card for DataReader class.
Class Name: DataReader
Super classes: None.
Subclasses: None.
Description: This class loads the latest files from data sources. Precisely, this class hosts
methods for loading CAPEC and CWE (xml and xsd) files from the data sources.
Responsibilities:
Collaborations:
- Knows URLs of attack pattern sources
UserInput (UI1, UI2)
(xml and xsd files)
- Knows URLs of weakness sources (xml
and xsd sources)
- Knows location to save attack pattern files
(xml and xsd files)
- Knows location to save weakness files
(xml and xsd files)
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Load attack pattern files Contract (xml and
xsd files) (DR1)
Load weakness files (xml and xsd files)
(DR2)
Comments:
Table C-11: CRC Card for DataParser class.
Class Name: DataParser
Super classes: None.
Subclasses: None.
Description: This class defines two other classes in its body: AttackPattern class and
Weakness class. These classes define the structure for storing all relevant attack pattern
information and weakness information retrieved from data source(s) CAPEC (Common
Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification) and CWE (Common Weakness
Enumeration) respectively. This class parses the CAPEC and CWE xml files and retrieves
useful information and stores them in defined structures for further use.
Responsibilities:
Collaborations:
- Knows location of saved attack pattern
UserInput (UI2)
files (xml and xsd files)
- Knows location of weakness files (xml and
xsd files)
- Saves attack pattern information
- Saves weakness information
Parse attack pattern file (xml) Contract
(DP1)
Parse weakness file (xml) Contract (DP2)
Comments:
Table C-12: CRC Card for OntologyManager class.
Class Name: OntologyManager
Super classes: None.
Subclasses: None.
Description: This class manages all operations on the security ontology (knowledge-base).
This class hosts methods for loading, updating, inferring, and querying the ontology.
Responsibilities:
Collaborations:
- Tests if an Agent or Entity already exists
DataReader (DR1, DR2)
in ontology
DataParser (DP1, DP2)
- Knows location of ontology
UserInput (UI3)
- Knows location to store inferred ontology
- Update attack pattern information in
ontology
- Update weakness information in ontology
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- Infer ontology
- Save inferred ontology
Initialize Contract (OM1)
- Loads Ontology
- Updates attack pattern information in
ontology
- Updates weakness information in
ontology
- Infers ontology
- Save inferred ontology
Retrieve applicable malicious
representations Contract (OM2)
Retrieve applicable attack patterns Contract
(OM3)
Comments:
Table C-13: CRC Card for RegexGenerator class.
Class Name: RegexGenerator
Super classes: None.
Subclasses: None.
Description: This class hosts methods for building customized application-specific regular
expression using the knowledge retrieved from the ontology.
Responsibilities:
Collaborations:
- Knows applicable malicious
OntologyManager (OM2, OM3)
representations
- Knows applicable attack patterns
Customize Contract (RE1)
- Formalization of application-specific
knowledge
- Builds regular expressions for
special symbols
- Builds regular expression for nonspecial symbols
- Builds regular expression by merging
regular expressions for both special and
non-special characters
- Builds customized regular expression
based on generic applicable attack patterns
Comments:
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APPENDIX D
DETAILED DESIGN AND TEST STRATEGY FOR UNIT TESTING METHODS

OF XSSMON

TOOL

The pre and post conditions for each of the methods along with the test strategy for
designing test suite is described below:
secKMgmt Package
DataParser Class Methods
1. public ArrayList<secKMgmt.AttackPattern> parseCAPEC(UserInput userInput) throws
FileNotFoundException,XMLStreamException
Method Description: This method parses the CAPEC xml file and retrieves attack pattern
information that includes: ID, title, summary, likelihood, severity, submitter info (such as source,
submitter name, organization, and date), and modification info (such as source, modifier name,
organization, date, and change summary) for each of the attacks and saves it in the structure defined
by AttackPattern class. The maximum size of the resulting ArrayList is restricted by the memory
size available.
Parameter(s): Object of type UserInput, that holds the location of CAPEC xml file
Return: Object of type ArrayList<secKMgmt.AttackPattern>, referred to as capecPattern
Throws: FileNotFoundException, XMLStreamException
Pre-Condition: there exists xml file in the specified location AND the xml file is well-formed
Post-Condition: capecPattern.size is greater than or equal to 0 AND capecPattern.size is equal to
number of attack patterns in the xml file AND ID, title, summary, likelihood, severity, submitter
name, submitter source, submitter organization, submission date, modifier name, modification
source, modifier organization, modification date, change summary fields of each of the array list
elements match exactly one attack pattern information in the xml file.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence-class” testing. The equivalence classes
are: no file presented; the xml file is ill-formed; no attack patterns are in the input file; one attack
pattern is in the input file; and more than one attack pattern is in the input file. Because there are
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523 attack patterns in the current version of CAPEC xml file, the test case included an input file
with 110 attack patterns. See Appendix B, Table B-1 for the Test Plan.

2. public ArrayList<secKMgmt.Weakness> parseCWE(UserInput

userInput)

throws

XMLStreamException, FileNotFoundException
Method Description: This method parses the CWE xml file and retrieves weakness information
that includes: ID, name, summary, likelihood, submitter info (such as submitter name, source, date,
and organization), modifier info (such as modifier name, source, organization, and date), and
related attack patterns information for each of the weaknesses and saves it in the structure defined
by Weakness class. The maximum size of the resulting ArrayList is restricted by the memory size
available.
Parameter(s): Object of type UserInput, that holds the location of CWE xml file
Return: Object of type ArrayList<secKMgmt.Weakness>, referred to as cweEnum
Throws: FileNotFoundException, XMLStreamException
Pre-Condition: there exists xml file in the specified location AND the xml file is well-formed
Post-Condition: cweEnum.size is greater than or equal to 0 AND cweEnum.size is equal to
number of weaknesses in the xml file AND ID, name, summary, likelihood, submitter name,
submitter source, submitter organization, submission date, modifier name, modification date,
modification source, modifier organization, and related patterns fields of each of the array list
elements match exactly one weakness information in the xml file.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
are: no file presented; the xml file is ill-formed; no weaknesses are present in the input file; one
weakness is in the input file; and more than one weakness is in the input file. Because there are
724 weaknesses in the current version of CWE xml file, the test case included an input file with
125 weaknesses. See Appendix B, Table B-2 for the Test Plan.
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DataReader Class Methods
1. public void loadLatestCAPEC(UserInput userInput) throws IOException
Method Description: This method reads-in all the contents of the user-specified version of
CAPEC xml and xsd files from the data source using the URLs specified by the user and stores
(saves) these files with user-specified name in the user-specified location.
Parameter(s): Object of type UserInput that holds the URLs of CAPEC files (xml and xsd), and
the location information to save them.
Return: Void – does not return anything
Throws: IOException
Pre-Condition: specified save location for xml and xsd files are reachable AND specified URLs
for xml and xsd file are reachable AND xml and xsd files are well-formed AND xml and xsd files
are buffer and stream without any exceptions
Post-Condition: the xml and xsd files are saved in the specified location with the file name
specified by the user.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) valid URLs (of xml and xsd files) and valid path for saving files (both xml and
xsd), b) one invalid URL, c) one invalid path for saving file, d) one invalid URL and one invalid
path for saving file. The mentioned equivalence classes subsume the testing for all possible
exceptions that may be thrown by the method. See Appendix B, Table B-3 for the Test Plan.

2. public void loadLatestCWE(UserInput userInput) throws IOException
Method Description: This method reads-in all the contents of the user-specified version of CWE
xml and xsd files from the data source using the URLs specified by the user and stores (saves)
these files with user-specified name in the user-specified location.
Parameter(s): Object of type UserInput, that holds the URLs of CWE files (xml and xsd) and the
location information to save them.
Return: Void – does not return anything
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Throws: IOException
Pre-Condition: specified save location for xml and xsd files are reachable AND specified URLs
for xml and xsd file are reachable AND xml and xsd files are well-formed AND xml and xsd files
are buffer and stream without any exceptions
Post-Condition: the xml and xsd files are saved in the specified location with the name coming
from the data source.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) valid URLs (of xml and xsd files) and valid path for saving files (both xml and
xsd), b) one invalid URL, c) one invalid path for saving file, d) one invalid URL and one invalid
path for saving file. The mentioned equivalence classes subsume the testing for all possible
exceptions that may be thrown by the method. See Appendix B, Table B-4 for the Test Plan.

OntologyManager Class Methods
1. public org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntology updateCAPEC(UserInput
userInput)

throws

org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntologyCreationException,

FileNotFoundException,

XMLStreamException,

org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntologyStorageException
Method Description: This method updates the OWLOntology with information parsed from
CAPEC xml file.
Parameter(s): One parameter: Object of type UserInput containing the name-space information
of the ontology and imported ontology used within it
Return: Object of type org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntology, referred to as ontology
Throws:

org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntologyCreationException,

org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntologyStorageException,
XMLStreamException, and FileNotFoundException
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Pre-Condition: there exists owl file in the specified location AND the xml file is well-formed
AND there exists location specified for saving updated ontology
Post-Condition: ontology with updated CAPEC information AND number of individuals of
Threat entity created = capecPattern.size AND total number of individuals = number of individuals
of Threat entity + capecPattern.size.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) ontology with zero threat individuals and parsed array with zero attack patterns,
b) ontology with zero threat individuals and parsed array with 1 attack pattern, c) ontology with
zero threat individuals and parsed array with 5 attack patterns, d) ontology with 1 threat individual
and parsed array with zero attack patterns, e) ontology with 1 threat individual and parsed array
with 1attack pattern not matching existing individual, f) ontology with 1 threat individual and
parsed array with 5 attack patterns with none matching existing individual, g) ontology with 1
threat individual and parsed array with 1 attack pattern matching existing individual, h) ontology
with 1 threat individual and parsed array with 5 attack patterns and one of them matching existing
individual, i) ontology with 5 threat individuals and parsed array with 5 attack patterns that match
all existing individuals, j) ontology with 5 threat individuals and parsed array with 5 attack patterns
with few matching existing individuals in ontology and few distinct, and k) the strings used to
create IRIs of ontology is incorrect (security ontology IRI and provenance IRI). The mentioned
equivalence classes subsume the testing for all possible exceptions that may be thrown by the
method. See Appendix B, Table B-5 for the Test Plan.

2. public org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntology updateCWE(UserInput
throws

userInput)

org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntologyCreationException,

FileNotFoundException,

XMLStreamException,

org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntologyStorageException
Method Description: This method updates the OWLOntology with information parsed from
CWE xml file.
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Parameter(s): One parameter: Object of type UserInput containing the name-space information
of the ontology and imported ontology used within it
Return: Object of type org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntology, referred to as ontology
Throws:

org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntologyCreationExceptio n,

org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntologyStorageException,
XMLStreamException, and FileNotFoundException
Pre-Condition: the exists owl file in the specified location AND the xml file is well-formed AND
there exists location specified for saving updated ontology
Post-Condition: ontology with updated CWE information AND number of individuals of
Weakness entity created = cweEnum.size AND total number of individuals = number of
individuals of Weakness entity + cweEnum.size.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) ontology with zero weakness individuals and parsed array with zero weakness
information, b) ontology with zero weakness individuals and parsed array with 1 weakness
information, c) ontology with zero weakness individuals and parsed array with 5 weakness
information, d) ontology with 1 weakness individual and parsed array with zero weakness
information, e) ontology with 1 weakness individual and parsed array with 1weakness information
not matching existing individual, f) ontology with 1 weakness individual and parsed array with 5
weakness information with none matching existing individual, g) ontology with 1 weakness
individual and parsed array with 1 weakness information matching existing individual, h) ontology
with 1 weakness individual and parsed array with 5 weakness information and one of them
matching existing individual, i) ontology with 5 weakness individuals and parsed array wi th 5
weakness information that match all existing individuals, j) ontology with 5 weakness individuals
and parsed array with 5 weakness information with few matching existing individuals in ontology
and few distinct, and k) the strings used to create IRIs of ontology is incorrect (security ontology
IRI and provenance IRI). The mentioned equivalence classes subsume the testing for all possible
exceptions that may be thrown by the method. See Appendix B, Table B-6 for the Test Plan.
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3. public boolean testOrgExists(UserInput

userInput,

String agentName)

throws

FileNotFoundException
Method Description: This method checks whether or not an organization with passed agentName
exists in the ontology and returns Boolean result.
Parameter(s): Two parameters: agentName of type String, and Object of type UserInput with
location information of inferred ontology
Return: Boolean true is returned if an organization exists with input agentName and false
otherwise.
Throws: FileNotFoundException
Pre-Condition: there exists owl ontology file in the specified location AND agentName != “”
Post-Condition: true if agentName already exists in ontology file loaded, false otherwise
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) lower case strings that match and do not match, b) upper case strings that match
and do not match, c) mixed case strings that match and do not match, and d) mixed case strings
with leading and/or trailing spaces that match and do not match. See Appendix B, Table B-7 for
the Test Plan.

4. public boolean testPersonExists(UserInput

userInput,

String agentName)

throws

FileNotFoundException
Method Description: This method checks whether or not a person with passed agentName exists
in the ontology and returns Boolean result.
Parameter(s): Two parameters: agentName of type String, and Object of type UserInput with
location information of inferred ontology
Return: Boolean true is returned if person exists with input agentName and false otherwise.
Throws: FileNotFoundException
Pre-Condition: there exists owl ontology file in the specified location AND agentName != “”
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Post-Condition: true if agentName already exists in ontology file loaded, false otherwise
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) lower case strings that match and do not match, b) upper case strings that match
and do not match, c) mixed case strings that match and do not match, and d) mixed case strings
with leading and/or trailing spaces that match and do not match. See Appendix B, Table B-8 for
the Test Plan.

5. public boolean testThreatExists(UserInput

userInput,

String threatName)

throws

FileNotFoundException
Method Description: This method checks whether or not a threat with passed threatName exists
in the ontology and returns Boolean result.
Parameter(s): Two parameters: threatName of type String, and Object of type UserInput with
location information of inferred ontology
Return: Boolean true is returned if threat exists with input threatName and false otherwise.
Throws: FileNotFoundException
Pre-Condition: there exists owl ontology file in the specified location AND threatName != “”
Post-Condition: true if threatName already exists in ontology file loaded, false otherwise
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) lower case strings that match and do not match, b) upper case strings that match
and do not match, c) mixed case strings that match and do not match, and d) mixed case strings
with leading and/or trailing spaces that match and do not match. See Appendix B, Table B-9 for
the Test Plan.

6. public ArrayList<String> retrieveThreatPatterns() throws FileNotFoundException
Method Description: This method retrieves all threat patterns associated with each of the threat
individuals and returns them as an ArrayList<String>.

166

Parameter(s): One parameter: Object of type UserInput with location information of inferred
ontology.
Return: Object of type ArrayList<String>, referred to as resultList
Throws: FileNotFoundException
Pre-Condition: there exists owl ontology file in the specified location
Post-Condition: resultList.size = 0 iff #individuals of Pattern entity in owl ontology file = 0
Else resultList.size > 0 AND resultList.size = Summation of hasEntityDescription
DataProperty of each of the individuals of Pattern entity.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) Pattern individuals with only one pattern, and b) Pattern individuals with multiple
patterns. See Appendix B, Table B-10 for the Test Plan.

7. public List<String> queryOntology() throws FileNotFoundException
Method Description: This method queries on ontology and produces a result set of all malicious
representations of allowed character-set of an asset.
Parameter(s): No parameters passed.
Return: Object of type List<String>, referred to as resultList
Throws: FileNotFoundException
Pre-Condition: there exists owl ontology file in the specified location
Post-Condition: If malicious representations retrieved from owl file != null then,
resultList.size > 0 AND resultList.size = Summation of hasMaliciousRepresentations data
property of all individuals of Entity Type Characters such that individuals are part of the asset
character-set. iff malicious representations retrieved from owl file != null
Else resultList.size = 0
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The test case design is
performed as follows: a) Character individual with only one malicious representation, b) character
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individual with multiple malicious representations, and c) character individuals with combination
of one and multiple malicious representations. See Appendix B, Table B-11 for the Test Plan.

8.

public ArrayList<String>

queryRetrieveAssetFormats(String

assetName)

throws

FileNotFoundException
Method Description: This method queries on ontology and produces a result set of all formats
of an asset.
Parameter(s): One parameter: assetName of type String.
Return: Object of type ArrayList<String>, referred to as resultList
Throws: FileNotFoundException
Pre-Condition: there exists owl ontology file in the specified location
Post-Condition: If asset formats retrieved from owl file != null then,
resultList.size > 0 AND resultList.size = Summation of hasEntityDescription data property of all
individuals of Entity Type Format such that individuals are related to assetName by isDefinedBy
Object Property.
Else resultList.size = 0
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The test case design is
performed as follows: a) Format individual with only one format defined, b) Format individual
with multiple formats defined, and c) Format individual with no format defined. See Appendix
B, Table B-12 for the Test Plan.

9. public

ArrayList<String>

queryRetrieveAssetLocations(String

assetName)

throws

FileNotFoundException
Method Description: This method queries on ontology and produces a result set of all allowed
and valid server locations that asset can use.
Parameter(s): One parameter: assetName of type String.
Return: Object of type ArrayList<String>, referred to as resultList
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Throws: FileNotFoundException
Pre-Condition: there exists owl ontology file in the specified location
Post-Condition: If allowed locations retrieved from owl file != null then,
resultList.size > 0 AND resultList.size = Summation of hasEntityDescription data property of all
individuals of Entity Type Locations such that individuals are related to assetName by
hasAllowedLocations Object Property.
Else resultList.size = 0
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The test case design is
performed as follows: a) Locations individual with only one allowed location defined, b)
Locations individual with multiple allowed locations defined, and c) Locations individual with
no allowed locations defined. See Appendix B, Table B-13 for the Test Plan.

10. public ArrayList<String> queryRetrieveAssetIOLocations(String assetName) throws
FileNotFoundException
Method Description: This method queries on ontology and produces a result set of all allowed
and valid locations from which an asset can load or use IO.
Parameter(s): One parameter: assetName of type String.
Return: Object of type ArrayList<String>, referred to as resultList
Throws: FileNotFoundException
Pre-Condition: there exists owl ontology file in the specified location
Post-Condition: If allowed locations retrieved from owl file != null then,
resultList.size > 0 AND resultList.size = Summation of hasEntityDescription data property of all
individuals of Entity Type IOLocations such that individuals are related to assetName by
hasAllowedIOLocations Object Property.
Else resultList.size = 0
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The test case design is
performed as follows: a) IOLocations individual with only one allowed location defined, b)
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IOLocations individual with multiple allowed locations defined, and c) IOLocations individual
with no allowed locations defined. See Appendix B, Table B-14 for the Test Plan.

11. public void getInferredOntology(org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntology secOnt,
UserInput

userInput)

throws

org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntologyCreationException,
org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntologyStorageException,
FileNotFoundException
Method Description: This method runs reasoner on the passed OWLOntology and infers from it
and saves the inferred ontology for further processing.
Parameter(s): Two parameters: secOnt of type org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntology,
and Object of type UserInput containing the location information for saving the inferred ontology
Return: Void – does not return anything
Throws:

org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntologyCreationException,

org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntologyStorageException, FileNotFoundException
Pre-Condition: there exists owl file in the specified location AND there exists a reachable location
specified for saving the inferred ontology
Post-Condition: The ontology with inferred sub-classes, property assertion, class assertion, data
property, object property, class equivalency, inverse object properties is generated and saved in
the specified location.
Test Design Strategy: N/A.
12. public org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntology loadOntology(UserInput userInput)
throws org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntologyCreationException
Method Description: This method is used to load an OWLOntology instance
Parameter(s): Object of type UserInput that has the location of the security ontology.
Return: Object of type org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntology, referred to as ont
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Throws: org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntologyCreationException
Pre-Condition: there exists owl file in the specified location
Post-Condition: returns ont that is a reference to the owl file loaded from file on specified
location.
Test Design Strategy: N/A.
13. public com.hp.hpl.jena.ontology.OntModel loadOntologyModel(UserInput

userInput)

throws FileNotFoundException
Method Description: This method returns an instance of OntModel, which is a handle to inferred
ontology.
Parameter(s): Object of type UserInput containing location information of inferred ontology.
Return: Object of type com.hp.hpl.jena.ontology.OntModel, referred to as model
Throws: FileNotFoundException
Pre-Condition: there exists owl ontology file in the specified location
Post-Condition: model is reference to owl ontology in the specified location
Test Design Strategy: N/A.
14. public com.hp.hpl.jena.query.ResultSet executeSelectQuery(com.hp.hpl.jena.ontology.O
ntModel model, String queryString)
Method Description: This method accepts an instance of OntModel and queryString as
parameters, executes the query and returns the result set.
Parameter(s): Two parameters: model of type com.hp.hpl.jena.ontology.OntModel
queryString of type String
Return: Object of type com.hp.hpl.jena.query.ResultSet, referred to as resultSet
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: none.
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and

Post-Condition: resultSet contains results of executing select query on owl ontology AND
resultSet.size = number of triples satisfying the executed select query.
Test Design Strategy: N/A.
secKToRE Package
RegexGenerator Class Methods
1. public ArrayList<Regex> buildRegex() throws FileNotFoundException
Method Description: This method builds regular expressions for all possible malicious
representations of allowed symbols (special-characters) and returns an ArrayList of regex, where
each list represents all possible malicious representations for an allowed symbol of the characterset
Parameter(s): No parameters passed
Return: Object of type ArrayList<Regex>, referred to as resultList
Throws: FileNotFoundException
Pre-Condition: there exists owl file in the specified location.
Post-Condition: If there exist special symbols with malicious representations, resultList.size > 0
AND resultList.size = number of malicious special symbols with malicious representations
(resultList contains a single regular expression for malicious representations of each of the special
symbols). Else resultList.size = 0.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) only one symbol allowed by the character-set, b) two symbols allowed by the
character-set, and c) no symbols allowed by the character-set. See Appendix B, Table B-15 for the
Test Plan.

2. public Regex createRegex(String malVal)
Method Description: This method takes a String of malicious representation as parameter and
builds a regular expression representing that string by appending one character at a time.
Parameter(s): One parameter: malVal of type String
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Return: Object of type Regex, referred to as resRegex
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: malVal != “”
Post-Condition: resRegex is the result of building a single regular expression using all characters
of the String malVal in the order in which they appear.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) input string with only one character, and b) input string with multiple characters.
See Appendix B, Table B-16 for the Test Plan.

3. public ArrayList<Regex> getPatternRegex(ArrayList<Regex> builtRegex,
ArrayList<String> patterns)
Method Description: This method accepts the customized ArrayList of regular expressions
representing special symbols and arraylist of String patterns as parameter, and returns customized
ArrayList of regular expressions based on allowed character-set
Parameter(s): Two parameters: builtRegex of type ArrayList<Regex> and patterns of type
ArrayList<String>
Return: Object of type ArrayList<Regex>, referred to as resultRegexes
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: builtRegex != null AND patterns.size > 0
Post-Condition: resultRegexes.size = patterns.size AND (resultRegexes[i] contains a customized
regular expression representing the pattern[i].
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) pattern with symbols in a range including ?, *, +, zero and non-zero, b) pattern
with case-sensitive and case-insensitive body, c) pattern with case-sensitive and case-insensitive
body with range including *, +, zero and non-zero. See Appendix B, Table B-17 for the Test Plan.

4. public Regex buildSymRegex(Regex symReps, String patString)
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Method Description: This method accepts regular expression representing a symbol (special
character such as <, >, etc.) and formalized representation of attack pattern as String and returns
customized application-specific regular expression for symbol based on attack pattern.
Parameter(s): Two parameters: symReps of type Regex and patString of type String
Return: Object of type Regex
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: symReps != null AND patString != “”
Post-Condition: resultRegex is a single resultant regular expression with all possible malicious
representations for a symbol dictated by allowed character-set AND symbol related pattern
information (like occurrence information {1,2} or * or ? or +).
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) symbol repeated zero to n times (star operation), b) symbol repeated one to n
times (plus operation), c) symbol occurring zero or one time, d) symbol repeated within the
specified range (non-zero range such as {2,4}), e) symbol repeated within specified range
(including zero such as {0,3}), and f) symbol repeated for exact number of times specified by
range (such as {2,2}). See Appendix B, Table B-18 for the Test Plan.

5. public Regex buildBodyRegex(String patString)
Method Description: This method accepts formalized pattern represented as String as parameter
and builds a regular expression based on the pattern.
Parameter(s): One parameter: patString of type String
Return: Object of type Regex, referred to as resultRegex
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: patString != “”
Post-Condition: resultRegex, a single regular expression for non-special symbols dictated by the
pattern information AND non-special symbol related pattern information (?i, or {1,2}, or *).
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Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) case-sensitive alphanumeric string without range, b) case-insensitive
alphanumeric string without range, c) case-insensitive alphanumeric string with exact range (such
as {2,2}), c) case-sensitive alphanumeric string with specified range (non-zero such as {1.3}), d)
case-sensitive alphanumeric string with specified range (including zero such as {0,2}), e) casesensitive alphanumeric string repeated zero to n times (star operation), and f) case-sensitive
alphanumeric string repeated one or more times (plus operation). See Appendix B, Table B-19 for
the Test Plan.

6. public ArrayList<Regex> buildWhitelistRegex(ArrayList<String> formats)
Method Description: This method accepts an array list of formats (represented as strings) of an
asset and constructs a regular expression representing each of the format of an asset and returns
array list of regular expressions representing all the formats representing an asset.
Parameter(s): One parameter: formats of type ArrayList<String>
Return: Object of type ArrayList<Regex>, referred to as resultRegexes
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: N/A
Post-Condition: resultRegexes.size = formats.size AND resultRegexes[i] contains regular
expression representing formats[i].
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) Single Format string containing expression with OR symbol only, b) Single
Format string containing expression without OR symbol, c) Single Format string containing
expression with and without OR symbol, and d) Multiple Format strings containing expression
with and without OR symbol. See Appendix B, Table B-20 for the Test Plan.

7. public Regex createSymb(String patString)
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Method Description: This method accepts a string as input and creates a regular expression for
the symbol represented by the passed string.
Parameter(s): One parameter: patString of type String
Return: Object of type Regex, referred to as resultRegex
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: N/A
Post-Condition: resultRegex, a single regular expression representing the special symbol passed
as parameter.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) White space as symbol, and b) Special Symbol. See Appendix B, Table B-21
for the Test Plan.
8. public Regex processOR(String patString)
Method Description: This method receives the string that contains OR symbol as input and
creates regular expression representation of the string.
Parameter(s): One parameter: patString of type String.
Return: Object of type ArrayList<Regex>, referred to as resultRegex.
Throws: NONE.
Pre-Condition: N/A.
Post-Condition: resultRegex, a single regular expression representing the string passed.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) String with only one OR symbol within specified range, b) String with multiple
OR symbols with one or more repetitions, and c) String with multiple OR symbols with zero or
more repetitions. See Appendix B, Table B-22 for the Test Plan.

9. public Regex processNoOR(String patString)
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Method Description: This method receives the string that does not contain OR symbol as input
and creates regular expression of the string.
Parameter(s): One parameter: patString of type String.
Return: Object of type ArrayList<Regex>, referred to as resultRegex.
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: N/A
Post-Condition: resultRegex, a single regular expression representing the string passed.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) String with lower-case alphabets, b) String with upper-case alphabets, c) String
with both lower-case and upper-case alphabets, d) Strings with numeric, and e) Strings with special
symbols. See Appendix B, Table B-23 for the Test Plan.
monitor Package
monitorIO Class Methods
1. public

static

void

main(String[]

args)

throws

IOException,

org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntologyCreationException,
org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntologyStorageException,
XMLStreamException, ParseException
Method Description: This method is the main method used to execute all the functionality of the
system. This method makes a call to methods necessary for executing the functionality of the
system.
Parameter(s): One parameter: args of type String array
Return: Void – does not return anything
Throws:

IOException,

org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntologyCreationException,

org.semanticweb.owlapi.model.OWLOntologyStorageException,
XMLStreamException, and ParseException
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inputManagement Package
UserInput Class Methods
1. public void getUserInput()
Method Description: This method prompts the user for input, accepts and saves the input into
appropriate variables.
Parameter(s): NONE
Return: Void – does not return anything
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: N/A
Post-Condition: The userInput object is set with the user inputs provided after processing them.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) all prompted user inputs are entered, b) Only some prompted user inputs are
entered, and c) None of the prompted user inputs are entered. See Appendix B, Table B-24 for the
Test Plan.

2. public void processUserInput()
Method Description: This method processes the accepted user input and puts it in usable format.
Parameter(s): NONE
Return: Void – does not return anything
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: The user input is prompted and accepted.
Post-Condition: The user input received is prompted and the userInput object is updated with the
processed object.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) valid inputs that require processing, and b) invalid inputs that cannot be
processed. See Appendix B, Table B-25 for the Test Plan.
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reToDFA Package
Alt Class Methods
1. public Nfa mkNfa(Nfa.NameSource names)
Method Description: This method creates NFA from two regular expressions representing two
alternate paths from start state to end state.
Parameter(s): One parameter: names of type NameSource that belongs to Nfa class, which is an
integer representing the state.
Return: returns object of type Nfa, referred to as nfa0
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: None
Post-Condition: If nfa1 has form s1s ----> s1e AND nfa2 has form s2s ----> s2e then,
nfa0 has form s0s -eps-> s1s ----> s1e -eps-> s0e
s0s -eps-> s2s ----> s2e -eps-> s0e
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) both regular expressions have only one symbol, b) both regular expressions have
more than one symbols, and c) first regular expression has one symbol and second has more than
one symbols. See Appendix B, Table B-26 for the Test Plan.

Dfa Class Methods
1. public boolean matchDfa(String input)
Method Description: This method performs pattern matching of IO strings based on DFA derived
from regular expression.
Parameter(s): One parameter: input of type String
Return: Returns a Boolean value. True if the input has a pattern defined by dfa, false otherwise.
Throws: NONE

179

Pre-Condition: dfa != null AND input != “” AND there should be at least one path from start state
to accept state in dfa
Post-Condition: true if the input takes dfa to one of its final states, false otherwise
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) matching DFA of a regular expression that has only symbol occurring at the start,
b) matching DFA of a regular expression that has only one symbol occurring at the end, c)
matching DFA of a regular expression that starts with one symbol and ends with another one, d)
matching DFA of a regular expression that has symbols at the start and end and alphanumeric in
between, and e) matching DFA of a regular expression that has combination of symbols and
alphanumeric with some range, case-sensitive and case-insensitive. See Appendix B, Table B-27
for the Test Plan.

2. public boolean matchWhitelistFormat(String input)
Method Description: This method performs pattern matching of IO strings based on DFA derived
from regular expression.
Parameter(s): One parameter: input of type String
Return: Returns a Boolean value. True if the input has a pattern defined by dfa, false otherwise.
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: dfa != null AND input != “” AND there should be at least one path from start state
to accept state in dfa
Post-Condition: true if the input takes dfa to one of its final states, false otherwise
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) matching DFA of a regular expression that has OR symbol only, b) matching
DFA of a regular expression that does not has OR symbol only, and c) matching DFA of a
regular expression that has some symbols with OR and some without OR symbol. See Appendix
B, Table B-28 for the Test Plan.
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3. public void writeDot(String filename) throws IOException
Method Description: This method writes a file with the DFA created for each of the
application-specific regular expressions for future use.
Parameter(s): One parameter: filename of type String
Return: Void – does not return anything
Throws: IOException
Pre-Condition: dfa object is not null AND dfa object has it attributes (start state, accept states,
and transitions) set.
Post-Condition: The contents of the dfa object are written to the file.
Test Design Strategy: N/A.

Nfa Class Methods
1. public void addTrans(Integer s1, String lab, Integer s2)
Method Description: This method adds a new transition from state s1 to state s2 on occurrence
of lab string.
Parameter(s): Three parameters: two Integer parameters representing state and a String parameter
that causes state transition from one state to another.
Return: Void – does not return anything
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: None.
Post-Condition: The transition from state s1 to state s2 is added on occurrence of symbol
represented by lab String.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The testing of this method
is performed as a part of testing mkNfa method of Alt, Seq, and Star classes.
2. public void addTrans(Map.Entry<Integer,List<Nfa.Transition>> tr)
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Method Description: This method adds all the transitions of a Nfa object (passed as parameter)
to the Nfa object that calls this method.
Parameter(s): One parameter: tr of type Map.Entry<Integer, List<Nfa.Transition>>
Return: Void – does not return anything
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: The transitions parameter tr passed is not null.
Post-Condition: The calling Nfa object, referred to as resNfa.transitions = resNfa.transitions
UNION tr.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The testing of this method
is performed as a part of testing mkNfa method of Alt, Seq, Star, and Sym classes.
3. public Dfa toDfa()
Method Description: This method converts NFA to DFA by constructing composite states using
compositeDfaTrans and epsilonClose methods. Then, composite states are replaced by simple
states using methods rename and mkRenamer.
Parameter(s): No parameters
Return: Object of type Dfa, referred to as resultDFA
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: The start state and transitions of the Nfa object are not null.
Post-Condition: resultDfa, which is equivalent representation of the Nfa object is created and
returned.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) Nfa representing regular expression with only one symbol, b) Nfa representing
regular expression of sequence of symbols, c) Nfa representing regular expression of alternate
symbols, and d) Nfa representing star operation on regular expression. See Appendix B, Table B29 for the Test Plan.
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4. static Map<Set<Integer>, Map<String, Set<Integer>>> compositeDfaTrans(Integer s0,
Map<Integer, List<Transition>> trans)
Method Description: Create the epsilon-closure S0 (a HashSet of Integers) of the start state s0,
and put it in a worklist. Create an empty DFA transition relation, which is a HashMap from a
composite state (an epsilon-closed HashSet of Integers) to a HashMap from a label (a non-null
String) to a composite state. Repeatedly choose a composite state S from the worklist. If it is not
already in the keyset of the DFA transition relation, compute for every non-epsilon label lab the
set T of states reachable by that label from some state s in S. Compute the epsilon-closure Tclose
of every such state T and put it on the worklist. Then add the transition S -lab-> Tclose to the
DFA transition relation, for every lab.
Parameter(s): Two parameters: s0 of type Integer and trans of type Map<Integer,
List<Transition>>
Return: Object of type Map<Set<Integer>, Map<String, Set<Integer>>>, resDfa
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: None.
Post-Condition: resDfa, is the Dfa representation of Nfa with composite states.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The testing of this method
is performed as a part of testing toDfa method.
5. static Set<Integer> epsilonClose(Set<Integer> S, Map<Integer, List<Transition>> trans)
Method Description: Repeatedly choose a state s from the worklist, and consider all epsilontransitions s -eps-> s' from s. If s' is in S already, then do nothing; otherwise add s' to S and the
worklist. When the worklist is empty, S is epsilon-closed; return S.
Parameter(s): Two parameters: States S of type Set<Integer> and trans of type Map<Integer,
List<Transition>>
Return: Object of type Set<Integer>, referred to as resSet
Throws: NONE
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Pre-Condition: None.
Post-Condition: resSet is set of all states s’ such that there is an epsilon transition from state s.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The testing of this method
is performed as part of testing of toDfa method.
6. static Map<Set<Integer>, Integer> mkRenamer(Collection<Set<Integer>> states)
Method Description: Given a Map from Set of Integer to something, create an injective Map from
Set of Integer to Integer, by choosing a fresh Integer for every value of the map.
Parameter(s): One parameter: states of type Collection<Set<Integer>>
Return: Object of type Map<Set<Integer>, Integer>, referred to as refMap
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: None.
Post-Condition: resMap has a new integer assigned for every value of set of integers.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The testing of this method
is performed as part of testing toDfa method.
7. static Map<Integer,

Map<String,

Integer>>

rename(Map<Set<Integer>,

Integer>

renamer, Map<Set<Integer>, Map<String, Set<Integer>>> trans)
Method Description: This method uses renamer to rename the composite (Set of Integer) states
with simple (Integer) states in the transitions, which is a Map from Set of Integer to Map from
String to Set of Integer. The result is a Map from Integer to Map from String to Integer.
Parameter(s): Two parameters: renamer of type Map<Set<Integer>, Integer> and trans of type
Map<Set<Integer>, Map<String, Set<Integer>>>
Return: Object of type Map<Integer, Map<String, Integer>>, referred to as renamed
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: None.
Post-Condition: renamed contains all composite states of the transitions renamed to simple
integer state.
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Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The testing of this method
is performed as a part of testing toDfa method.

8. static Set<Integer> acceptStates(Set<Set<Integer>> states, Map<Set<Integer>, Integer>
renamer, Integer exit)
Method Description: This method returns the set of accepted states for the Dfa created from Nfa.
Parameter(s): Three parameters: states of type Set<Set<Integer>>,

renamer of type

Map<Set<Integer>, Integer>, and exit of type Integer
Return: Object of type Set<Integer>, referred to as accStates
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: None.
Post-Condition: accStates = set of integers where each integer represents accept states of Dfa.
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The testing of this method
is performed as a part of testing toDfa method.

Regex Class Methods
1. public abstract Nfa mkNfa(Nfa.NameSource names)
Method Description: This is an abstract method that will be implemented by classes that extend
Regex class.
Parameter(s): One parameter: names of type NameSource of Nfa class
Return: Object of type Nfa
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: None.
Post-Condition: Returns Nfa object representing Nfa of regular expression.
Test Design Strategy: N/A.

Seq Class Methods
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1. public Nfa mkNfa(Nfa.NameSource names)
Method Description: This method creates Nfa that represents results a single path from start state
to end state that is sequence of two regular expressions
Parameter(s): One parameter: names of type NameSource of Nfa class, which is an integer
representing the state
Return: Object of type Nfa, referred to as nfa0
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: None
Post-Condition: If nfa1 has form s1s ----> s1e AND nfa2 has form s2s ----> s2e then,
nfa0 has form s1s ----> s1e -eps-> s2s ----> s2e
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) both regular expressions have only one symbol, b) both regular expressions have
more than one symbols, and c) first regular expression has one symbol and second has more than
one symbols. See Appendix B, Table B-30 for the Test Plan.
Star Class Methods
1. public Nfa mkNfa(Nfa.NameSource names)
Method Description: This method creates Nfa that represents result of performing * (star)
operation on a regular expression.
Parameter(s): One parameter: names of type NameSource of Nfa class, which is an integer
representing state.
Return: Object of type Nfa, referred to as nfa0
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: None
Post-Condition: If nfa1 has form s1s ----> s1e then,
nfa0 has form s0s ----> s0s
s0s -eps-> s1s
186

s1e -eps-> s0s
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence classes
identified are: a) regular expression with only one symbol, and b) regular expression with more
than one symbols. See Appendix B, Table B-31 for the Test Plan.
Sym Class Methods
1. public Nfa mkNfa(Nfa.NameSource names)
Method Description: This method creates Nfa for a symbol.
Parameter(s): One parameter: names of type NameSource of Nfa class, which is an integer
representing state.
Return: Object of type Nfa, referred to as nfa0
Throws: NONE
Pre-Condition: None
Post-Condition: The resulting nfa0 has form s0s -sym-> s0e
Test Design Strategy: The test strategy is “Equivalence class” testing. The equivalence
classes identified are: a) the symbol passed is white space, and b) the symbol passed is character
(any character including special symbols). See Appendix B, Table B-32 for the Test Plan.
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